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The primary aim of this thesis was to investigate aspects of self-awareness in 
individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD).  Given widely accepted assumptions 
that ǲthe selfǳis not a unitary construct, but is instead multifaceted, this thesis explored 
the extent to which impairments in self-awareness may be ǲdomain-specificǳ.  The nine 
experimental tasks reported in this thesis explored several aspects of self-awareness in 
children and adults with ASD, including awareness of the physical self, conceptual self, 
and mental self.  Overall, the results of these studies suggest that individuals with ASD 
demonstrate selective impairments in only some aspects of self-awareness.  It is 
suggested that the pattern of results reported in this thesis best support the suggestion 
that physical self-awareness is intact in individuals with ASD, whilst psychological self-
awareness is impaired.  The theoretical and practical implications of these findings for 
our current understanding of self-awareness in autism spectrum disorder, and self-
awareness in typical development, are discussed.  





AN INTRODUCTION TO SELF-AWARENESS IN AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER; 
CONCEPTS, THEORIES, AND RESEARCH 
Autism Spectrum Disorder 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a developmental disorder diagnosed on the 
basis of social-communication deficits, and fixated interests and repetitive behaviours 
(see American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  Although it is widely acknowledged that 
ASD is not a modern phenomenon, it was first formally recognised in the 1940s by Leo 
Kanner (1943) and Hans Asperger (1944).  ǯ
described a group of children who seemed unable to engage in normal social 
relationships and social integration.  These children also demonstrated consistent 
patterns of rigid and repetitive behaviour, such as a desire for sameness, and presented 
facets of ability that are still considered fundamental aspect of ASD today.  Remarkably, 
both Kanner and Asperger chose to describe these children using the term ǲautisticǳǡ a 
word that originates from the Greek word autos, and literally translates as ǲselfǳ- ism.  
While the term was first used by Eugen Bleuler to describe characteristics of some 
individuals with schizophrenia, who were very socially withdrawn, it has since been 
used to describe individuals like the children described by Kanner and Asperger.   
It is now widely acknowledged that ASD is a neurodevelopmental disorder, and 
is thus present from birth (though symptoms of this disorder may not manifest 
themselves till later on in development).  Recent epidemiology studies suggest that, 
regardless of age or intellectual ability, around 1% of the population have ASD (e.g., 
Baird et al., 2006; Brugha et al., 2011; Kadesjo, Gillberg, & Hagberg, 1999).  It is also 




widely established that more males have ASD than females, and that on average a male 
to female ratio of 4:1 appears to be the case. 
ASD is defined according to behavioural characteristics, as no specific biological 
markers for this disorder are known.  The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-V: American Psychiatric Association, 2013) now identifies two core 
areas of impairments in individuals with ASD (in DSM-IV ASD was previously 
characterised by a triad of impairments; please see Figure 1 for a comparison of DSM-IV 
and DSM-V).  Firstly, people with ASD demonstrate impairments in social 
communication and social interaction across multiple contexts.  These impairments 
manifest themselves in behaviours such as abnormal social interactions during 
conversation, poor nonverbal communication (such as atypical eye contact, facial 
expressions and body language) and difficulties developing and understanding 
relationships.  Additionally, individuals with ASD demonstrate restricted and repetitive 
patterns of behaviour and interests.  These often manifest themselves in the form of 
repetitive movements, an insistence on sameness, extremely focussed interests and 
abnormal sensory activity.  It is widely acknowledged that these impairments manifest 
on a spectrum, and the severity of social-communication deficits and fixated interests 
and repetitive behaviours varies across individuals with this disorder.  Alongside these 
impairments, some individuals with ASD (though not all) will also demonstrate 
accompanying structural language impairments and/or accompanying intellectual 
impairments.   
ASD is characterised by a unique profile of cognitive strengths and weaknesses, 
and several cognitive theories have been suggested to explain the behavioural features 
of the disorder.  Although several theories have been proposed over the years, some 
theories have taken a particularly prominent stance within the field.  The following 




section will outline three particularly prominent theories suggested to explain social 
communication impairments seen in individuals with ASD, namely the mindblindness 
theory, the executive dysfunction theory, and the weak central coherence theory. 
 
 
Figure 1: Graphical representation of the core areas of impairments in autism 
spectrum disorder, as identified in DSM-IV (A) and DSM-V (B). 
 




Cognitive accounts of ASD 
The mindblindness theory of ASD.  According to its original definition, theory 
of mind (ToM) is the ability to attribute mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and 
intentions, to self and others in order to explain and predict behaviour (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978).  Whilst the term ǲmetacognitionǳis often used to refer to the ǯǡǲmindreadingǳ is often used to refer to an ǯfer mental states in others.   
As a possible explanation for the social communication impairments found in 
ASD, it has been suggested that individuals with ASD are delayed (and deviant) in the ǡǲǳto a certain extent (e.g., 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985).  As a consequence, individuals with ASD 
demonstrate difficulties understanding other people's beliefs, attitudes, and emotions.  
Early evidence for this theory comes from findings that many children with ASD do not 
pass false belief tasks, such as the Sally-Anne task.  In the Sally-Anne task, one doll 
(Sally) places a marble in a basket and then leaves the scene.  Whilst doll Sally is away a 
second doll (Anne) comes along and takes the marble out of the basket.  Instead she 
places the marble into a box.  When doll Sally returns, children are asked where Sally 
will look for the marble.  To successfully pass the task children need to understand that 
Sally will falsely think that the marble is still in the basket, and that her belief will not 
represent the true state of affairs (that the marble is really in the box).  Whilst four-year 
old neurotypical children (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), and children with other 
developmental disorders (who have a similar verbal mental ages to the children with 
ASD) typically pass false belief tasks, children with ASD are often delayed in passing the 
Sally-Anne task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).  The vast majority of neurotypical children 




will pass false belief tasks by the age of five (and children with other developmental 
disorders will pass false belief tasks by a mental age of five).  However children with 
ASD, regardless of their intelligence, do not appear to pass false belief tasks until a 
mental age of around 10 years (Happé, 1995).  Thus, although it is possible for ǯ 
states, this ability is severely developmentally delayed, and it is possible that the 
mindreading abilities that do develop in ASD may be acquired through atypical 
strategies and compensatory learning (see below).   
Mindblindness accounts of ASD suggest that several characteristics of ASD can be 
explained by deficits in mindreading.  However, despite still demonstrating 
impairments in social communication that are characteristic of individuals with ASD, 
some individuals with ASD, particularly those with typical language abilities, do not 
show always impairments on typical false belief tasks.  This is not in keeping with the 
mindblindness theory, and needs to be explained if the mindblindness theory can viably 
explain social communication impairments in ASD.  However, it is critical to distinguish 
between undiminished performance on such tasks, and actual mindreading competence.  
Although individuals with ASD may show typical levels of performance on some tests of 
mindreading, this does not mean that they engage in the same underlying processes 
during such tasks as those employed by neurotypical individuals.  Several ASD 
researchers have argued that high-functioning individuals with ASD employ ǲǳ solutions to mindreading tasks in the absence of 
true mindreading competence (Bowler, 1992; Happé, 1995).  Evidence for this 
hypothesis comes from a variety of sources, including, but not limited to (a) atypical 
patterns of performance across different tasks/conditions (e.g., Surian & Leslie, 1999; 
Williams & Happé, 2009b), and (b) atypically high associations between ToM task 




performance and verbal ability among individuals with ASD (Fisher, Happé, & Dunn, 
2005; Lind & Bowler, 2009b).  Additionally, recent evidence suggests that intellectually 
high-ǲǳ
nonetheless fail to spontaneously mindread during other tasks (see Senju, 2012; Senju, 
Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009).  ǯ
mental states among individuals with ASD has been acquired in an atypical manner, and 
not primarily via the mindreading system.   
A particular strength of the mindblindness theory is that it can make sense of the 
social communication difficulties present in ASD.  However it does not appear to ǲ-ǳǡ
interests.  It may be that additional theories are required to explain these features of the 
disorder.   
Executive functioning accounts of ASD.  The mindblindess hypothesis is 
considered an extremely influential account of ASD.  Of course, that is not say that there 
are not competing theories of ASD, and another important account of ASD is executive 
dysfunction accounts.  Unlike mindblindness account of ASD, executive functioning 
accounts can potentially make sense of restricted and repetitive interests and 
behaviours, stereotypical of this disorder.   
Executive functioning (EF) is an umbrella term used to refer to a range of 
cognitive processes used in mental control and regulation, including planning, decision 
making, set shifting, working memory and inhibition.  Whilst, executive functions are 
not needed for routine actions and behaviours, they are crucial when engaging in novel 
actions, and shifting between separate tasks.  Executive functions are primarily 
underpinned by the frontal lobes (see Stuss & Knight, 2002), and patients with damage 
to the frontal lobes often show inflexible behaviours and cognitions, similar to those 




demonstrated by individuals with ASD.  As such, this has led to suggestions that 
impairments in EF may be responsible for several of the behavioural features seen in 
ASD.   
In keeping with executive dysfunction accounts of ASD, there is substantial 
evidence to suggest that individuals with ASD demonstrate impairments in several 
higher order aspects of executive functioning,  including planning ability (e.g., Ozonoff, 
Pennington, & Rogers, 1991; Pellicano, 2007) and cognitive flexibility (e.g., Ambery, 
Russell, Perry, Morris, & Murphy, 2006; Ozonoff et al., 1991).  However, other aspects of 
executive functioning appear to be unimpaired in ASD.  For example individuals with 
ASD do not appear to show impairments in inhibition, except when making prepotent 
responses (Hill, 2004).  Studies have also shown that individuals with ASD tend to 
demonstrate typical performance on classic measures of inhibitory control, such as 
Stroop tasks (e.g., Ambery et al., 2006) and Go/No-Go tasks (e.g., Happé, Booth, 
Charlton, & Hughes, 2006).  Clearly then, individuals with ASD do not demonstrate 
across the board impairment in executive functioning.   
One significant strength of  executive dysfunction accounts is that they offers a 
credible explanation for at least some of the clinical features of ASD, in particular 
restricted, repetitive behaviours and interests (RRBIs) typically demonstrated by 
individuals with this disorder.  Indeed, executive dysfunction has been shown to 
significantly correlate with the level of RRBIs individuals with ASD manifest (see e.g., 
Boyd, McBee, Holtzclaw, Baranek, & Bodfish, 2009; Lopez, Lincoln, Ozonoff, & Lai, 
2005).  Additionally, some have also proposed that impairments in executive 
functioning may also explain impaired performance on mindreading tasks in individuals 
with ASD (see e.g.,Ozonoff et al., 1991).  One explanation that has been suggested is that 
mindreading tasks themselves pose several executive demands, and during 




mindreading individuals are required to inhibit their own belief/knowledge about ǡǯ.  As such, impairments in executive ǡǯǡ
impaired performance on tasks of mindreading in ASD.   
However, there are problems with executive accounts of ASD (see Hill, 2004, for 
a review).  One difficulty is that whilst executive function difficulties are common in 
ASD, they are not a universal feature of the disorder.  Inconsistencies in ǯfindings 
have meant that it has been difficult to reach an overall consensus concerning which 
specific aspects of executive function are atypical in ASD or not.  Additionally, there is 
little evidence for EF impairments in preschool children with ASD (see Hill, 2004), 
which suggests EF impairment in ASD may in fact be secondary to other cognitive 
deficits.  As with mindblindness theories of ASD executive dysfunction accounts of ASD 
might best explain specific impairments found in ASD, but as yet cannot account of all 
aspects of this disorder.   
Weak central coherence accounts of ASD.  A third major cognitive theory of 
ASD suggests ǲweak central coherenceǳmight explain several of the deficits associated 
with ASD.  The term ǲweak central coherenceǳrefers to detail-focused processing that 
has been proposed to explain many of the characteristics of ASD.  Weak central 
coherence accounts of ASD suggest that a difference in both low-level and high-level 
processing means individuals with ASD fail to extract global meaning from stimuli and 
situations, using local processing styles instead.  The weak central coherence hypothesis 
of autism was originally proposed by Frith (1989, 2003).  Uta Frith nicely describes 
weak central coherence as not being able to see the wood for the trees, whereas strong 
central coherence, in its extreme, involves not being able to see the trees for the wood 
(Frith, 2003).   




Another way to think about weak central coherence is in terms of a processing 
style that disregards context.  Context gives meaning to individual parts as a whole, and 
thus processing overall context can sometimes results in cognitive strengths, other 
times in weaknesses.  As such, weak central coherence tries to explain several aspects of 
ASD, in particular the fact that individuals with ASD can demonstrate remarkable ability 
and focus in some areas (including special interests and restricted and repetitive 
behaviours), yet at the same time demonstrate cognitive impairments in other areas of 
functioning, including impairments in social communication and interactions.   
Evidence from several studies supports weak central coherence accounts of ASD.  
For example, a well-documented strength in individuals with ASD is good performance 
on block design tests.  One suggestion for why standard block design tests are thought 
to be difficult is that they require individuals to separate an overall design into several 
smaller, appropriate segments.  Thus, individuals with a strong drive towards central 
coherence should find these tasks particularly hard.  This idea is supported by studies 
that have shown that when the job of segmenting the block design into smaller 
components (which correspond to the appropriate blocks) is done for participants, 
performance in neurotypical children is drastically improved (e.g., Shah & Frith, 1993).   
The idea that individuals with ASD demonstrate good performance on block 
design tasks (because they demonstrate weak central coherence) was also tested in this 
study.  Individuals with ASD performed significantly better than controls on the block 
design task when the designs were unsegmented, but both groups performed well when 
the designs were segmented (please see Figure 2).  This suggests that individuals with 
ASD required less effort to segment the block designs in the standard, unsegmented 
condition, relative to the comparison participants.  Additionally, studies have shown 
that individuals with ASD score above their mental age on tasks in which they are asked 




to find hidden figures embedded in pictures (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Witkin, 
Oltman, Raskin, & Karp, 1971).   
 
Figure 2: Example of an unsegmented block design (left) and segmented block 
design (right), similar to the designs used in Shah and Frith (1993). 
 
Additionally, evidence for weak central coherence in ASD has been found in 
several different aspects of processing, not just visual processing but also auditory 
processing and verbal semantic processing.  For example, studies have shown that 
individuals with ASD benefit less from the context of meaning in sentences compare to 
neurotypical individuals (Happé, 1994).  This has led researchers some researchers to 
suggest that central coherence can be considered a cognitive style that varies within the 
population (between weak and strong ends of the spectrum) and that individuals with 
ASD tend to demonstrate cognitive styles at the weak extreme of this spectrum  (e.g., 
Happé, 1999). 
Fractionation of ASD characteristics 
Of course, this section has only touched on a few of the more prominent 
conceptual models that attempt to explain strengths and weaknesses in ASD, and is by 




no means a comprehensive account of the cognitive theories proposed to explain this 
disorder.  Indeed, it is debatable whether one theory alone can adequately explain all 
aspects of ASD (see e.g., Happé, Ronald, & Plomin, 2006).  As things stand, none of the 
existing cognitive theories (including those described above) can satisfactorily explain 
the full range of behaviours seen in individuals with ASD.  As such, research has now 
begun to question whether one theory can explain ASD, and there is a growing trend 
towards multiple explanations for ASD and suggestions that different aspects of 
impairments in ASD as separable.  For example it has been suggests that whilst 
mindblindness accounts of ASD may account for social communication impairments in 
ASD, executive dysfunction theories may explain RRBIs (Happé & Ronald, 2008).  
Nevertheless, it is important to understand these theories of ASD before moving on to 
discuss self-awareness in ASD, and before considering what aspects of ASD might 
explain impairments in some aspects of self-awareness in this disorder.   
Theories of self-awareness 
Several theories of ASD predict that individuals with this disorder should 
demonstrate impairments in understanding the self.  However, before reviewing self-
awareness in ASD it is worth discussing theories concerning the typically development 
of self-awareness.   
Within the fields of psychology, philosophy, and cognitive neuroscience the 
concept of ǲthe selfǳhas been widely discussed.  The term is often used to refer to 
multiple different phenomena and thus a single definition of ǲthe selfǳis often difficult 
to define.  In early conceptualisations James (1890) proposed that the self could not be 
considered a single entity; instead the self consists of multiple different dimensions 
including the physical self, mental self, spiritual self, and the ego.  Crucially, James 




distinguishes between different levels of self/self-awareness; the self as the ǲIǳand the 
self as the ǲMeǳ.  As the ǲIǳǡ the self is the subject of experience, and is not reflexive in 
nature.  In contrast, the self as the ǲMeǳis the object of experience, and the ǲMeǳmakes 
sense of the ǲIǳacting in the present moment.  According to James, only when the self 
becomes the object of ǯ experiences (the ǲmeǳȌ do individuals become explicitly 
self-aware (as opposed to merely implicitly experiencing the self).  ǯ
conceptualisations of the self-have influenced later theories that also distinguish 
between multiple aspects of the self (e.g., the aspects of self-awareness proposed by 
Neisser, 1988; please see below for more details).  More recently, Rochat (2003) has 
also suggested that throughǯ-awareness 
unfold, developing from self-obliviousness to fully developed self-consciousness (or ǲǳ-awareness). 
A framework for understanding self-knowledge in ASD 
One influential conceptualisation of the self is that outlined by Neisser (1988).  
Neisser suggested that people have access to five different kinds of information about 
themselves, each type of which specifies Ǣǯǡ
these are ecological, interpersonal, private, extended, and conceptual aspects of the self.  
Neisser considered these aspects of the self so distinct that he referred to them as ǲselves: they differ in their origins and developmental history, in what we know 
about them, in the pathologies to which they are subject, and in the manner in which 
they contribute to human social experienceǳ (Neisser, 1988, p386). 
The ecological self is the experience of the self in its physical form, and in 
relation to its physical environment.  The ǲIǳin the ecological self is the person present 
in a physical place, or engaged in a physical activity.  The interpersonal self is the self as 




experienced in social and emotional relationship with others.  The extended self can be 
considered the self that reflects on personal, episodic memories and also the self that is 
engaged when anticipating about  ones future self.  The private self encompasses the ǡǯ
own personal thoughts and experiences are different to other peopleǯ.  Finally, the ȋǯ-concept) consists of 
the theories and assumptions that an individual believes about themself.  This can 
encompass awareness of social dimensions of the self (e.g., I am a mother) as well as 
other aspects of oneself that an individual considers significant (e.g., I am intelligent, I 
am attractive).   
What underlies all the theories of the self that have been discussed, including ǯȋǤǤǡ ? ? ? ?Ȍ-knowledge, is that there are different 
aspects of the self, which can be experienced (pre-reflectively) and known (reflectively) 
at any one time.  Similarly it is clear that there are multiple types of self-awareness.  
This implies that aspects of self-awareness can be selectively impaired (see Zahavi, 
2010).  ǯ-knowledge clearly 
defines five distinct aspects of self-awareness, and draws distinctions between certain 
aspects of the self that might in fact be distinct in ASD.  ǡǯ
self is used in the following section, to structure a review of the literature on self-
awareness in ASD.   
Self-Awareness in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
Now that a theoretical framework for considering the nature of self-awareness 
has been outlined, it is possible to consider how this might be applied to the case of ASD.  
The following section will review the literature surrounding what is known about self-




awareness in ASD to date.  It is important to note that the research reported in this 
thesis does not systematically explore all aspects of the self, and self-awareness, in ASD.  
Thus the following review does focuses on some aspects of self-awareness in ASD more 
than other, in particularly focussing on the current literature surrounding private and 
ecological self-awareness, given the strong relevance this literature has to the empirical 
studies reported in this thesis.   
Ecological self-awareness.  First we can begin by looking at the evidence 
surrounding whether ecological self-awareness is impaired in ASD.  Neisser defines the ǲǣ
the person here in thǡǳȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ p.386).  
Awareness of the ecological self allows an individual to perceive their location in space, ǯ.   
Action monitoring.  One important aspect of ecological self-awareness is the ǯ.  Russell and Hill (2001, p.317) define action ǡǲǡ-observation, 
(a) for which changes in perceptual input they are responsible and (b) what they are ǳ.  As such, action monitoring allows an individual to 
distinguish those changes in perceptual experience that are self-caused from those that 
are externally-caused.  Thus, action monitoring gives rise to the experience of agency.   
Action monitoring ability is often assessed through tasks that examine an ǯs ability to monitor and correct their own errors.  Typically, individuals are 
able to correct errors so rapidly that they cannot simply be relying on visual feedback 
alone.  Instead correcting errors at this speed is thought to depend on monitoring so 
called ǲefference copiesǳof motor plans.  This enables errors to be corrected before a 
motor command for the particular action is even completed.  Error correction problems 




are normally interpreted as reflecting diminished action monitoring ability, and are 
found frequently in studies of schizophrenia (see Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000).  
Thus, it is striking that one early study observed slowed error correction among 
individuals with ASD (e.g., Russell & Jarrold, 1998).  This may suggest diminished action 
monitoring/ecological self-awareness in ASD.   
However, according to Russell (Russell & Jarrold, 1999), tasks which require 
individuals to discriminate online between their own actions and actions initiated by 
something/someone else provide a more direct measure of action monitoring ability.  ǡǲǳǡ
monitoring ability in individuals with ASD (Russell & Hill, 2001; Williams & Happé, 
2009a).  During the Squares task participants are required to judge which of several 
different coloured moving squares on a computer screen is the square that is directly ȋǢǢǯ
hand is covered meaning that success on this task requires monitoring of efference 
copies).  In contrast the other squares on the screen are ǲdistractorǳsquares, and the 
movements of these squares are controlled by the program, and not by the movements 
of the mouse.  In order to judge correctly which square is under their own control, 
participants need to monitor their own efference copies of the movements they are 
generating, and compare them to their visual scene (the movements of the squares on 
the computer screen).  Using this task Russell & Hill (2001) found that individuals with 
ASD were as good as neurotypical individuals at determining which of the squares was 
under their own control.  This suggests that action monitoring may be unimpaired in 
ASD.   
That being said, one problem with drawing decisive conclusions from this study 
is that all but five of the participants with ASD appeared to show either strong floor or 




ceiling effects on the task (see Williams & Happé, 2009a).  Following Russell and Hill 
(2001), Williams and Happé (2009a) employed a version of the squares task.  This 
version was more incremental in terms of difficulty compared to that employed by 
Russell and Jarrold, and was designed to avoid the floor/ceiling effects that affected 
performance of participants in this study.  Additionally, as well as employing a typical ǲselfǳversion of the task (as described above) this study also included a second ǲother-
personǳcondition.  In this condition participants placed their hands on the computer 
mouse, but the movements of the mouse were controlled by the experimenter.  Thus, in 
this condition, participants experienced no motor intentions for the movements of the 
mouse in the other condition, and so could not rely on feelings of agency to determine 
which of the stimuli is being controlled by the mouse.  For an individual with an 
unimpaired sense of their own agency, this condition should be significantly more 
challenging than the self-condition.  In contrast, if individuals are unable to accurately 
monitor their own actions then it should not matter who controls the mouse (because in 
both cases participants cannot rely on an experience of agency to perform the task, and 
instead can only rely on their ability to match felt actions with the observed 
consequences of these actions).  Williams and Happé (2009a) did not observe any 
significant between-group difference in either the level or pattern of performance 
shown by individuals with and without ASD on the task.  These results again suggest 
that ecological self-awareness is relatively spared in individuals with ASD.   
Findings that suggest individuals with ASD appear to demonstrate typical online 
action monitoring ability, are in keeping with other studies in the broader action 
monitoring literature in ASD (e.g., Blakemore et al., 2006; David et al., 2006).  These 
results are also in keeping with those from an early study by Frith and Hermelin (Frith 
& Hermelin, 1969) which also suggested children with ASD appeared to be better at 




monitoring their own efference copy, relative to comparison participants.  In this study 
participants were required to move a stylus along a track that had been cut into a piece 
of Perspex.  Participants were then asked to complete the task again, this time without 
the aid of visual cues.  Frith and Hermelin (1969) found that participants with ASD 
completed the task significantly fast than comparison participants, and concluded that 
these findings were consistent with enhanced, rather that impaired, action monitoring.   
The enactment effect.  Another source of evidence concerning whether 
individuals with ASD show impairments in ecological self-awareness comes from 
studies that have assessed relative memory for self-performed actions versus memory 
for observed actions.  It is well established that neurotypical individuals show reliably 
superior memory for actions that they themselves have performed than actions that 
they have observed other people perform (e.g., Baker-Ward, Hess, & Flannagan, 1990; 
Engelkamp, 1998).  Superior memory for self-performed actions over other-performed 
actions is referred to aǲǳ
motoric components involved in performing an action leading to those actions being 
more deeply encoded than observed actions (e.g., Engelkamp & Zimmer, 1989). 
Several studies have explored the enactment effect in individuals with ASD and 
reported finding typical enactment effects in individuals with this disorder (e.g., Hare, 
Mellor, & Azmi, 2007; Lind & Bowler, 2009c; Maras, Memon, Lambrechts, & Bowler, 
2012; Summers & Craik, 1994; Williams & Happé, 2009a).  This lends support to the 
view that action monitoring (and ecological self-awareness, more generally) is 
undiminished in ASD.  However, whilst several studies report typical enactment effects 
in ASD, several studies have also reported reduced or absent enactment effects in ASD 
(Farrant, Blades, & Boucher, 1998; Hala, Rasmussen, & Henderson, 2005; Millward, 
Powell, Messer, & Jordan, 2000; Russell & Jarrold, 1999; Wojcik, Allen, Brown, & 




Souchay, 2011; Zalla et al., 2010).  That being said, it is difficult to draw conclusions 
from the studies by Farrant et al., (1998), Hala et al., (2005), Millward et al., (2000) and 
Wojcik et al., (2011) due to methodological problems that are arguably inherent in the 
design of each study (for more details please see chapter six, which discusses 
methodological concerns with these studies in considerable detail).  Out of all these 
studies only Russell and Jarrold (1999), and Zalla et al.,  (2010) appear to report 
reduced or absent enactment effects in individuals with ASD, using sound experimental 
designs. Interestingly, Williams & Happé (2009a) could not replicate the results of 
Russell and Jarrold (1999).  As such it appears that (withholding the results of Zalla et 
al., 2010), the results from studies of the enactment effect are in keeping with those 
from studies of action monitoring, and suggest that ecological self-awareness is intact in 
individuals with ASD.  Overall, the majority of studies of the enactment effect and action 
monitoring in ASD thus suggest that ecological self-awareness is intact in this disorder. 
Interpersonal self-awareness.  The interpersonal self is conceptualized as the 
self as engaged in social interactions with other individuals.  These interactions are 
similar to what Trevarthen terms ǲprimary intersubjectivityǳ.  ASD can be considered a 
prototypical disorder of interpersonal self-awareness.  Neisser himself even suggested 
that failures in the development of the interpersonal self are associated with ASD:  
The successful achievement of intersubjectivity depends not only on the 
operation of the perceptual and motor systems but on some additional, 
specifically human mechanism that permits us to relate to members of our own 
species.  The mechanism can fail, and it has often been suggested that the 
dramatic condition called infantile autism, characterised from the outset by a 
total lack of interest in relationships with people, results from just such a failure.  
(1988, p.394) 




It is clear that interpersonal self-awareness is impaired in ASD, and such impairments 
are a fundamental aspect of this disorder. However, recently, support for this suggestion 
has come from research exploring mirror neuron activity in ASD.  
Mirror neurons.  The discovery of mirror neurons may provide a neural basis 
for the interpersonal self.  Mirror neurons are neurons in the brain that are activated by 
performing and observing an action being performed (e.g., Dipellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, 
Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996).  A fundamental 
characteristic of such neurons is that they have been shown to fire both when an 
individual (or primate) performs an action, and when they observe someone else 
performing a similar action.  Whilst mirror neurons are primarily thought to be 
involved in understanding and interpreting actions, mirror neurons have also been 
implicated in several other social-communication processes, including imitation (e.g., 
Iacoboni et al., 1999), mindreading (Gallese & Goldman, 1998), and empathy (Iacoboni, 
2005).  From this perspective, several features of ASD, including impairments in social 
communication and the capacity to understand others, match functions thought to be 
mediated by the mirror neurons.  Thus, evidence for damaged mirror neuron systems in 
ASD would provide evidence of the neuro basis of impairments in the interpersonal self 
in ASD.   
It has been proposed that the social-cognitive difficulties seen in ASD may be the 
results of atypical activation in the mirror neuron system, an idea that is often termed 
the ǲbroken mirrorǳhypothesis (Ramachandran & Oberman, 2006).  Evidence to 
support the idea that the mirror neuron system is ǲbrokenǳin ASD comes from 
electroencephalography (EEG), transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies that have shown atypical activation in the 
mirror system in ASD (Dapretto et al., 2006; Nishitani, Avikainen, & Hari, 2004; 




Oberman et al., 2005; Théoret et al., 2005).  For example, employing an fMRI study 
Dapretto and colleagues (Dapretto et al., 2006) found that whilst imitating and 
observing emotional expressions, children with ASD demonstrated no mirror neuron 
activity in the inferior frontal gyrus (a key part of the mirror system).  In contrast, 
neurotypical children demonstrated typical mirror activation in this area whilst 
imitating facial expressions (Dapretto et al., 2006).  Interestingly, Dapretto et al., (2006) ǯ
functioning in the social domain.  These results suggest that children with ASD appear 
to process actions performed by others differently from neurotypical children, and 
support suggestions that differences in mirror neuron activity in ASD may explain 
several of the social-communication impairments seen in this disorder.   
However, not all studies exploring mirror neuron activity in ASD have found 
evidence of atypical activation in ASD (see e.g., Avikainen, Kulomäki, & Hari, 1999; 
Dinstein et al., 2010).  Additionally, if ASD is characterised by atypical activation in the 
mirror neuron areas, studies should find evidence of behavioural impairments in 
imitation ability in ASD, alongside atypical mirror neuron activity.  However, there is 
considerable variability in imitation ability in individuals with ASD (with studies not 
always finding impairments in imitation ability.  It has even been noted  (see Southgate 
& Hamilton, 2008) that several of the studies that report atypical mirror neuron activity 
in individuals with ASD fail to find behavioural differences in imitation ability in their 
ASD groups, relative to neurotypical participants  (e.g., Dapretto et al., 2006; Nishitani et 
al., 2004; Williams et al., 2006).  This itself suggests that atypical activations in mirror 
neuron brain areas do not in fact appear to relate to an iǯ.  
Such findings have led some researchers to doubt the broken mirror hypothesis (e.g., 
Southgate & Hamilton, 2008), or suggest that perhaps only some aspects of mirror 




neuron activity are impaired in ASD (see Boria et al., 2009; Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro, 
2010).  Whilst it appears unlikely that mirror neuron theories alone can explain 
cognitive impairments in ASD, studies exploring mirror neuron activity do provide at 
least some neurological support for the idea that interpersonal self-awareness is 
impaired in ASD. 
Conceptual self-awareness.  A third aspect of self-awareness defined by 
Neisser is that of conceptual self-awareness.  The conceptual self can be considered the 
self as defined in terms of the theories and assumption an individual holds about 
themselves.  ǡǯ-
concept, or what one brings to mind when thinking about themselves.  There is some 
indication that individuals with ASD conceptualise themselves differently to individuals 
without ASD.  Studies have shown that individuals with ASD tend to define themselves 
less in terms of social self-concepts (Lee & Hobson, 1998; Tanweer, Rathbone, & 
Souchay, 2010) and mental terms (Kristen, Rossmann, & Sodian, 2014) relative to 
neurotypical individuals, defining themselves more in terms of abstract concepts 
(Tanweer et al., 2010) and physical terms (Lee & Hobson, 1998).  This suggests that at 
least some aspects of conceptual self-awareness are atypical in ASD.   
As well as examining conceptual self-awareness in ASD by explicitly asking 
individuals to define themselves in terms of self-concepts, evidence of conceptual self-
awareness in ASD can also be taken from studies of pronoun use, self-reference effects, 
and self-recognition.  The presence of such behaviours is typically taken as behavioural 
indications of conceptual self-awareness.  The following section reviews studies that 
explore pronoun use, self-referencing and self-recognition in ASD.   
Pronoun use.  Early manifestations of conceptual self-awareness can be seen in 
the language neurotypical children begin to use at around two years of age, when 




children start to use and understand personal pronouns.  The use of personal pronouns 
(such as ǲIǳǡǲMeǳ and ǲYouǳ etc.) is a relatively unambiguous expressions of self-
awareness.  By using words such as ǲIǳor ǲYouǳan individual demonstrates an explicit 
understanding/awareness of the distinction between self and other.   ǯǡ
ASD demonstrated abnormal personal pronoun use (Kanner, 1943).  Kanner observed ǲǡ change to suit the ǳ (Kanner, 1943, p.244).  Bosch (1970) also provided early clinical 
illustrations of unusual pronoun use in individuals with ASD, including example of 
pronoun reversal mistake, but also examples of children with ASD referring to ǲȀǳ.  These observations suggest that 
individuals with ASD use pronouns incorrectly in utterances that cannot be sufficiently 
explained by echolalia (for example using third person pronouns like ǲheǳto refer to 
oneself).  Instead, Bosch suggested that mistakes in pronoun use arise from diminished 
self/other distinctions in individuals with ASD.  ǯǯ
observations have been supported by a number of empirical studies that suggest 
personal pronoun use is atypical in ASD (Hobson, Lee, & Hobson, 2010; Jordan, 1989; 
Lee, Hobson, & Chiat, 1994; Lind & Bowler, 2009a; Loveland & Landry, 1986).  For 
example, Jordon (1989) reported that, compared to matched comparison children, 
children with ASD demonstrated atypical pronoun use when an experimenter asked 
them questions about what had happened during a game.  In general children with ASD 
tended to refer to themselves or the experimenter using proper names, or pronouns in 
the incorrect case (e.g., saying ǲIǳinstead of ǲmeǳȌ.  This pattern of results implied 
children with ASD were not simply echoing pronouns, but made atypical pronoun 
utterances because of diminished self- and other referencing.  Alongside other studies 




(Hobson et al., 2010; Lee et al., 1994; Lind & Bowler, 2009a; Loveland & Landry, 1986) 
such findings support the suggestion that conceptual self-awareness is diminished in 
ASD.   
The self-reference effect.  Evidence concerning conceptual self-awareness in 
ASD also comes from studies exploring self-referencing.  It has been suggested that the ǡǯ
base is organised in relation to the self (see Conway, 2005).  ǯ-memory 
system (SMS: Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) emphasises the interconnectedness 
between memory and the self, and this framework proposes that the integration of the 
self within memory is essential for typical memory functioning.  Typically, individuals 
show superior memory for information that is considered self-relevant, or that has been 
encoded in relation to the self (see Symons & Johnson, 1997).  For example, when 
presented with descriptive words, individuals typically remember words they have 
considered in relation to themselves (e.g., ǲre you quietǫǳ), than words they have 
considered in relation to others (e.g., ǲs your mother quiet?ǳ).  ǲ-ǳ
effect is thought to occur because encoding information in relation to the self facilitates 
deeper encoding of this information within memory, in turn making this information 
more likely to be retrieved.  This effect can be thought of as a depth-of-processing effect 
(Craik & Tulving, 1975).  Craik and Tulving proposed that the deeper or more 
elaborately information is processed during encoding, the more likely such information 
is to be retrieved from memory.  For example, you are more likely to retrieve 
information you have processed semantically than information you have processes 
phonologically.  By extension, information you have processed in relation to the self is 
thought to be encoded deeply, and thus is more likely to be retrieved relative to 
information not processed in relation to the self.  As such, if the concept of the self is 




diminished among individuals with ASD, then individuals with ASD should show 
diminished self-reference effects, relative to neurotypical individuals.   
Several studies have examined the self-reference effect in individuals with ASD 
(Henderson et al., 2009; Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2007; Toichi 
et al., 2002).  For example, Lombardo and colleagues investigated whether adults with 
ASD demonstrated typical self-reference effects, compared to a group of matched 
neurotypical adults (Lombardo et al., 2007).  In this study individuals were presented 
with psychological trait adjective and asked to rate on a scale of 1-6 the extent to which 
the word described a) themselves, b) a close friend, or c) Harry Potter.  Another 
condition also asked participants to assess the number of syllables in the word.  After a 
delay, participants were then given a surprise recognition test, in which they were 
presented with the words from the previous part of the tasks alongside new lure words, 
and asked to judge on a scale of 1-6 how confident they were that a word was ǲoldǳ (had 
been presented in the previous part of the task).  Judgments on a scale of 1-3 were 
considered ǲnewǳ judgements and judgements on a scale of 4-6 were considered ǲoldǳ 
judgements.  In this study ݀ᇱwas then used to analyse recognition performance on the 
task.  Both groups showed depth of processing and self-reference effects (Syllable < 
Harry Potter < Close Friend < Self).  However the magnitude of the self-reference effect 
demonstrated in each group was different.  When difference scores were calculated 
between recognition for words processed self-referentially than words processed in 
relation to Harry Potter, analysis indicated that the self-reference effect shown in the 
ASD group (ǯd = 0.92) was diminished relative to the effect shown in the 
neurotypical group (ǯd = 1.32).  The results of this study are in keeping with the 
results of an earlier study conducted by Toichi and colleagues (Toichi et al., 2002).   




Using a similar design Henderson et al., (2009) extended these findings, and 
demonstrated that children with ASD also fail to show typical self-reference effects.  In 
this study children were asked to process psychological trait adjectives in three 
conditions.  Participants were asked to judge a) whether the word described themselves 
(Self condition), b) whether the word describe Harry Potter (Other condition) or c) 
whether the word was longer than seven letters long (Featural condition).  Recognition 
memory for the words in all three conditions was then tested and assessed using݀ᇱ.  
Children in both the neurotypical and ASD groups showed depth of processing effects 
(Featural< Other/Self condition).  However, only the neurotypical group showed a self-
reference effect (Other<Self).  Individuals in the ASD group did not differ in their 
memory for words in the self-condition relative to the other condition.  As such, both 
Lombardo et al., (2007) and Henderson et al., (2009) indicate that both children and 
adults with ASD do not show typical self-referential processing.  However, whilst 
Lombardo et al., (2007) found that adults with ASD did demonstrate a diminished self-
reference effect, and were thus capable of self-referential encoding to some degree, 
Henderson et al., (2009) implies that children with ASD show no evidence at all of 
processing information in relation to the self. 
Furthermore, results from Lombardo et al., (2007) indicated that impairments in 
recognition memory on the task were not restricted purely to the self-condition.  
Individuals with ASD also recognised significantly fewer words from the Close friend 
condition relative to the neurotypical group.  This suggests that individuals with ASD 
failed to encode and structure information within memory in relation to the self and in 
relation to others.  One interpretation of these finding is that individuals with ASD hold 
diminished concepts of both self and other.  Arguably, social-communicative ǯboth a typical concept 




of the self, and also typical knowledge about others.  In contrast, individuals with ASD 
did not show a diminished ability to encode information in relation to Harry Potter, 
reflecting the fact that they showed typical, psychological concept of the character.  
However, acquiring knowledge of Harry Potter does not depend on any social-
communicative experiences and instead depends on reading (or watching a film).  As 
such, this may explain why individuals with ASD did not show diminished recognition 
performance in the Harry Potter condition, but did show diminished recognition of 
words in the Self condition and Close friend condition.   
Mirror self-recognition.  Mirror self-recognition tasks (e.g., Amsterdam, 1972; 
Gallup, 1970) are commonly used to measure higher-order self-awareness.  In a ǲclassicǳ mirror recognition task (such as the ǲrouge testǳ), during the beginning of the 
task, ǯȀ.  
After this has been done, participants are then shown their own reflection in the mirror.  
If an individual proceeds to touch the mark on their face, this is taken as evidence that 
they possess an objective awareness of their own body (a physical self-concept).  
Although it is debated exactly what mirror self-recognition tasks measure (e.g., Hobson, 
1990), it is almost universally agreed that touching ones nose during the task can be 
taken as evidence that an individual has at least a basic physical self-concept  (i.e., a 
mental representation of what they physically look like).  Mirror self-recognition has 
been used to asses conceptual self-awareness in both infants and animals (e.g., Gallup, 
1970), and neurotypical children tend to pass mirror recognition tasks around the age 
of 18 months (e.g., Courage, Edison, & Howe, 2004).   
To date, four studies have assessed mirror self-recognition in children with ASD 
(Dawson & McKissick, 1984; Ferrari & Matthews, 1983; Neuman & Hill, 1978; Spiker & 
Ricks, 1984).  These studies have fairly consistently found that a large proportion of the 




children with ASD tested successfully recognise their own image in the mirror (Williams 
(2010) reports that across these four studies, an average of 74% of the children with 
ASD successfully recognised their own reflection).  This suggests that mirror self-
recognition is largely unimpaired in ASD, and suggests that at least physical self-
concepts appear intact in children with ASD.  However, one major problem with these 
studies is that none include a comparison group of neurotypical participants that are 
closely matched for age and mental age to the ASD group.  This makes it difficult to 
claim decisively that mirror self-recognition is entirely typical in ASD.  That being said, 	ǯȋ1983) and Dawson and ǯ s study (1984)  the children with ASD who failed the task were also children 
who demonstrated signs of developmental delay (see Williams 2010).  	ǯ
(1983) the children who failed the task had an average mental age within the 
developmental time period neurotypical children also fail mirror self-recognition tasks.  
Additionally, the two children who failed to recognise their reflection in Dawson and ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌȀ
permanence.  As such, this does suggest that the children with ASD who failed the 
mirror task in these studies did so not because of deficits specific to ASD, but because of 
their delays in their developmental level.  This highlights the importance of assessing 
performance in children with ASD relative to children matched for mental ages, as well 
as chronological age.   
 As things stand, mirror self-recognition appears to be a relative strength in ASD 
(even among low functioning individuals).  This stands in contrast to the evidence 
discussed concerning both pronoun use and self-referencing, which suggests that 
conceptual self-awareness is impaired in ASD.  However, one important distinction 
between the conceptual self-awareness demonstrated by mirror recognition, compared 




to the conceptual self-awareness demonstrated by typical pronoun use and self-
referencing is that mirror recognition relies on having intact higher-order physical self-
awareness, but does not necessarily rely on higher-order psychological self-awareness 
(but see Lewis, 2003 for a counter argument).  It is possible that individuals with ASD 
have intact physical self-concepts, but impaired psychological self-concepts.  
Interestingly, Lind  (2010) highlights the fact that all existing studies of self-referencing 
in individuals with ASD have explored self-referencing in relation to psychological trait 
adjectives alone and thus only examine whether individuals encode information in ǯ-concept.  Indeed, Lind (2010) 
directly predicts that individuals with ASD would show typical self-reference effects 
when encoding information in relation to the physical self.  This distinction between 
physical and psychological self-awareness (not just in conceptual self-awareness but 
also concerning extended self-awareness) is discussed in more detail in sections to 
come.   
Extended self-awareness.  Extended self-awareness involves an awareness of ǯǡ.  As such extended 
self-awareness involves the understanding that several alternative representations of 
the self can reflect different representations of the same enduring self (across time).  
One aspects of cognition that extended self-ǯ
autobiographical memories (see Povinelli, 2001), which several studies have explored 
in ASD.   
Episodic memory and episodic future thinking.  Autobiographical memory ǯ.  Two distinct 
types of autobiographical memory exist; autobiographical semantic memory, which 





nationality) and autobiographical episodic ǡǯ
memory for events they have experienced (e.g., what they did on their last birthday).  
Whilst both aspect of autobiographical memory are arguably related to aspects of the 
self, autobiographical episodic memory alone specifically involves extended self-
awareness.   
The majority of evidence suggests that individuals with ASD demonstrate 
impaired autobiographical episodic memory (Bruck, London, Landa, & Goodman, 2007; 
Crane & Goddard, 2008; Goddard, Howlin, Dritschel, & Patel, 2007; Klein, Chan, & 
Loftus, 1999; Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lind, Williams, Bowler, & Peel, 2014; Lind, Williams, 
Raber, Peel, & Bowler, 2013; Losh & Capps, 2003), whilst episodic semantic memory 
appears relatively spared, at least in adults with ASD (see e.g., Klein et al., 1999; Crane & 
Goddard, 2008).  Additionally, individuals with ASD appear to demonstrate impaired 
episodic future thinking (see Crane, Lind, & Bowler, 2013; Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lind, 
Williams, et al., 2014; Lind et al., 2013; Terrett et al., 2013) Episodic future thinking 
refers to the ability to imagine event that might plausibly happen to oneself at a future 
time and several links between episodic future thinking and autobiographical episodic 
memory have been made within the literature.  Both episodic future thinking and 
episodic memory emerge at the same time during typical development (Suddendorf, 
2010) and it has been suggested that both rely on the same underlying cognitive 
mechanism (see e.g., Lind, Williams, et al., 2014). Impairments in both processes in ASD 
suggest that individuals with this disorder demonstrate a diminished sense of extended 
psychological self and an impaired understanding of themselves throughout time.   
Delayed self-recognition.  Evidence of extended self-awareness in ASD can also 
be explored through studies of delayed self-recognition.  As discussed above, although 




the evidence is not unequivocal, mirror self-recognition appears to be intact in children 
with ASD.  However, two studies have also used an extension of the mirror task to 
assess extended self-awareness in children with ASD.  During a delayed, video self-
recognition task, a video is taken while the experimenter surreptitiously places a sticker 
on the back of the participants head (whilst the participant completes a distraction 
task).  After a short period the participant (who still has the sticker on his/her head) is 
then shown this video.  Whilst viewing the video, if a participant proceeds to reach up 
and remove/ the sticker on the back of their head, this is typically taken as evidence that 
they possess an extended self-representation (i.e., they understand that the individual 
in the video is the same individual as currently watching the video (themselves), and 
will thus recognise that presently they will have a sticker on their own head.  ǯphysical self-awareness but not 
necessǯmental self-awareness.  In keeping with this 
idea studies have shown that performance on delayed video tasks does not relate to 
performance on mindreading tasks (Suddendorf, 1999).  Two studies have assessed 
delayed video self-recognition in children with ASD (Lind & Bowler, 2009a; Nielsen, 
Suddendorf, & Slaughter, 2006).  Lind and Bowler (2009a) report that, amongst 
participants who all demonstrated intact mirror self-recognition, the majority of 
participants with ASD, as well as the majority of age- and ability-matched neurotypical 
participants, passed a delayed video self-recognition task as well.  This is in keeping 
with the results reported in Nielsen et al., (2006), who used a similar task to explore 
delayed video self-recognition in high-functioning children with ASD.  As such, these ǯ
ASD.  Interestingly, Lind & Bowler (2009a) also asked participants to identify who it 
was that they could see in the video and found that participants with ASD were 




significantly more likely to refer to themselves using their proper name, rather than 
referring to themselves as ǲmeǳ.  This is in keeping with previous findings that pronoun 
use is impaired in ASD (see p.21 above), and again highlights a dissociation between 
aspects of self-awareness in ASD.  Whilst the children with ASD in this study appeared 
to show intact extended self-awareness (at least concerning their physical self) they still 
demonstrated impairments when using pronouns, evidence of impaired conceptual self-
awareness.   
Concerning extended self-awareness overall, it appears that individuals with ASD 
may demonstrate selective impairments in extended selfȂawareness.  Whilst results 
from tasks of episodic memory and episodic future thinking suggests that extended 
psychological self-awareness is impaired in ASD, results from studies of delayed self-
recognition suggest that an extended awareness of the physical self appears intact in 
ASD.   
Private self-awareness.  As outlined above, private self-awareness is an 
awareness of the self that cannot be shared with anyone else.  This encompasses ǯǡǯȋǡǡȌǡǯ.  
Until quite recently, there has been an absence of clear research investigating whether 
individuals with ASD demonstrate impaired self-awareness of their own private self.  
However recently there has been a growing body of studies exploring private self-
awareness in ASD.  Classic approaches to the study of private self-awareness in ASD ǲǳǲǳȋȌ.  However, more recently private self-awareness in ASD has also 
been assessed by studies exploring metacognition.   




Metaǲǳ.  More ǡǯ
cognitions (often referred to as metacognitive knowledgeȌǯ
assess and control their own cognitive processes (often referred to as metacognitive 
skill).  Within the context of metacognitive skills metacognitive monitoring refers to an ǯǡǡ
whereas metacognitive control ǯ
their own cognitive processes.  Private self-awareness can be thought of as synonymous 
with metacognitive skill, therefore.   
Self-awareness and mindreading: One-system or two?  Before reviewing the 
literature surrounding private self-awareness in ASD it is worth considering theories 
surrounding the relationship between mindreading (which is commonly thought to be 
impaired in ASD), and private self-awareness.  One question, currently debated within 
the literature is whether aspects of self-awareness rely on the same neuro- cognitive 
mechanism as the ability to represent others' mental states (henceforth termed 
mindreading).  According to one perspective (e.g., Carruthers, 2009; Frith & Happé, 
1999) ǯmental states (metacognition) relies on the 
same underlying metarepresentational mechanism as the ability to understand mental 
states in others (mindreading).  ȋǲ-ǳȌ
that metacognition results from turning our mindreading capacities on ourselves 
(Carruthers, 2009).  Thus, according to Carruthers, mindreading is both ontogenetically 
and phylogenetically prior to metacognition.  Crucially, according to this argument, no 
dissociation should exist between mindreading and metacognition, because a single 
faculty governs both processes.   




However, the one mechanism theory of mentalising is far from undisputed, and 
this position has been contested by several alterative theories.  According to one ǲǳǡǯ minds stems from our 
ability to directly introspect the contents of our own mind, and then use this ǯ(e.g., Goldman, 2006).  
From this perspective, metacognition is both ontogenetically and phylogenetically prior 
to mindreading.  According to a third theory, proposed by Nichols and Stitch (2003), 
mindreading and metacognition are underpinned by separate mechanisms; one ǲǳȀǯǡǲǳǯ.  As with 
ǯ ǡǲ
mecǳǡ-inferential access 
to our own mental states, whereas we have to infer mental states in others on the basis 
of behaviour.  However, it departs from simulation theory by suggesting that 
information gained from introspection of our own mental states is not foundational for 
mindreading.  The crucial implication stemming from both the simulation theory and 
the two mechanisms theory is that there should be some people who manifest 
diminished mindreading abilities, despite undiminished metacognition.  Indeed, both 
Goldman (2006), and Nichols and Stich (2003) explicitly suggest that autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD) provides just such a case.   
Private self-awareness in ASD.  The study of private self-awareness in ASD can 
thus inform the current debate concerning the underlying mechanisms involved in 
mindreading/metacognition.  The following section reviews studies of private self-
awareness in individuals with ASD, with the former section reviewing ǲclassicǳ 
approaches to the study of theory of own mind, and the later part focussing specifically 




on studies that have used classic tests of metacognition to explore private self-
awareness in individuals with ASD.   
ǯ.  Hurlburt and colleagues (Hurlburt, 
Happé, & Frith, 1994) used an experience sampling method to examine whether three 
high-functioning adults with ASD could self-report their own thought processes on a 
daily basis.  During this study, participants were asked to carry around a small device 
which beeped at random intervals, and were asked to write down an account of their 
thoughts whenever the device beeped.  Interestingly, Hurlburt found that at least one 
participant found it extremely difficult to report what their own thought processes had 
been when they heard the device beeping.  Although we should bear in mind that this 
study only consisted of an extremely small sample of participants, this does imply that 
perhaps some individuals with ASD demonstrate diminished private self-awareness.   
ǯȀ.  Studies exploring the awareness of ǯ
findings.  In one study Philips and colleagues (ǡǦǡƬǡ ? ? ? ?) 
found that children with ASD confused their own intentions with their own desires.  
Whilst similar, intentions and desires are not the same mental states; for example it is 
distinctly possible to desire an outcome without having any intention of carrying it out, 
or to carry out an intended action that you have no desire to do.  It is this distinction 
that children with ASD struggled with in Phillips et al., (1998).  During this study 
children with ASD played a rigged target-shooting game, in which they attempted to 
shoot particular targets, only half of which contained a desirable prize.  Phillips found 
that when children with ASD mistakenly hit a target that they had not intended to hit, 
but which contained a prize which they had desired, they incorrectly reported that they 
had intended to hit that target in the first place.  Whilst neurotypical children matched 




for age and intelligence were able to distinguish between the targets they intended to 
hit, and those they desired to hit, children with ASD struggled with this task.  This 
provides support for suggestions that individuals with ASD are less aware of their own 
private selves.   ǡǯǡ
and Hill (2001 ; Experiment 2) failed to replicate these results, suggesting that children 
with ASD do not show impairments reporting their own (failed) intentions.  
Additionally, in another experiment Russell and Hill found only mixed evidence for 
diminished awareness of intentions in children with ASD (Russell & Hill, 2001, 
Experiment 3).  This experiment employed the ǲtransparent intentions taskǳ (Russell, 
Hill, & Franco, 2001) in which children were asked to complete a drawing on a piece of 
transparent paper (e.g., draw a handle on a cup).  However, during the task a second 
transparent piece of paper was placed on top of the first, which displayed another 
unfinished drawing (e.g., a head missing an ear) that aligned perfectly with the drawing 
on the first transparency.  When asked to complete the drawing on the bottom 
transparency children actually unintentionally completed the other drawing on the ǲhiddenǳ transparency, placed on top of the picture the children thought they were 
completing.  As such, children unknowingly completed the top drawing rather than the 
one they had intended to complete.  Children were then asked what they had meant to 
draw (the ǲMeanǳ question), and what they had thought they were drawing throughout 
the task (the ǲThinkǳ question).  When the Mean question was asked first, before the 
think question, children with ASD showed diminished performance on the task.  
However, performance was not diminished in the ASD group relative to the 
neurotypical group when the Mean question was asked second, nor on the Think 
question (regardless of question order).  In contrast to the results of Phillips et al., 




(1998), these findings do not support ǯ
intentions is impaired in ASD.  Nonetheless, some caution should be taken when 
interpreting these results.  Williams and Happé (Williams & Happé, 2010), having raised 
several methodological concerns with Russell & HiǯȋǯƬ±ǡ
2010b for details), attempted to replicate these results.  This study found that children 
with ASD were in fact significantly poorer at identifying their mistaken intentions, 
relative to comparison participants (Williams & Happé, 2010b, Experiment 2).   ?ǯ
with ASD, testing whether children were able to identify correctly automatic knee-jerk 
reflexes as being unintentional.  Compared to matched typically-devolving children, 
children with ASD were significantly less likely to recognise that their knee-jerks were 
not intentional actions.  Both findings can be taken as an indication that individuals with 
ASD find it difficult to accurately represent their own intentions.   
As such, although not unequivocal, the evidence within the literature suggests 
that individuals with ASD show a diminished awareness of their own intentions and 
beliefs.  This supports the idea that individuals with ASD demonstrate impairments 
understanding their own mental states (Williams, 2010), and demonstrate diminished 
private self-awareness.   
ǯ.  One of the tasks most widely used to assess 
understanding of mental states, in both self and others, is the unexpected contents false 
belief task (Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 1986).  Although several versions of the task 
exist, the origiǯ belief about the content of a smarties tube.  
During the ǲsmarties taskǳ children are shown a smarties tube and asked what they 
think is inside.  Children will commonly respond that they think there are smarties 
(sweets/chocolate) inside the tube.  Children are then shown that, in fact, the tube does 




not contain smarties but contains a pencil instead.  Children are then asked two 
questions; 1) what was it they previously thought was inside the smarties tube (Self 
condition), and 2) what would another person think was inside the smarties tube, if 
they had not been shown the contents (Other condition).  Typically, children of four or 
five years of ages will consistently pass this test, and can accurately report what false 
belief they had previously held, as well as what false belief another person would have.  
Notably, neurotypical individuals also tend to show similar performance on the task in 
both the Self and Other condition of the task, finding each condition of equivalent 
difficulty (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  Several studies have used the smarties ǯǯ (e.g., 
Baron-Cohen, 1992; Fisher et al., 2005; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Perner, Frith, Leslie, & 
Leekam, 1989; Williams & Happé, 2009b).  In two early studies (Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; 
Perner et al., 1989) children with ASD showed stereotypical impairments in ǯǡ
own previously held false beliefs were during the task.  At face value this would imply 
that individuals with ASD demonstrate a typical understanding of their own mental ǡǯ.  However, methodological 
issues associated with the Self condition in these studies leave these conclusions 
somewhat questionable (Williams & Happé, 2009b).  Namely, it is possible that the 
children with ASD in these studies passed the smarties task simply by remembering 
what they had previously said was in the tube, allowing them to successfully pass the 
task despite a despite a diminished understanding of their previous belief.   
However, some researchers have suggested that even when children are asked to 
report what they thought was in the tube, the smarties task may still over-estimate 
children ability to understand their own mental states.  In each of the studies previously 




mentioned children with ASD were always asked to explicitly state their false belief 
before they were asked the Self question.  It is possible that the processes of asking 
children with ASD to verbally report their false belief during the task might itself lead to 
inflated levels of performance on the task.   
To test this idea, Williams & Happé (2009b) developed a version of a false beliefs 
task in which children were not asked to verbalise their beliefs about the content of a 
container.  Instead, a plasters box and two other containers were places within reach of 
participants, but not the experimenter.  During the task, the experimenter pretended 
that they had cut their finger, and asked the child if they would pass him a plaster.  
Participants reached for the plasters box and unexpectedly found that it contained 
candles instead of plasters.  Children were then asked 1) what they had thought was 
inside the box (Self condition) and 2) what someone else would think was inside the box 
if they had not seen its contents (Other condition) .  By selecting the plasters box, 
participants undeniably demonstrated their false belief that the box contained plasters, 
without ever explicitly verbalising this belief.  As such, during the self-condition of the 
task, children were not able to pass the task simply by reporting what they had stated 
was in the box, but could only pass the self question if they recognised and recalled their 
false belief.  Williams & Happé (2009b) found that children with ASD found it 
significantly more difficult to report what their own false belief had been on the task, 
compared to what another ǯ.  In contrast, participants 
without ASD and participants with developmental disabilities performed consistently 
on both the self and other question.  These results suggest that even when children with 
ASD cannot rely on recalling their previous statement, they show a diminished ability to 
understand their own mental states.   




ǯ.  Recently research has also explored 
whether individuals with ASD are able to understand their own emotional feelings.  
Whilst it is well documented that individuals with ASD demonstrate impairments in 
empathy and understanding ǯǡ
also be the case with understanding their own emotions.  The term alexithymia refers to 
the inability to accurately ǯǡ
phenomenon that affects roughly 10% of the population (Linden, Wen, & Paulhus, 
1995).  However, studies of alexithymia in ASD have suggested that perhaps almost 
50% of individuals with this disorder demonstrated difficulties identifying and 
describing emotions, impairments that are typical of alexithymia (Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 
2004).  Silani and colleagues investigated this issue by asking individuals with ASD, and 
matched neurotypical participants to complete the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20), 
a commonly used measure of alexithymia characteristics (Silani et al., 2008).  Alongside 
completing this questionnaire participants were asked to rate a series of photographs 
on how emotionally arousing they considered them, during an fMRI experiment.  In 
keeping with the results of Hill et al., (2004) participants with ASD reported 
significantly higher scores on the TAS-20, indicating higher self-reported levels of 
alexithymia in the ASD group relative to the control group.  Silani and colleagues also 
found a strong relationship between TAS-20 scores in both groups and activity in the 
anterior insula, when participants were asked to assess their feelings towards 
unpleasant pictures.  Studies have shown that the anterior insula appears to be involved 
during mentalising (e.g., Modinos, Ormel, & Aleman, 2009).  Additionally, when asked to 
introspect on their feelings the ASD group showed atypical activity in several brain 
regions typically associated with mentalising, relative to the neurotypical group.  These 
areas included the mPFC, ACC, precuneus, and cerebellum, areas that previous studies 




have indicated are activated during self-reflection and mentalising (Frith & Frith, 2006).  
Such results support the suggestion that emotion awareness is atypical in individuals 
with ASD. 
Another study that has explored awareness of emotions in ASD was carried out 
by Ben Shalom and colleagues (Ben Shalom et al., 2006), who asked both ASD and 
neurotypical children to report how emotional they found a series of pictures, alongside 
taking physiological indicators of participǯ
pictures.  ǯ
emotional pictures did not appear to differ between participants in the ASD and 
neurotypical group.  However the study did find some differences in the emotion ratings 
participants in the ASD group gave relative to the neurotypical group.  Namely, children 
were asked to rate pictures (pleasant, unpleasant and neutral pictures) on ratings of ǲpleasantnessǳ and rating of ǲinterestingnessǳ.  Whilst the neurotypical group 
significantly differed in the pleasantness and interestingness ratings they gave for ǡǯt rate pictures in any of the 
conditions differently depending on whether they were rating pleasantness or 
interestingness.  The authors tentatively pose that due to impairments expressing or 
understanding conscious feelings of emotions the children with ASD may have 
employed a compensatory strategy on the task (Ben Shalom et al., 2006).  They suggest 
it is possible that the children with ASD rated the pictures simply on a generic ǲgoodnessǳ rating rather than distinguishing separately between feelings of 
pleasantness and interest.  Whilst there is no explicit evidence for this suggestion, this 
idea does suggest that children with ASD do not show a typical understanding of their 
own emotions, or at least do not rate emotional pictures in a similar way to neurotypical 
participants.  However, again caution should be taken when interpreting these results.  




Group difference in distinguishing between ratings of pleasantness and interestingness 
(which are both relatively abstract concepts) could potentially be explained by large 
group difference in VIQ (with the ASD group having an average VIQ of 27 IQ points less 
than the average VIQ in the neurotypical group).   
Overall, the literature explorinǯ
with ASD is sparse, relative ǯ
emotions in ASD.  The few studies exploring this do appear to suggest impairments in 
self-reported awareness of emotions in ASD, which supports the suggestion private self-
awareness, is impaired in ASD.  However, the results supporting this are far from 
conclusive, given the limited research in this area.   
ǯ.  Similarly, only a few studies have ǯ.  In a study 
by Perner and colleagues (Perner et al., 1989) children with ASD and neurotypical 
children were shown a series of boxes.  During the experiment children were informed 
that each box contained a different object.  On some trials the participant was allowed to ǲǳ
in the other box (instead of the participant).  After either the participant or confederate 
looked in the box children were asked whether they knew what was in the box (Self 
condition) or whether the confederate knew what was inside the box (Other condition).  
Perner found that whilst the neurotypical group was able to accurately judge both their 
own knowledge states and those of the confederate, the children with ASD showed 
significantly poorer performance in both the self and other conditions.  The children 
with ASD tended to overestimate their own knowledge and that of the confederate, 
suggesting more often that the person who had not looked inside the box would know 
what the contents were.   




Kazak and colleagues also assessed awareness for knowledge states in children 
with ASD.  Kazak and colleagues (Kazak, Collis, & Lewis, 1997) found no significant 
difference between children with and without ASD on their ability to understand the 
difference between knowing something and guessing it.  Again this suggests that private 
self-awareness appears to be unexpectedly intact in children with ASD.  However, it has 
been argued (Williams, 2010) that this could be mainly due to poor performance in ǯ.  The neurotypical 4-year-old participants performed at below 
chance level on the task, demonstrating atypically poor ability.  As such, it is unclear 
whether the children with ASD in the study showed intact understanding of knowledge, 
or whether the control children just showed impairments.   
Problems with self-versions of mindreading tasks.  One potential difficulty 
interpreting self-versions of classic mindreading tasks is that test questions in such 
studies require participants to recall their prior mental states, rather than report their 
current mental states.  Simulation and two mechanisms theories claim that only current 
mental states are directly accessible without the need for mindreading.  Thus, arguably, 
the results from the above studies do not necessarily show that metacognition/private 
self-awareness is impaired in ASD, because these tasks require inferences to be drawn 
about past mental states (but see Williams, 2010, for a counter-argument).  By contrast, 
it is widely agreed that metacognitive judgements are based on awareness of current 
mental states.  As such, studying classic tests of metacognition overcomes problems 
associated with the majority of studies of private self-awareness in ASD discussed.   
Metamemory.  One important component of metacognition is metamemory, an ǯor and control their own memory.  ǯ
(1990) influential model of metamemory divides metamemory processes into two Ǣǲ-ǳǲ-ǳȋFigure 3 for a graphical 




representation).  The object-level consists of first-order memory processes, whilst the 
meta-level consists of dynamic second-order representations of the object-level.  
Through monitoring, the meta-level can acquire information about the state of the 
object-level and can change object-level representations accordingly.  Whilst research 
has extensively investigated impairments at the ǲobject-levelǳ(Nelson & Narens, 1990) 
of cognitive processes in ASD, little research has examined the ǲmeta-levelǳ of such 
processes.   
 
Figure 3: A graphical representation of Nelson and Narens metamemory model.  
Figure taken from Nelson & Narens, (1990). 
 
Metamemory judgments.  Research exploring metamemory abilities employs a 
variety of different paradigms to test monitoring accuracy.  In general these either ask 
participants to make metamemory judgements concerning a future memory event, or 
concerning a past memory event.  Whilst prospective metamemory judgements refers to 
judgements in which participants assess their confidence about a future memory event 
(e.g., feeling of knowing judgments, tip of the tongue judgments, judgements of learning) 
retrospective metamemory judgements refers to judgements in which participants 
assess a previous memory event (e.g., confidence judgements).  It has been suggested 




that prospective and retrospective judgments rely on different sources of information 
(Fleming & Dolan, 2012). 
Two paradigms widely used to assess metamemory monitoring accuracy involve 
making judgements-of-learning (JOL; Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969) and/or feelings-of-
knowing (FOK; Hart, 1965).  During a standard JOL task participants are asked (during a ȌȋǤǤǡǡǲ-ǳǡǲ-ǳǤȌ.  After the learning phase, participants are presented 
with one stimulus from the ȋǢǤǤǡǲǳȌ
the likelihood that, at a later point, they will be able to recall the stimulus pair (the ǢǤǤǡǲǳȌ.  Participants are then presented with one stimulus from a word pair, 
the cue, and asked to recall the missing target word.  The accuracy of participantsǯ 
judgements ǯ
recall performance with their actual recall performance.  Generally, neurotypical adults 
are able to make accurate JOLs, although accuracy is influenced by the length of the 
delay between the learning phase and when participants make a JOL (e.g., Nelson & 
Dunlosky, 1991).  Nelson and Dunlosky (1991) demonstrated that individuals make 
much more accurate JOLs when there is a short delay between learning stimulus pairs 
and making a JOL about them (a delayed-JOL) than when JOLs are made immediately 
after leaning (an immediate-JOL).  Nelson and Dunlosky suggested that this effect may 
be explained by the suggestion that when individuals make delayed JOLs their 
judgements are based more on information recollected from long-term memory than 
immediately accessible information from short-term memory (e.g., Nelson & Dunlosky, 
1991).  This information is thought to be a better indicator of future memory 
performance than information available immediately after stimuli are learnt.  The 
delayed-JOL effect may also be explained by the fact that the context delayed JOLs are 




made in are less similar to the context stimuli are learnt, and more similar to the context 
in which recall is tested (than immediate JOLs).   
During a typical FOK task, participants are asked to make judgments about 
whether they will be able to recognise previously learned stimuli pairs, which they have 
currently failed to recall.  Typically, participants are firstly asked to memorise a series of 
stimulus pairs (a learning phase).  Participants are then presented (during a recall test-
phase) with one stimulus from each pair, the cue, and asked to recall its pair (i.e., the 
target).  Importantly, on trials in which participants fail to correctly recall the target they 
are then asked to judge the likelihood that, at a later point, they would be able to 
recognise the missing word.  Finally, participants are then presented with one word 
from ȋȌǡǯȋȌ
several options (a recognition test-phase).  ǡǯǯpredictions about their future ability 
to recognise the correct target with their actual recognition performance.   
Another paradigm that has been widely used to measure metamemory ability in 
neurotypical individuals is a judgment of confidence (JOC) task.  Unlike both FOK and 
JOL paradigms, which involve making prospective metamemory judgements, JOC tasks 
ask participants to make retrospective judgments concerning their memory ability.  
Studies assessing judgments of confidence typically involve participants answering 
questions about recently-studied material or stored semantic knowledge, and then 
reporting their confidence in the answers they provided.  ǯ-
monitoring ability is high, then their confidence judgements should discriminate 
accurately between correct and incorrect answers.  This aspect of self-monitoring is 
perhaps particularly important, because confidence judgements are often used by 
individuals to control their behaviour (see Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). 




Different heuristic-based theories have been proposed to explain what type of ǯ.  The cue-
familiarity hypothesis (e.g., Metcalfe, Schwartz, & Joaquim, 1993; Reder, 1987) suggests ǲǳ
missing target.  Familiarity in this sense refers to a general feeling of memory that 
varies in strength, but does not contain any information about the context in which that 
knowledge was acquired.  ǲǳǡ
additional incorporation of contextual information in memory.  As such, the cue-
familiarity hypothesis suggests that when making a metamemory judgement (for ǡǲ-ǳȌǡȋǲǳȌǡtion they can recollect about the target ȋǲǳȌ.  In contrast, the accessibility hypothesis (e.g., Koriat, 1993) suggests that 
individuals base their metamemory judgements on the extent to which they can retrieve 
partial or related information about the target, at the time they make a metamemory 
judgment.  For example, a person may make a more positive JOL if they can recall some 
information about the missing target (e.g., its first letter, how many letters it consisted 
of, its semantic category etc.). 
Metamemory in ASD.  As discussed above, whilst the relationship between 
understanding ǯǯǡ
that both processes rely on the same mechanisms then there is reason to predict that 
metacognition (private self-awareness) should be severely impaired in ASD.  However, 
despite an abundance of studies examining whether individuals with ASD show 
impaired mindreading little research has been carried out directly investigating 
metacognition in individuals with ASD.   




In an early study Farrant and colleagues attempted to directly investigate 
metamemory in children with ASD across a series of five experiments (Farrant, 
Boucher, & Blades, 1999).  ǯȋǡǯȌ
influence memory.  Farrant found that on all five metamemory tasks the children with 
ASD demonstrated undiminished performance (although they were less likely than 
controls to make spontaneous use of memory strategies involving other people).  As 
such the study proposed that metacognition was unimpaired in ASD.  However, Farrant ǯǯ.  It is quite 
possible that different processes are involved in acquiring metacognitive knowledge 
and the ability to accurately assess oneǯ.  Thus, this conclusion only 
applies to metamemory knowledge in ASD.   
Judgments of confidence (JOC).  More recently Wilkinson and colleagues asked 
children with ASD to make judgments of confidence (JOCs) concerning how certain they 
were that they had correctly recognised faces (Wilkinson, Best, Minshew, & Strauss, 
2010).  JOCs involve making retrospective judgements, either after a recall or ǡǯormance was.  This study suggested that 
confidence judgments made by children with ASD were less accurate (i.e., less in 
keeping with actual recognition performance) than those made by neurotypical 
children, indicating that to some extent children with ASD were not able to accurately 
judge what information they knew.  However, this difference was not replicated in 
adults.  Although the study found subtle differences between memory awareness in 
adults with and without ASD, no significant between-group difference was found 
between adults overall memory awareness.  Additionally, in both adult and children, 
memory awareness in this study was assessed during a facial recognition task.  Given 




that research has shown unequivocally that individuals with ASD show impairments in 
face processing (e.g., Hauck, Fein, Maltby, Waterhouse, & Feinstein, 1998; Williams, 
Goldstein, & Minshew, 2005) there could be concern that impairments at the basic level ǯ.   
Wojcik and colleague (Wojcik et al., 2011) also used a JOC paradigm to assess 
whether children with ASD were able to make accurate confidence judgements 
surrounding whether they had accurately performed a series of actions correctly.  In ǯ(2010), in this study children with ASD appeared to be 
as accurate as neurotypical children in judging whether they had correctly recalled a 
series of actions (Wojcik et al., 2011).  In keeping with this study, Elmose and Happé 
report typical JOC accuracy in children with ASD (Elmose & Happé, 2014). Taken 
together these studies demonstrate inconsistent findings in studies examining whether 
individuals with ASD show impairments in their ability to monitor their own memory.   
Finally, Sawyer employed a JOC task that assessed both monitoring and control 
in adults with ASD, the only study thus far to explore the accuracy of metamemory 
control processes in individuals with ASD (Sawyer, Williamson, & Young, 2014).  
Whereas metacognitive monitoring refers ǯǯ
states, metacognitive control refers to the ǯǡ
mental states and cognitive activity (Flavell, 1979).  In this study, participants were 
asked to complete an emotion recognition task involving facial stimuli.  Participants 
were instructed that the aim of the study was to submit as many correct responses as 
possible.  For each emotion recognition judgement, participants rated how confident 
they were that they had selected the correct response.  Participants were then given the 
opportunity to submit each answer towards their total score (and gain a point for each 
correct answer), or discard the answer (and avoid losing a point for getting an answer 




wrong).  This provided a measure of metacognitive control.  In a second experiment, the ǯo 
general knowledge questions, rather than emotion recognition.   
Across both experiments, Sawyer et al., (2014) reported no significant between-
group differences in JOC accuracy, implying undiminished meta-monitoring ability in 
ASD.  However, the between-group difference in JOC accuracy on the general knowledge 
task was of borderline significance (associated with a one-tailed p value of .06), 
potentially implying a subtle monitoring impairment in ASD.   
In terms of metacognitive control, Sawyer et al., (2014) found no between-group 
differences on their key index (d'), implying undiminished metacognitive control in ASD.  
However, Sawyer et al., performed additional post-hoc tests, which suggested that a 
significantly higher proportion of ASD participants (n = 12) than neurotypical 
participants decided not to withhold any answers.  This could imply that these 12 ASD 
participants were not showing any metacognitive control at all.  Alternatively, it could 
reflect a mere failure to understand the task demands among these participants.  As 
such, the extent to which metacognitive control is diminished in ASD is still not entirely 
clear.   
Feeling of knowing (FOK) judgments.  Only one study so far has directly 
examined whether individuals with ASD are able to accurately monitor their own 
memory to predict their future memory performance whilst making FOK judgements 
(Wojcik, Moulin, & Souchay, 2013).  ǯ
metamemory monitoring ability using two FOK tasks, one asking individuals to assess 
their memory for information stored episodically and one assessing memory for 
information stored semantically.  Wojcik reported that children with ASD were 




significantly poorer than neurotypical children at making accurate FOK judgements, but 
only when assessing their episodic memory.   
Judgments of learning (JOL).  One final study has also recently published the 
results of two experiments exploring metamemory in individuals with ASD using JOL 
paradigms.  Recently Wojcik and colleagues (Wojcik, Waterman, Lestie, Moulin, & 
Souchay, 2014) reported the results of two JOL tasks in children with ASD, and reported ǯǤ 
 
Problems with study of metamemory in ASD thus far 
Table 1 provides a summary of the existing studies of metamemory monitoring 
accuracy in ASD thus far.  From Table 1 it is clear that there are several inconsistencies 
within the literature concerning whether monitoring accuracy is impaired in ASD or not.  
Whilst some studies report large group difference in monitoring accuracy others report 
no group difference at all.  Such inconsistencies do not appear to be explained by 
differences in the specific type of metamemory judgements being made, or whether the 
metamemory judgements being made are prospective or retrospective in nature.  
However, methodologically there is some concern surrounding the existing studies of 
metamemory in ASD thus far, which may explain why the results from studies of 
metamemory are not in keeping with other studies in the literature that fairly 
consistently suggest private self-awareness is impaired in ASD.


















Retrospective ASD children< Neurotypical 
children 
ASD adults= Neurotypical 
adults (with some group 
difference moderate in size) 
Object level task (face processing) may have 
confounded meta-level task performance in the 
ASD group.   




Retrospective ASD= Neurotypical controls PIQ and VIQ for groups not reported (only FSIQ 
reported)  
Wojcik et al., 
(2013) 
Feeling of knowing 
judgements (FOK) 
Prospective ASD< Neurotypical controls 
(but only for episodic material, 
not semantic material)  
Groups not matched for VIQ 




Prospective ASD= Neurotypical  controls 
(in both experiments) 
Groups not matched for VIQ 




Retrospective ASD = Neurotypical Controls Groups not matched for Age and VIQ.  
Additionally the object level task (emotion 
recognition) may have confounded task 













ASD = Neurotypical Controls 
 
 
ASD = Neurotypical Controls 
Groups are not matched for VIQ 
Judgments of confidence were made on a 
limited rating scale. 
 
  




One potential explanation for discrepancies between the results of metamemory 
studies in ASD could be that individuals with ASD only demonstrate impairments in 
metacognitive monitoring alongside impairments in mindreading performance.  This 
suggestion is in keeping with one mechanism theories that predict both processes rely 
on the same underlying mechanisms.  If one mechanism theories are correct, you would 
only predict metamemory impairments in individuals impaired in mindreading task 
performance.  To date only one study has directly explored metamemory abilities in 
ASD alongside mindreading abilities (Farrant et al., 1999).  As discussed the results of 
Farrant et al., suggested that children with ASD no not demonstrate metamemory 
impairments.  However, an unexpectedly small number of the children in their ASD 
group showed deficits on the false belief task carried out in this study, indicating that 
mindreading was relatively unimpaired in their sample.  Of course, it is possible that the 
children with ASD in this study passed the false belief task by hacking out a solution, 
despite impaired mindreading ability.  Nevertheless if it is the case that the majority of 
the children in the ASD group  passed the false belief task because of genuinely intact 
mindreading ability then it is unsurprising that they also demonstrated unimpaired 
performance on the metacognitive (if the prediction  that mindreading and 
metacognition rely on the same underlying processes is to be believed).  Several 
empirical chapters in this thesis explore this issue in more depths, assessing 
metacognition alongside mindreading ability in individuals with ASD.   
Another particular methodological difficulty affecting several of the studies 
discussed above is that often the ASD and neurotypical groups were not matched for 
participant characteristics, specifically verbal IQ (e.g., Sawyer et al., 2014; Wojcik et al., 
2013; Wojcik et al., 2014) and age (Sawyer et al., 2014).  Matching for intellectual 
abilities is essential in such studies, because differences between groups in this respect 




can potentially entirely explain between-group differences in experimental task 
performance (see Mervis & Klein-Tasman, 2004).  Although some studies of 
metacognition have recognised this limitation and tried to overcome it using an ǲǳȋǤǤǡǤǡ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ
not, in fact, solve this problem (see Miller & Chapman, 2001).  As such, as things stand, 
we cannot determine whether group differences in these studies were driven by 
diagnostic status or by differences in age/intellectual ability.   
Finally, another potential confound of both Sawyer et al.,  (2014) and Wilkinson 
et al., (2010) is the fact that in both studies metamemory ability was assessed on tasks 
in which participants with ASD stereotypically demonstrate difficulties with at the 
object level.  Sawyer et al., (2014) required participants to make judgments of 
confidence surrounding emotion recognition judgements, which are stereotypically 
impaired in ASD (see e.g., Harms, Martin, & Wallace, 2010; Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 
1988) and Wilkinson et al., (2010) asked participants to make confidence judgements 
during a face processing task, a known difficulty in ASD (see e.g., Hauck et al., 1998; 
Rouse, Donnelly, Hadwin, & Brown, 2004).  Crucially, in studies of metacognition it is 
essential that groups are equated for object level ability on the task.  If this is not the 
case group differences in metamemory monitoring accuracy may be simply the result of 
difference in overall memory processes, rather than specifically due to differences in 
monitoring ability alone (see Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2008). 
 
Conclusions 
To summarise, it appears that whilst aspects of self-awareness appear to be 
impaired in ASD, individuals with this disorder clearly do not demonstrate completely 
across the board impairments in self-awareness.  For example ecological self-awareness 




and some aspects of both conceptual and extended self-awareness appear relatively 
unimpaired in this disorder.  One question that remains to be answered within the 
literature is why some aspects of self-awareness are spared in ASD, whilst others 
appear to be considerably impaired.  The empirical studies carried out in this thesis 
explore several aspects of self-awareness in ASD, and attempt to better understand 
where impairments in self-awareness lie.  This thesis contributes to the existing 
literature by using novel methods to explore self-awareness in ASD, in particular private 
self-awareness and its relationship to mindreading abilities.  It will be argued that 
findings from the literature, and the results of the studies reported in the thesis, support 
the idea that individuals with ASD demonstrate impairments in understanding their 
own mental selves, but not impairments understanding their physical selves.  






The studies conducted in this thesis explore self-awareness in both children and 
adults with ASD, and neurotypical children and adults.  This chapter outlines aspects of 
methodology and procedure that were used during all experiments.  It provides an 
overview of the inclusion and exclusion criteria that were used to select participants for 
all studies, and discusses how ASD and neurotypical groups were matched in the 
experiments.  Additionally, several tasks were used in multiple experiments throughout 
the thesis.  An outline of the procedure used in these tasks is provided here, instead of 
being individually reported in each chapter.  Finally, general details concerning how 
data were analysed and reported in the empirical chapters are outlined.   
Participant recruitment 
Adults.  Adult participants with ASD were recruited through the National 
Autistic Society and Durham University Service for Students with Disabilities.  
Neurotypical adults were recruited from the University of Durham and from 
advertisements in local newspapers.  Additionally, both adults with ASD and 
neurotypical adults were recruited from an existing database of individuals with autism 
spectrum disorder and neurotypical individuals (at Durham University), who had 
expressed an interest in taking part in research.  Participants all gave written, informed 
consent before participating. 
Children.  Children with ASD were recruited through mainstream schools and 
specialist schools for children with ASD.  Children participants were also recruited 
through parent support groups organised by the Kent Autistic Trust (KAT).  




Neurotypical children were all recruited from mainstream schools around Kent.  
Parents of children with ASD and neurotypical children provided informed consent, ǯ.  Additionally, children all gave written, informed 
consent before participating.  At the time of testing, the children were also asked if they 
are happy to take part and the nature of the testing session was explained to them.  All 
participants were aware that they could stop participation in any experiments, at any 
time.   
Participant diagnoses 
Children and adults who were included in the ASD groups had all received formal ǯ-IV-TR/ICD-10 
criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; World Heath Organisation, 1993).  No 
participants, in either the ASD or neurotypical group, reported using any psychotropic 
medication or any history of neurological or psychiatric disorders (apart from ASD).   
Adults.  Firstly, to confirm diagnoses, adults with ASD provided a copy of a 
medical statement, outlining the details of their diagnosis.  Additionally, in order to 
assess current ASD features, 15 of the 18 adults with ASD who participated in the 
studies reported in this thesis completed the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-
Generic (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000) assessments.  The ADOS is a semi-structured, 
standardized assessment of communication, social interaction, and imaginative use of 
materials that can be used to help diagnose autism spectrum disorder (ASD).  All 
participants who completed  ? ?ǡ-off for 
ASD (Lord et al., 2000).  The remaining three participants declined to complete the 
ADOS, as they did not feel comfortable being filmed.  The three participants who did not 




complete the ADOS had rigorous diagnoses and scored above the cut-off on the Autism-
spectrum Quotient (see immediately below).   
All adults with ASD also completed the Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001), a self-report questionnaire that 
assesses ASD/ASD-like features.  Fifteen out of 18 participants with ASD scored above 
the defined cut-off for ASD on the AQ (total  ? ? ?Ǣ-Smith, Robinson, & 
Baron-Cohen, 2005).  Only three participants missed this cut-off.  However, all three of 
these participants scored well above the defined ASD cut-off on the ADOS (all ADOS  ? ? ?Ȍ.  Comparison participants also 
completed the AQ.  All neurotypical adults scored below the defined cut-off for ASD on 
the AQ.   
Children.  	ǡǯ
through their special educational needs (SEN) statements.  To assess severity of ASD 
features, parents of participants with ASD also completed the Social Responsiveness 
Scale (SRS; Constantino et al., 2003).  Parents of the neurotypical children also 
completed the SRS.  The SRS alone cannot be used as a diagnostic tool for ASD, and thus 
participants were not automatically excluded from participating in any experiments 
because they did not meet the criteria on this questionnaire.  However, to ensure that ǯ
they participated in, all analyses were re-run, excluding any children who did not meet 
the recommended cut-off on the SRS (in both the ASD and neurotypical group).  After 
removing these participants from analyses, none of the results (nor study conclusions) 
reported in any chapter changed substantively (i.e., no p value changed from significant 
to non-significant or vice versa, and no effect size changed category Ȃ small, moderate, 
large).  ǡǯ.  It is clearly noted in 




each chapter how many participants met the diagnostic cut off for ASD, in both the ASD 
and neurotypical groups.   
Participant matching 
Appropriate ASD/comparison group matching is fundamental to any study of 
cognition in ASD (see the 2004 special issue on matching of the Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, Vol.  34).  As such, the participant groups in all experiments 
were closely equated for verbal and non-verbal ability (please see each chapter for 
specific detail of group characteristics).  For both children and adults participants, 
Verbal IQ (VIQ), performance IQ (PIQ), and full-scale IQ (FSIQ) were assessed using the 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999).  Groups were also 
closely equated for chronological age.   
Additionally, for experiments investigating metacognitive ability on a task (see 
chapters three, four, and five), it was essential that the ASD group did not demonstrate 
impairments at the object-level of the task (i.e. basic memory performance).  
Theoretically, impairments at the object-level of a metamemory task may confound 
performance at the meta-level of the task, and potential group differences in 
metacognition could be explained by group differences overall on task performance.  
Thus it was essential that participants groups were also matched so that ASD groups 
showed similar recall/ recognition ability on memory task, relative to comparison 
participants.   
Participation in multiple experiments  
Data collection for several of the studies reported in this thesis was often carried 
out during the same batch of testing, and thus participants with ASD and neurotypical 




participants sometimes participated in more than one of the experimental studies.  
However, it was not the case that all participants completed all of the experiments they 
were suitable for.  This was mainly due to restrictions that occurred during data 
collection (e.g., participants missing testing sessions, participants having to leave early, 
schools only agreeing for children to participate in particular studies etc.).  As such, 
participant numbers vary between experimental tasks.   
Measures of mindreading (ToM) ability 
In several ǡǯǡ
to determine whether the individuals in ASD groups demonstrated stereotypical 
mindreading impairments, relative to comparison, neurotypical individuals.  It was 
important to assess parǯǡ
in the thesis were based on the assumption that mindreading would be impaired in 
individuals with ASD (e.g., according to the one-mechanism theory, metacognitive 
impairments should only be apparent if mindreading impairments are also present).  To 
assess mindreading ability in adults with ASD, a version of the animations task (Abell, 
Happé, & Frith, 2000) was used.  To assess mindreading ability in children two well 
established mindreading tasks were employed; the strange stories task (Happé, 1994) 
and also the animations task (Abell et al., 2000).   
The animations task.  The animations task is a widely-used measure of 
mindreading ability, and several studies have found that individuals with ASD 
demonstrate impaired performance on the task (Abell et al., 2000; Campbell et al., 2006; 
Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002; Jones et al., 2011; Lind, Williams, et al., 2014; Salter, 
Seigal, Claxton, Lawrence, & Skuse, 2008; White, Coniston, Rogers, & Frith, 2011; 
Zwickel, White, Coniston, Senju, & Frith, 2011).  Additionally, neuroimaging studies 




have also shown that the network of brain regions typically activated during 
mindreading (see, for example, Perner, Aichhorn, Kronbichler, Staffen, & Ladurner, 
2006; Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004; Saxe & Powell, 2006) are 
activated when neurotypical adults watch the animations (see Castelli et al., 2002; 
Castelli, Happé, Frith, & Frith, 2000).   
Figure 4: Graphical representation of the animations task (taken from Abell, et al., 
2000).  These five stills are WDNHQIURPWKH³&RD[LQJ´DQLPDWLRQVPRWKHUDQGFKLOGD
Mother tries to interest child in going outside.  b) Child is reluctant to go out.  c) Mother 
gently nudges child towards the door.  d) Child explores outside.  e) Mother and child play 
happily together.   
 
During the animations task, participants were required to provide a verbal 
description of silent video clips, each of which displayed an interaction between a large 
red triangle and a small blue triangle (please see Figure 4).  These clips were taken 
directly from Abell et al., (2000).  For adults, in four of the clips, an adequate 





attitudes, such as beliefs, intentions, and/or desires.  Ǥǯǡǲǳȋ-level mindreading).  In the ǡǯ
attribution of goal states, but did not necessarily require the attribution of propositional 
attitudes/epistemic mental states.  As in Abell et al., (2000), these clips comprised a ǲ-ǳ.  Child participants completed a shorter version of the 
animations ǡȋǲǳǲǳȌǡȋǲ	ǳǲ	ǳ
animations) comprised the goal-directed condition.   
Each clip was presented to participants on a laptop computer.  Before 
undertaking the experimental trials, participants (both children and adults) also 
completed two practice trials, to familiarise themselves with the task (one goal-directed 
and one mentalising).  During practice trials, participants were asked to describe the 
behaviour displayed by the triangles in each of the video clips, and the experimenter 
gave feedback after each description.  For each of the experimental animations, 
participants watched each clip twice.  First, participants watched the clip through once ǲǳ.  ǲ
would like you to tell me how the triangles are interactǳ.  Participants provided a ǯ
the clip.  	ǡǯ
was made for later transcription.  No feedback was given on the experimental trials.   ǯ.  
These transcriptions were then scored by a rater who was blind to the diagnostic status 




of the participants, according to the scoring criteria outlined in Abell et al., (2000; please 
see appendix one for a detailed copy of the scoring criteria).  ǯ
of each animation were given a score of zero, one, or two according to their level of ǡǯ
intended meaning of the animation.  As such the total score achievable in each condition 
(Mentalising/Goal-directed) was between zero and eight for adults, and zero and four 
for children.  Inter-rater reliability for scores across the four animations was assessed 
by ǯȽ, and was extremely reliable (inter-rater reliability for animations scores 
in is reported separately in each chapter).   
The strange stories task.  The Strange Stories task (Happé, 1994) was also used 
as a second measure of mindreading ability, for child participants.  The strange stories 
task is widely used in ASD research and has been shown to be a sensitive measures of 
mindreading (e.g., e.g., Happé, 1994; Joliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999).  During the Strange 
Stories task participants were presented with four short vignettes (two mentalising 
stories and two physical stories).  These stories were taken from Happé (1994).  First, 
each story was individually presented on cards to participants.  Children either read the 
story aloud or, if children did not feel comfortable reading aloud, the experimenter read 
each story to them.  After each story had been read the experimenter produced a second 
card and presented participants with a question about the content of the story (e.g., ǲWhy did the prisoner say that?ǳ).  The experimenter read this question aloud, and 
participants provided a verbal response to each question.  Before undertaking the 
experimental trials, participants also completed one practice trial, to familiarise 
themselves with the task (one mentalising story).  During practice trials, participants 
read a story and provided an answer to the practise question.  The experimenter then ǯ.  For the 




experimental trials, a digital audio recording ǯ
later transcription, and no feedback was given.  ǯ
answers to each question were transcribed verbatim.  These transcriptions were then 
scored by a rater who was blind to the diagnostic status of each participant, according 
to the scoring criteria outlined in White, Hill, Happé and Frith (2009; please see 
appendix two for a detailed copy of the scoring criteria). ǯǡǡ
according to their level of accuracy, defined as tǯ
answers correctly answered the questions.  The score achievable in each condition 
(Mentalising/Physical) was between zero and four.  Again, inter-rater reliability for 
scores across the four stories was assessed by CronǯȽǡ.  Inter-
rater reliability for strange stories scores is reported separately in each chapter that 
uses this task.   
Measures of metacognitive monitoring accuracy.   
There are several approaches used to assess metacognitive monitoring accuracy 
in metamemory paradigms, including the FOK, JOC and JOL paradigms used in chapters 
three, four, and five.  The most commonly used measure of metacognitive monitoring 
accuracy is a Gamma correlation (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954).  Gamma correlations are 
a non-parametric measure of ǡǯ
object-level task performance is associated with their meta-level judgements on the 
task.  As such they provide an index of overall judgement accuracy during a 
metamemory task.  Gamma correlations are recommended by Nelson (1984) as the 
most appropriate way to analyse metacognitive monitoring accuracy, and are 
commonly used to analyse FOK tasks (Kelemen, Frost, & Weaver, 2000; Nelson & 




Narens, 1990; Nelson, Narens, & Dunlosky, 2004; Wojcik et al., 2013), JOL tasks (Wojcik 
et al., 2014) and JOC tasks (e.g., Sawyer et al., 2014; Roebers, Schmid & Roderer, 2009).  
Gamma correlations were used to assess monitoring accuracy in the experiments 
reported in chapters three, four, and five.  Gamma scores were calculated in one of two 
ways, depending on whether participants made dichotomous metamemory judgements 
(e.g., Yes/No) judgements, or continuous metamemory judgements.   
Dichotomous metamemory judgements.  For the adult FOK and JOL tasks 
(reported in chapters three and four), participants made dichotomous Yes/No memory 
judgements, and gamma scores were calculated using the formula ࡳ ൌ ሺࢇࢊ െ࢈ࢉሻȀሺࢇࢊ ൅ ࢈ࢉሻ.  ȋȌǲǳ
predictions an individual made, (b) the represented numbǲǳǡȋȌǲǳǡȋd) ǲǳ.  Gamma scores range between + 1 
to -1, where a score of 0 indicates chance-level accuracy, a large positive value indicates 
a good degree of accuracy, and a large negative value indicates less than chance-level 
performance on the task.  However, when calculating gamma scores this way, the score 
cannot be calculated when two or more of the prediction rates (a, b, c, or d) are equal to 
zero.  As such, the raw data were adjusted by adding 0.5 onto each prediction frequency 
and dividing by the overall number of FOK/JOL judgements made (N) plus 1 (N+1).  
This correction is recommended by Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) and is routinely used 
when calculating gamma scores on metamemory tasks (Bastin et al., 2012; Wojcik et al., 
2013). 
Continuous metamemory judgements.  In the remaining metamemory 
experiments, participants did not make simple Yes/No judgements concerning their 




memory ability, but made metamemory judgements on a likert scale (e.g., in the JOC 
task reported in chapter five participants made confidence judgements on a scale 
ranging between one to seven, where one indicates very little confidence in their 
answer, and seven indicated that participants were extremely confident in their 
answer).  For these experiments gamma correlations were calculated using the formula 
below, where Na ǯ
metamemory judgements and Ni represents the total number of disagreements 
between metamemory judgements.  Gamma calculations were calculated individually 
for each participant, using SPSS.   
 
ܩ ൌ ܰܽ െ ܰ݅ܰܽ ൅ ܰ݅ 
Power analyses 
G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) was used to conduct  
power analyses, to determine the sample size required to detect between-group 
differences in experimental task performance for each experiment (using Cohen's 1992 
criterion).  However, a priori power analyses were not conducted to determine the 
necessary power to detect reliable associations between variables.  As such, in the 
General Discussion, issues surrounding power are discussed, specifically issues 
surrounding whether some of the exploratory correlational analyses run were 
adequately powered to detect significant correlations.   
Statistical considerations  
A standard alpha level of .05 was used to determine statistical significance.  All 
reported significance values are for two-tailed tests, unless otherwise indicated.  Where 




ANOVAs were used,  values are reported as measures of effect size ( ?Ǥ ? ? éǡ ?Ǥ ? ? éǡ ?Ǥ ? ? éǢǡ ? ? ? ?).  Where t-tests were ǡǯd values are reported as measures of effect size ( ?Ǥ ?Ǥ ? ? éǡ ? ?Ǥ ? ? éǢ ? ?Ǥ ? ? éǢǡ ? ? ? ?).  When correlations were  ?Ǥ ? ?ǡ ?Ǥ ? ?moderate effect and  ?Ǥ70 was considered a large effect (Cohen, 1969).  





METACOGNITION, METAMEMORY, AND MINDREADING IN HIGH-FUNCTIONING 
ADULTS WITH AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER1 
Introduction ǲ ǳ.  More ǡǯ
ǲǳǡǲǳǡǲǳ.  ǯabout cognitive 
processes in general (in self and others), whereas metacognitive monitoring and control ǯǯǡ
mental states and cognitive activity (Flavell, 1979).   
One extensively studied component of metacognition is metamemory, which ǯǡ
control their own memory.  ǯ(1990) influential model of 
metamemory divides metamemory (monitoring and control) processes into two levels: ǲ-ǳǲ-ǳ.  The object-level consists of first-order memory 
processes (i.e., memory itself), whilst the meta-level consists of dynamic, second-order 
representations of the object-level.  This model is supported by neuropsychological 
(e.g., Janowsky, Shimamura, & Squire, 1989; Shimamura & Squire, 1986) and psycho-
pharmacological (e.g., Dunlosky et al., 1998) data, which highlight a dissociation 
                                                      
1 This chapter has been adapted from Grainger, C., Williams, D. M. & Lind, S. E. (2014).  
Metacognition, Metamemory, and Mindreading in High-Functioning Adults with Autism 
Spectrum Disorder.  Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 123 (3), pp. 650-609.  It has been modified 
to fit the format of this thesis.  




between memory and metamemory.  ǯǡ
metamemory monitoring individuals create a meta-representation of the object-level 
(Nelson & Narens, 1990).  Additionally, metamemory control processes use information 
held at this meta-level to feedback to the object-level, allowing individuals to alter 
object-level processes and implement different strategies during learning (e.g., by 
allocating more study time to information that one believes one has not learnt).  It is 
partly for this reason that metamemory is considered essential for adaptive functioning, ǯǯ
object-level memory.  ǡǯate 
the strategies they implement during learning are likely to be ineffective.   
 Metamemory judgments  
One of the most commonly-used and classic paradigms to assess metamemory 
monitoring involves asking people to make feeling-of-knowing (FOK; Hart, 1965) 
judgements.  During a typical FOK task, participants are asked (during a study phase) to ȋǤǤǡǡǲ-ǳǡǲ-ǳǤȌ.  Participants are then presented (during a cued-recall test phase) with ȋǢǤǤǡǲǳȌǡȋǢǤǤǡǲǳȌ.  Importantly, on trials in which participants fail to correctly 
recall the target they are asked to judge the likelihood that, at a later point, they would 
be able to recognise it.  Finally, participants are then presented with the cue and are 
asked to select the unrecalled target from several options (a recognition test phase).  ǯ
using Gamma correlations (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954), which measure the association ǯ




target with their actual subsequent recognition performance (see p.63 for a detailed 
description of how Gamma correlations are calculated).   
 
ǲǳ 
Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to attribute mental states, such as beliefs, 
desires, and intentions, to self and others in order to explain and predict behaviour 
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  While most research into ToM focuses on awareness of 
other ȋǲǳȌǡmetacognition focuses on ǯ.  Indeed, given the potential role of metacognition in self-
regulation, Flavell (2000) ǲǳ.   
Several different perspectives have been proposed to explain the potential 
relation between mindreading and metacognition.  According to one perspective (e.g., 
Carruthers, 2009; Frith & Happé, 1999)ǡǯ
(metacognition) relies on the same underlying metarepresentational mechanism as the 
ability to understand mental states in others (mindreading).  Crucially, according to this 
one-mechanism theory, no dissociation should exist between mindreading and 
metacognition ability; individuals who demonstrate mindreading impairments should 
also demonstrate impaired metacognition.  However, this proposal has been disputed.  
According to a version of thǲǳǡ
from our ability to directly introspect the contents of our own mind, and then use this ǯ(e.g., 
Goldman, 2006).  From this perspective, metacognition is both ontogenetically and 
phylogenetically prior to, and foundational for, mindreading.  According to a third 
theory, proposed by Nichols and Stich (2003), mindreading and metacognition are Ǣǲǳ





Crucially, both of these latter two theories imply that there should be some people who 
manifest diminished mindreading abilities, despite undiminished metacognition.  
Indeed, both Goldman, and Nichols and Stich explicitly suggest that people with autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD) present precisely this pattern of impaired mindreading, but 
intact metacognition.   
Metacognition in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a developmental disorder diagnosed on the 
basis of social-communication deficits, and fixated interests and repetitive behaviours 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  It is widely acknowledged that ASD is 
characterised by diminished mindreading ability (see Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & 
Solomonica-Levi, 1998).  However, until recently the question of whether metacognition 
is diminished among people with ASD has remained largely unexplored.   
The study of metacognition in ASD could have important implications for 
educational practice among individuals with ASD.  Metacognition in general and, more 
specifically, metamemory play key roles in aspects of learning and decision-making that 
we know people with ASD have difficulties with.  ǯ
(1990) ǡǯ
feeds back to memory functioning, allowing individuals to control their learning 
efficiently.  As such, having a good awareness of what one has learnt can improve an ǯ.  For example, when revising for an exam, if an 
individual can accurately assess what information they already know, they are able to 
spend their time effectively, revising the topics they do not know.  This issue may be 




particularly relevant for intellectually high-functioning people with ASD, given that 
many of these individuals show significantly lower academic achievement than would 
be expected on the basis of their intelligence, which in turn impacts negatively on their 
life chances (see Estes, Rivera, Bryan, Cali, & Dawson, 2011).  Indeed, the educational 
domains in which people with ASD frequently under-achieve are just those in which 
learning is known to be fostered by metacognitive training.  Such training has been 
shown to remediate difficulties in reading comprehension (see Brown & Campione, 
1996), writing (e.g., Sitko, 1998) and mathematical reasoning (e.g., Fuchs et al., 2003).  
In each of these domains, individuals with ASD show statistically significant under-
achievement, relative to IQ (see Estes et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2009).  It is possible that 
diminished metacognitive monitoring contributes to the lower-than-expected levels of 
academic achievement in ASD in these areas.   
 Thus, for several reasons it is important to establish the extent to which 
individuals with ASD show diminished metacognitive ability.  In a seminal paper, Frith 
and Happé (1999) argued explicitly that individuals with ASD are as impaired at 
metacognition as they are at mindreading.  More recently, Williams (2010) has taken up 
this idea, citing evidence that individuals with this disorder are as impaired at 
recognisiǯ(Hurlburt et al., 1994), emotions 
and specific mental states, such as beliefs and intentions (Williams & Happé, 2010), as 
they are at recognising these states in others.  Evidence ǲǳ
mindreading tasks (e.g., Williams & Happé, 2009b), in which participants are asked to 
report their own previously held (now false) belief, also suggests that individuals with 
ASD demonstrate diminished awareness of their own beliefs.  Each of these findings 
suggests that metacognition is impaired in individuals with ASD, which appears in 
keeping with the view that mindreading and metacognition rely on the same underlying 




mechanism.  As such, it has been argued that the evidence from studies of mental state 
attribution in ASD provides support for the one-mechanism account. 
However, some have argued that there is a critical limitation with these types of 
studies that prevents definitive conclusions being drawn about metacognitive ability in 
ASD (see Carruthers, 2009; Nichols & Stich, 2003).  The potential difficulty is that test 
questions in self versions of classic mindreading tasks require participants to recall 
their prior mental states, rather than report their current mental states.  Simulation and 
two mechanisms theories claim that only current mental states are directly accessible 
without the need for mindreading.  Thus, arguably, the results from the above studies 
do not necessarily show that metacognition is impaired in ASD, because these tasks 
require inferences to be drawn about past mental states (but see Williams, 2010, for a 
counter-argument). 
By contrast, it is widely agreed that metamemory monitoring judgements are 
based on awareness of current mental states.  As such, if the accuracy of metamemory 
monitoring is diminished among people with ASD, this would provide strong support 
for the suggestion that metacognition is diminished in ASD, contrary to the predictions 
that follow from the simulation/two-mechanisms theory.  In this regard, a seminal 
study by Farrant, Boucher and Blades (1999) reported no metamemory impairment in 
ASD.  This study was used by Nichols and Stich (2003) to support the suggestion that 
metamemory is unimpaired in individuals with ASD, and thus to support their two-
mechanisms theory.  However, an issue with this study is that Farrant et al., assessed 
metamemory knowledge.  The one-mechanism account proposes that metacognitive 
monitoring/control, rather than metacognitive knowledge, necessarily relies on the 
same metarepresentational mechanism as mindreading.  ǡ	Ǥǯ
cannot be taken as conclusive evidence that all aspects of metamemory are typical in 




individuals with ASD.  At most, it suggests that the metamemory knowledge may be 
intact Ȃ the study did not assess metamemory monitoring or control.   
In order to unambiguously test whether metacognition is impaired in ASD, 
evidence is instead required from studies of metacognitive monitoring (or control).  
Performance on FOK tasks relies on individuals monitoring current internal memory 
states.  Only one study to date has examined metamemory in ASD using a FOK task 
(Wojcik et al., 2013).  ǯ
monitoring ability using two FOK tasks, one asking individuals to assess their memory 
for information stored episodically and one assessing memory for information stored 
semantically.  Wojcik reported that children with ASD were significantly poorer than 
neurotypical children at making accurate FOK judgements, but only when assessing 
their episodic memory.  However, there is a particular methodological difficulty Ǥǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
being drawn.  The difficulty is that the ASD and neurotypical groups were not matched 
for verbal IQ (VIQ).  Matching for VIQ is essential in such studies, because differences 
between groups in this respect can potentially entirely explain between-group 
differences in experimental task performance (see Mervis & Klein-Tasman, 2004).  
Wojcik et al., (2013) recognised this limitation and tried to overcome it using an ǲǳ.  However, ANCOVA does not, in fact, 
solve this problem (see Miller & Chapman, 2001)  and, thus, we cannot determine 
whether group differences were driven by diagnostic status or by VIQ differences.  In 
the current study, FOK accuracy was explored among ASD and comparison groups that 
were closely matched for VIQ, as well as for age, PIQ, and FSIQ.  If, as predicted, 
between-group differences in FOK accuracy were apparent, this would provide the first 
definitive evidence of a diminution of this ability among individuals with ASD.   




The Current Study 
The aim of this study was to explore the extent to which individuals with ASD are 
able to accurately monitor their own memory.  To examine this, a classic FOK task was 
employed.  It was predicted that participants with ASD would make significantly less 
accurate FOK judgments than comparison participants.  During the FOK task different 
types of errors can lead to inaccurate FOK judgements; individuals can make over-
confident errors (in which individuals incorrectly predict they will recognise a word 
that they subsequently fail to recognise) and also under-confident errors (in which 
individuals fail to predict their subsequently successful recognition of a target word).  
The type of error made by people with ASD during metacognitive monitoring tasks has 
not been explored previously, but it was predicted that individuals with ASD would 
make more FOK judgement errors overall, but would not be specifically biased towards 
over-confident or under-confident errors.   
Additionally, the Meta-cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ; Cartwright-Hatton & 
Wells, 1997) was also used, as a self-ǯ
own metacognitive ability.  To date, no study has previously assessed metacognitive 
ability in individuals with ASD using a self-report questionnaire.  It was predicted that 
individuals in the ASD group would report diminished confidence in and awareness of 
and their own thoughts, as reflected by lower scores on the cognitive self-consciousness 
sub-scale and higher scores on the cognitive confidence sub-scale of the MCQ.   
A measure of mindreading ability was also included in the current study.  It was ǯǡ-
mechanism theory, metacognitive impairments should only be apparent if mindreading 
impairments are also present.  To assess mindreading ability, a version of the 




animations task (Abell et al., 2000) was employed.  During this task, individuals are 
asked to view a series of clips in which animated triangles interact with one another.  
Participants are asked to provide descriptions of/explanations for the patterns of 
interaction between the triangles in each clip.  ǯ
interactions requires the attribution of mental states (e.g., intentions, desires).  Two 
conditions of the animations task were employed; namely a mentalising condition and a 
goal-directed condition.  Both of these conditions appear to rely on the mindreading 
system, although performance on the mentalising condition is thought to rely on 
mindreading to a greater extent than the goal-directed condition.  Based on the findings 
from previous studies (e.g., Abell et al., 2000; Lind, Williams, et al., 2014), it was 
predicted that participants with ASD would show diminished overall performance on 
the animations task, but not a group (neurotypical/ASD) by condition 
(mentalising/goal-directed) interaction on the task.   
Method 
A priori power analysis 
Prior to commencing the study, G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007) was used to 
conduct a power analysis to determine the sample size required to detect the predicted 
group differences in gamma correlation on the FOK task.  It can be argued that no valid 
studies of FOK accuracy have been conducted among individuals with ASD.  Thus, for 
the purpose of this power analysis, an effect size for the between-group difference in 
FOK accuracy could not be predicted based on effect sizes found in previous studies.  
Therefore, based on theoretical inclinations toward the one-mechanism view, it was 
predicted that metacognitive impairments in ASD should be of a similar magnitude to 
the magnitude of mindreading impairments in this disorder.  As such, the prediction for 




the effect size associated with between-group difference in FOK accuracy in the current 
study was based on the effect size found for between-group differences in mindreading 
ability in studies of ASD.  In a meta-analysis exploring mindreading ability in individuals 
with ASD relative to neurotypical individuals, Yirmiya and colleagues reported an ǯd of 0.88 (Yirmiya et al., 1998).  Thus, assuming d = 0.88 for between-Ƚ éǤ ? ?ǡ
sample size of n  é ? ?ǯ(1992) 
recommended power of .80.  
Participants 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from Durham University ethics 
committee.  Eighteen adults with ASD (13 males, 5 females) and 18 neurotypical 
comparison adults (11 males, 7 females) took part, all of whom gave written, informed 
consent before participating.  One participant with ASD completed the MCQ incorrectly, ǯ.  Participants in 
the ASD group had all received formal diagnoses of autistic disorder (n = 4) or ǯȋn = 14), according to DSM or ICD criteria (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000; World Heath Organisation, 1993).   
In order to assess current ASD features, 15 of the 18 participants in the ASD 
group completed Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-Generic (ADOS; Lord et al., 
2000) assessments.  The remaining three participants declined to complete the ADOS, 
as they did not feel comfortable being filmed.  The three participants who did not 
complete the ADOS had rigorous diagnoses and scored above the cut-off on the Autism-
spectrum Quotient (see immediately below).  All participants who completed the ADOS  ? ?ǡ-off for ASD (Lord et al., 2000).  All participants




completed the Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), a self-report 
questionnaire that assesses ASD/ASD-like features.  Fifteen out of 18 participants with 
ASD scored above the defined cut-off for ASD on the AQ ( ? ? ?Ǣ-
Smith et al., 2005).  Only three participants missed this cut-off.  However, all three of 
these participants scored well above the defined ASD cut-off on the ADOS (all ADOS  ? ? ?Ȍ.  All comparison participants scored 
below the defined cut-off for ASD.   
Table 2: Participant Characteristics (Means, Standard Deviations and Inferential 
Statistics). 
No participants, in either group, reported using any psychotropic medication or 
any history of neurological or psychiatric disorders (apart from ASD).  The participant 
groups were closely equated for verbal and non-verbal ability (see Table 2 for 
 Group    
 ASD              
 (n = 18) 
Neurotypical  
(n = 18) 
t p ǯd 
Age (years) 28.96 (10.28)  30.43 (14.59) 0.35 Ǥ ? ? ?  ?Ǥ ? ? 
VIQ 111.67 (14.66) 112.28 (10.87) 0.14 .888 0.05 
PIQ 109.67 (15.75) 114.50 (10.96) 1.07 .293 0.36 
FSIQ 112.33 (15.00) 114.94 (10.50) 0.61  .549  0.20 
AQ Total Score 33.39 (9.24) 13.00 (6.22) 7.77 <.001 2.59 
ADOS Social + 
Communication Score* 
 11.93 (2.19)     
 
AQ: Autism-spectrum Quotient; ADOS: Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; 
PIQ = performance IQ; FSIQ = full scale IQ; VIQ = verbal IQ  
*Based on 15/18 participants 
 




participant characteristics).  Verbal IQ (VIQ), performance IQ (PIQ), and full-scale IQ 
(FSIQ) were assessed using the full (four subtest) version of the Wechsler Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999).  Groups were also closely equated for 
chronological age.   
Materials and Procedures 
Feeling-of-knowing task.  The stimuli used in the FOK task were 80 word pairs, 
comprising of 160 concrete nouns (80 cue words and 80 target words).  Cue words 
were matched with the target words for syllable length and word frequency (Kucera & 
Francis, 1967), as reported in the MRC psycholinguistic database (Coltheart, 1981).  The 
adequacy of this matching was confirmed by a non-significant effect of word type ȋȀȌȋǯȌ
syllable length and word frequency as the dependent variables, F (2, 157) = 0.68, p = .93.   
The procedure for the FOK task consisted of a study phase, a cued-recall test 
phase (during which FOK judgements were also made; see below), and a recognition 
test phase (see Figure 5 below for a graphical representation of one trial of the task).  
The task was run on an LG desktop computer and lasted approximately 25 minutes.  
Before completing the task participants completed a practice version of the entire 
procedure, consisting of five word pairs.  As such, individuals knew before the study 
phase that their memory for the word pairs would be tested, both by a cued-recall test 
and a recognition test.  
Study phase.  During the study phase, participants were presented with ȋǤǤǡǲ-ǳȌǡȋǲǳȌȋǲǳȌ.  Each word pair was presented individually for four seconds.  
After the study phase, there was a five minute break, during which participants filled in 




the MCQ (see subsection below).  After this break participants immediately completed 
the cued-recall test phase.   
Cued-recall and FOK phase.  During the cued-recall phase, participants were 
shown individually presented cue words, in a random order, and were asked to recall 
the missing target word associated with each cue.  Immediately after each recall attempt 
(i.e., on a trial-by-trial basis), participants were asked to make a FOK judgement as to 
whether they thought they would be able to recognise the missing target word at a later ȋǲǳǲǳȌ.  As such, participants made FOK judgements for all cue 
words, regardless of whether their recall of the target word had been accurate or not.  
However, in the statistical analyses of FOK accuracy, only judgements made on trials in 
which participants failed to recall the target were included.  This procedure is common 
to studies of FOK ability among typically and atypically developing populations.  The 
procedure is designed to test parǯ
be able to recognise information they have failed to recall.   
Recognition phase.  Immediately after the cued-recall phase, participants 
completed the recognition test phase.  During the recognition test, participants were 
individually presented with all 80 cue words, in a random order, and were asked to 
identify the correct target word in a four-alternative, forced-choice recognition test.  On 
each trial, participants were asked to click (using the ǯȌ
thought had been previously paired with the cue, from a selection of four options; the 
correct target word, an incorrect target word (that had previously been paired with a 
different cue word), and two novel distractor words not previously used in the task.  
Importantly, for a given cue word, all participants were shown the same four options to 
choose from.  Once participants had clicked on a response the next trial began.  During 
the recognition test phase a target word only appeared as an option twice; once on a 




trial in which it was the correct target word and once on a trial as an incorrect target 
word.  The same target word (appearing either as the correct or incorrect option) never 
appeared on two consecutive trials.   
Figure 5: Graphical representation of the procedure used during the FOK task.   
 
Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire.  The Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ; 
Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) ǯ
own thoughts, and the efficacy of different thought processes.  The MCQ presents ȋǤǤǡǲmemory for 
words and ǳȌarticipants were asked to decide the extent to which they 
agreed with each statement, responding on a 4-point likert scale, ranging from do not 
agree, agree slightly, agree moderately, to agree very much.  The questionnaire consists 
of 65 items comprising five subscales.  The study was interested in two of these 
subscales specifically.  The Cognitive confidence and Cognitive self-consciousness 





their confidence in their own cognitions, which are of particular relevance to this study.  
In contrast, the remaining subscales addressed issues about worrying and the effects ǯǡ
the aims of the study.   
Animations task.  The animations task (Abell et al., 2000) was administrated, as 
a measure of mindreading ability.  A full description of this task is provided in chapter 
two, p.59.   
Scoring 
Feeling-of-knowing task.  ǯ-level 
memory performance were calculated on the FOK task.  Recall ability was calculated as 
the proportion of target words participants correctly recalled during the cued-recall-
stage.  Similarly, recognition ability was calculated as the proportion of target words 
participants correctly recognised during the recognition test phase of the task.  Gamma 
scores (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954) were calculated to provide an index of overall FOK 
judgement accuracy.  This analysis is recommended by Nelson (1984) and is commonly 
used to analyse FOK tasks (Kelemen et al., 2000; Nelson & Narens, 1990; Nelson et al., 
2004; Wojcik et al., 2013).  Gamma scores are a non-parametric measure of association 
(between predictions and actual performance) and were calculated by comparing the 
number of correct predictions that each individual made with the number of incorrect 
predictions they made.  To calculate gamma scores the formula ܩ ൌ ሺܽ݀ െ ܾܿሻȀሺܽ݀ ൅ܾܿሻ ǡȋȌǲǳǡȋȌǲǳǡȋȌǲǳǡȋdȌǲǳ.  Gamma 




scores range between + 1 to -1, where a score of 0 indicates chance-level accuracy, a 
large positive value indicates a good degree of accuracy, and a large negative value 
indicates less than chance-level performance on the task.  However, when calculating 
gamma scores, the score cannot be calculated when two or more of the prediction rates 
(a, b, c, or d) are equal to 0.  As such, the raw data were adjusted by adding 0.5 onto each 
prediction frequency and dividing by the overall number of FOK judgements made (N) 
plus 1 (N+1).  This correction is recommended by Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) and is 
routinely used when calculating gamma scores on metamemory tasks (Bastin et al., 
2012; Wojcik et al., 2013).   
The number of errors made by participants in each group was calculated for two 
different types of errors in FOK predictions.  The number of under-confident errors ǲǳǡ
individuals failed to predict their subsequently successful recognition of a target word.  
The number of over-confident errors participants made was calculated as the number of ǲǳǡ
would recognise a word that they subsequently failed to recognise.   
Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire.  MCQ Sub-scale scores were calculated for the 
Cognitive confidence subscale and the Cognitive self-consciousness subscale.  Lower 
total scores on the Cognitive confidence sub-scale indicated a greater confidence in ǯǡ-consciousness sub-
scale ǯ.   
Animations task.  ǯ
transcribed verbatim.  These transcriptions were then scored by a second, independent 
rater (who was blind to the hypotheses of the study and the diagnostic status of the 




participants) on the basis of scoring criteria outlined in Abell et al., (2000).  Inter-rater 
reliability for scores across the eight animations was almost perfect, ǯȽ = .98.   
Results 
Feeling of knowing task 
Memory (object-level) performance.  Group differences in object-level 
memory performance were examined using independent-samples t-tests (see Table 3 
for descriptive and inferential statistics).  These indicated that individuals in the ASD 
group recalled significantly fewer target words than comparison participants in the FOK 
task.  However, no significant group difference was found in the proportion of target 
words correctly recognised in the FOK task.   
Metamemory performance.  Group differences in metamemory monitoring 
accuracy were examined (see Table 3 for descriptive and inferential statistics).  An 
independent-samples t-test indicated that there was a significant difference in gamma 
scores between the ASD and neurotypical group.  Thus, in accordance with predictions, 
participants with ASD were significantly poorer at predicting their own memory 
performance than were neurotypical participants.  Nonetheless, one-sampled t-tests 
indicated that gamma scores were significantly above chance (i.e. significantly greater 
than 0) in ASD and neurotypical groups, all ts > 2.97, all ps < .009.   
An additional analysis was also carried out to investigate whether the significant 
group difference in object-level recall of target words confounded performance at the 
meta-level of the task (i.e., FOK judgements).  For the purpose of this analysis, two 
participants from each group were excluded to create ASD and neurotypical groups that 
were matched closely for recall ability, t (30) = 1.14, p = .26, d = 0.41.  Groups also 
remained matched for chronological age, VIQ, PIQ, and FSIQ (all ps > .33, all ds < 0.35).  




An independent-samples t-test indicated that even when groups were equated closely 
for recall ability, FOK gamma scores were still significantly lower in the ASD group (M = 
.09, SD = .16) than in the neurotypical group (M = .25, SD = .18), t (30) = 2.60, p = .014, d 
= 0.94. 
Group differences in the specific type of errors participants made on the FOK 
task were also examined.  Independent samples t-tests indicated that participants in the 
ASD group made significantly more under-confident FOK errors than participants in the 
neurotypical group (see Table 3 for statistics).  There was no significant group 
difference in the number of over-confident FOK errors made (see Table 3 for statistics). 
Self-report measure of metacognitive ability 
Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations for the two key MCQ subscale 
scores in the ASD and neurotypical group.  A significant between-group difference was 
found in scores on the Cognitive self-consciousness subscale, indicating that 
participants in the ASD group believed they were superior at monitoring their own 
thoughts, and more aware of their own thought processes relative to comparison adults.  
There was no significant between-group difference in scores on the Cognitive 
confidence subscale.   




















Note: ASD = autism spectrum disorder; FOK = Feeling of knowing; MCQ = Meta-cognitions Questionnaire 
*Gamma scores index metamemory monitoring accuracy
Table 3: Means (SDs) and inferential statistics for group differences in performance on the FOK task, MCQ,  and 
animations task.  
Experimental Measure  Group     
  ASD Neurotypical  t p ǯ
d 
FOK Task: Object-level 
memory performance 
Proportion of targets recalled .18  (.15) .31 (.22)  2.04 .049 0.69 

















 Number of over-confident 
judgments 
6.50 (6.56) 6.89 (7.14)  0.17 .866 0.06 
 
Number of under-confident 
judgments 
22.50 (7.41) 14.22 (6.59)  3.54 .001 1.18 
 
MCQ Cognitive self-consciousness 
subscale 
21.06 (3.73) 16.89 (4.31)  3.05 .004 1.03 
 
 Cognitive confidence subscale 19.00 (4.30) 19.83 (5.17)  0.52 .609 0.17 
 
Animations task Mentalising condition 3.78 (1.70) 4.89 (1.71)  1.96 .059 0.65 
 
 Goal-directed condition 5.83 (1.50) 7.22 (0.73)  3.52 .001 1.18 




Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations for performance on the 
animations task.  A mixed-model ANOVA was carried out on these data with Group 
(neurotypical/ASD) entered as the between-subjects variable, and Animation Type 
(mentalising/goal-directed) entered as the within-subject variable.  There was a 
significant main effect of Group on animations scores, reflecting the fact that 
participants with ASD performed significantly less well than comparison participants on 
the task overall, F (1, 34) = 9.02, p = .005,  = .21.  There was also a significant main 
effect of Animation Type, indicating that, across both groups, scores were higher in the 
goal-directed condition than the mentalising condition, F (1, 34) = 72.82, p < .001.   = 
.68.  There was no significant Group by Animation Type interaction, F (1, 34) = 0.29, p = 
.59, = .01, suggesting that individuals in the ASD group were impaired at both higher- 
and lower-level mindreading, relative to individuals in the neurotypical group.   
Exploratory correlation analyses: Associations between metamemory ability, and 
mindreading ability and self-reported metacognitive skill 
A series of correlational analyses was carried out to explore the relation between 
performance in each condition of the animations (mindreading) task and performance 
on the FOK (metacognition) task.  It should be noted that, although the current study 
was sufficiently powered to detect predicted group differences in FOK accuracy, it was 
not sufficiently powered to detect moderately-sized correlations (r = .30) between FOK 
accuracy and mindreading ability (please see the discussion for further information 
regarding study power).  The following correlation analyses should, thus, be considered 
exploratory.  In summary, neither FOK accuracy (gamma score), nor the number of 
under-confident FOK errors made, nor the number of over-confident FOK errors made 
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was associated significantly with performance in the mentalising condition of the 
animations task, or performance in the goal-directed condition of the animations task, 
among ASD or comparison participants,  all r ?-.32, all p ?Ǥ ? ? ?.  Additionally, neither 
FOK accuracy (gamma score), nor the number of under-confident FOK errors made, nor 
the number of over-confident FOK errors made was associated significantly with scores 
on either of the MCQ sub-scales, among ASD or comparison participants, all r ?-.43, all 
p ?Ǥ ? ? ?.   
Discussion 
Until now, no study has established the extent to which individuals with ASD are 
able to accurately monitor their own memory by judging feelings-of-knowing.  As such, 
the primary aim of this study was to establish this.  In terms of the central experimental 
finding, the study found that participants with ASD showed significantly diminished 
FOK accuracy.  This diminution was associated with a large effect size (d = 0.97), 
indicating a substantial difficulty with metamemory monitoring.   
This result is in keeping with predictions that individuals with ASD would show 
impairments in metamemory monitoring.  However, there are several potential 
explanations for the observation of diminished gamma scores in the ASD group.  One ǲǳ
the task.  The concept of a positive illusory bias refers to a tendency for an individual to 
self-assess their perceived competence as greater than their actual ability.  This bias has 
been observed among individuals with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (see 
Owens, Goldfine, Evangelista, Hoza, & Kaiser, 2007).  More importantly, some studies 
have indicated that individuals with ASD tend to self-report their own social functioning 
more positively than parents will report (e.g., Lerner, Calhoun, Mikami, & De Los Reyes, 
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2012), and will self-report the level of their own autistic traits as less severe than 
parents will report (e.g., Johnson, Filliter, & Murphy, 2009).  These studies have been 
interpreted as suggesting that individuals with ASD may also show a tendency to 
manifest a positive illusory bias.  Demonstrating a positive illusory bias may indeed 
partly explain findings that participants with ASD self-reported (on the MCQ) greater 
awareness of their own mental states than neurotypical comparison participants 
reported.  This self-reported superior awareness among participants with ASD stood in 
direct contrast to their diminished performance on an objective, well-established 
measure of metamemory monitoring ability.  As such, the idea that some individuals 
with ASD manifest a positive illusory bias provides a plausible explanation for the MCQ 
findings.   
However, it is not apparent that a positive illusory bias can explain the central 
finding of diminished FOK accuracy among participants with ASD.  Individuals who 
manifest a positive illusory bias would, by definition, overestimate their memory ability 
and would, thus, be expected to make more over-confident errors when making FOK 
judgements.  In other words, diminished FOK accuracy among people whose 
judgements were driven by a positive illusory bias would be driven by over-confidence.  
Yet, participants with ASD did not specifically make significantly more over-confident 
errors than comparison participants.  Rather, individuals with ASD made significantly 
more under-confident errors than comparison participants.  As such, it appears that 
demonstrating a positive illusory bias cannot explain the specific pattern of results 
shown in this study 
The finding that participants with ASD made significantly more errors of the 
under-confident type (i.e., they tended to recognise targets that they judged they would 
not recognise), but not the over-confident type, was contrary to the prediction that 
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between-group differences in monitoring accuracy would be driven by an increase of 
both types of error among participants with ASD.  This suggests that diminished 
performance on the FOK task among participants with ASD was driven by a relative lack 
of awareness of existing knowledge, rather than a belief in the possession of knowledge 
that does not, in fact, exist.   
These results have several potential practical and clinical implications.  
Ultimately, if an individual has a reduced ability to accurately assess what information 
they know, and what they do not know, this may have several consequences.  From an 
educational perspective, studies have shown that several outcomes (such as exam 
performance) can be predicted by metacognitive monitoring accuracy (e.g., Hartwig, 
Was, Isaacson, & Dunlosky, 2012; Thiede, Anderson, & Therriault, 2003).  Findings that 
individuals with ASD show impaired metamemory monitoring need to be taken into 
account in educational environments, and should inform intervention efforts designed 
to remediate cognitive impairments in ASD.  Studies in typical development have also 
shown that cognitive impairments can be remediated by fostering metacognition (e.g., 
Dunlosky, Kubat-Silman, & Hertzog, 2003).  Indeed, training metacognitive skills has 
been shown to remediate difficulties in reading, writing and mathematical reasoning 
(see Brown & Campione, 1996; Fuchs et al., 2003; Sitko, 1998) in typical development.  
The results of the current study make it plausible to suggest that diminished 
metacognitive monitoring ability contributes to educational underachievement in these 
areas among people with ASD.  If this turns out to be correct, it could have revolutionary 
effects on educational practices for people with ASD.  It is important for future research 
to build upon the current results by exploring the extent to which metacognitive 
impairments contribute to educational success among individuals with ASD.   
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As well as having important educational implications, the central finding of 
reduced FOK accuracy in ASD also has theoretical implications.  The central findings of 
diminished FOK accuracy alongside diminished mindreading ability are in keeping with 
the predictions of the one mechanism theory of the relation between metacognition and 
mindreading.  Of course, the results do not definitively prove the theory, but certainly 
they are not in keeping with a key prediction made by either the simulation theory or 
the two-mechanisms theory that metacognition is unimpaired in ASD.  As such, the main 
results of this study provide some support for the one-mechanism account.  Having said 
this, the study did not find a significant positive association between FOK accuracy and 
performance in either the mentalising or goal-directed conditions of the animations 
task.  The one-mechanism account would have predicted such associations between 
metamemory and mindreading, so the current results did not support the theory in this 
respect.  However, caution should be taken when interpreting the results of the 
correlation analyses.  The exploration of associations between FOK task performance 
and animations (mindreading) task performance was carried out as exploratory 
analysis, and no a priori power analysis was conducted to establish that the study had 
adequate power for this secondary aim.  A subsequent power analysis (after completion 
of the study) was conducted with a view to determining what sample size would have 
been necessary to detect meaningful, statistically significant associations between 
metacognitive monitoring ability and mindreading ability.  Assuming a moderate 
association (r  é ?Ǥ ? ?ȌȽ éǤ ? ?ǡn = 67 participants would be ǯ(1992) recommended power of .80 for the correlational 
analyses.  Thus, this study was under-powered to detect a meaningful association 
between these two abilities.  This represents a limitation of this study and, as such, 
caution should be taken when interpreting the findings from these correlation analyses.  
C h a p t e r  T h r e e :  F O K  j u d g m e n t s  i n  A S D  | 91 
 
 
Future studies using larger sample sizes are warranted to further investigate relations 
between metacognitive monitoring and mindreading ability. 
What is clear is that the current study was sufficiently powered to detect 
predicted group differences in FOK accuracy and that results indicated participants with 
ASD showed a substantial diminution of metamemory monitoring.  Of course, there are 
other forms of judgement that can be used to assess metamemory, namely judgements 
of learning and judgements of confidence.  It remains possible that people with ASD will 
show undiminished accuracy in these judgements.  Judgments of learning involve 
assessing how well one thinks one has learnt a piece of information, and judgements of ǯ
knowledge about a piece of information.  The literature on typical development suggests 
that metamemory accuracy is only modestly correlated across different types of 
metamemory judgement (Kelemen et al., 2000; Leonesio & Nelson, 1990).  This has led 
to suggestions that different metamemory judgments may be based on different sources 
of information.  Metamemory judgements are thought to be based on mnemonic cues 
and it is possible that different judgements are based on different cues (see Koriat, 
1993; Metcalfe et al., 1993).  Although it was predicted that individuals with ASD will 
demonstrate impairments across different metamemory judgements, this may not turn 
out to be the case.  So far there have been only two published studies of judgment of 
confidence accuracy (Wilkinson et al., 2010; Wojcik et al., 2011).  Results from these 
studies have been inconsistent; whereas Wilkinson et al., (2010) report that confidence 
judgments made by children with ASD were less accurate than those made by 
neurotypical children, Wojcik and colleague report no impairments in JOC accuracy in 
children with ASD (Wojcik et al., 2011).  Thus, the study of metacognitive monitoring in 
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ASD is in its infancy and a sustained study of metamemory and its neurocognitive basis 
in ASD would be fruitful.   
Future research should address these issues, and should also aim to address 
whether it is possible to foster metacognitive skills in individuals who do show 
impairments.  In our view, a comprehensive investigation of metacognition in ASD is 
essential, given the consequences that impaired metacognitive monitoring and ǯrformance.  It is hoped that 
alongside future research the findings from this study will help to establish a more 
definitive account of metacognitive ability in ASD, and that a greater understanding of 
this area will eventually contribute to successful remediation of cognitive and 
behavioural impairments in this disorder.  





JUDGMENT OF LEARNING ACCURACY IN HIGH-FUNCTIONING CHILDREN AND 
ADULTS WITH AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER 
Introduction 
Metacognition is typically assessed in the context of metamemory, an ǯ
memory processes during learning.  Employing a traditional metamemory task, chapter 
three investigated whether individuals with ASD demonstrate metamemory 
impairments, when asked to judge the extent to which they feel they will know a piece 
of information in the future (a FOK judgements).  The results of this chapter indicated 
that individuals with ASD demonstrate impairments in metacognitive monitoring 
processes, and are less accurate at assessing their own states of knowledge than 
comparison participants.   
There are of course several other forms of judgements that can be used to assess 
metamemory, most notably judgements of learning and judgements of confidence.  
Although chapter three indicated that individuals with ASD demonstrate impaired 
metamemory on a FOK task, it remains possible that people with ASD will show 
undiminished accuracy in these other judgements.  The literature on typical 
development suggests that metamemory accuracy is not necessarily consistent across 
different types of metamemory judgements (Kelemen et al., 2000; Leonesio & Nelson, 
1990).  This has led to suggestions that different metamemory judgments may be based 
on different sources of information.  As such, although theoretically impairments on 
other metamemory tasks are predicted, it is possible that metamemory monitoring is 
not universally impaired in ASD.   





ǯepeatedly been assessed by 
asking people to make judgement of learning (JOL; Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969) 
assessments.  During a standard JOL task participants are asked (during a learning 
phase) to memorise a series of stimuli pairs (e.Ǥǡǡǲ-ǳǡǲ-ǳǤȌ.  After the learning phase, participants complete the JOL 
phase.  During this phase, participants are presented with one stimulus from the pair ȋǢǤǤǡǲǳȌjudgement on the likelihood that, at a later ǡǯȋǢǤǤǡǲǳȌ.  Finally, during 
a recall phase, participants are presented with each cue word in turn and asked to recall 
the corresponding missing target word.  ǯǯ
performance with their actual recall performance.   
Thus, in a standard procedure, the JOL phase involves making so-ǲ- ǳ(Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992), and participants are presented only with 
the cue word and are asked the judge the likelihood that they will later recall the 
corresponding target.  However, an important variant to this standard procedure 
involves participants making so-ǲ-ǳȋƬ
1992).  In this version, which involves a manipulation of the JOL phase, individuals are 
asked to determine the future retrievability of the target when presented with both the 
cue and the target.  Whilst both JOL tasks ask individuals to assess their future memory 
ability, it is distinctly possible that individuals rely on different types of information and 
cues during such tasks.  Typically, individuals demonstrate better accuracy on cue-alone 
JOL tasks than cue-target JOL task (e.g., Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992, 1997).  One 




explanation for this finding is that when making each type of JOL individuals retrieve 
information about the to-be-remembered stimuli from both their short term memory 
(STM) and long term memory (LTM).  Information from LTM is thought to be a better 
indicator of future memory performance than information from STM, as it is more 
similar to the information participants will rely on during the recall phase of a JOL task.  
Delayed cue-alone JOLs are thought to be based mostly on information recollected from 
long-term memory, than from information immediately accessible n from short-term 
memory.  However, when making delayed cue-target JOLs information directly 
accessibly from STM (reactivated into STM by the presentation of both the cue and 
target word) is thought to add ǲnoiseǳto the information retrieved from LTM, thus 
reducing the accuracy of individuals cue-target predictions (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992, 
1997).  Alternatively it has been suggested that individuals are less accurate at making 
cue-target JOL assessments, as the presence of the target word during the JOL phase 
means participants are not given the opportunity to experience retrieving the target 
word during the JOL phase ,which presumably occurs when individuals make cue-alone 
JOL assessments (see Dunlosky & Nelson, 1997).   
Additionally, judgements of learning are not always made on an individual, item-
by-item basis.  When making an aggregate JOL individuals are asked to make an overall 
estimate of the number or percentage of items they think they will remember, and 
predictions about future performance are made after individuals have completed all 
learning trials.  It has been proposed that aggregate JOLs may provide individuals with a 
different opportunity for self-monitoring, compared to item-by-item JOLs (e.g., 
Schneider, Visé, Lockl, & Nelson, 2000).  Individuals tend to make different types of 
errors on aggregate JOL tasks, compared to item-by-item tasks; whereas neurotypical 
individuals tend to demonstrate overconfidence in their judgements on item-by-tem JOL 




tasks, individuals tend to demonstrate less overconfidence on aggregate JOL tasks (e.g., 
Mazzoni & Nelson, 1995).  Individuals also typically demonstrate better accuracy on 
aggregate JOL tasks than item-by-item JOL tasks (e.g., Schneider et al., 2000).  This is 
thought to be because individuals base aggregate judgements on prior experience 
retrieving similar information and on how deeply they feel they have encoded all 
memory items, rather on specific mnemonic cues associated with individual memory 
items.   
JOL accuracy in individuals with ASD 
There is a growing body of research that suggests individuals with ASD manifest 
diminished awareness of their own mental states (e.g., Williams & Happé, 2009b; 
Williams & Happé, 2010; Wojcik et al., 2013).  In keeping with the results from these 
studies, the results reported in chapter three indicated that adults with ASD showed 
significantly diminished feeling of knowing accuracy.  These results suggest that, at least 
when making on one type of metamemory judgment, individuals with ASD are less 
accurate at monitoring their own mental states.   
At the time of designing and running Experiment 1, no studies had been 
published using a JOL task to assess metamemory in either children or adults with ASD.  
Thus, based on the results of previous studies, as well as theoretical predictions that 
metacognition should be impaired in individuals who demonstrate mindreading 
impairments, predictions of impaired monitoring accuracy on a JOL task were 
unequivocal.  However, recently Wojcik and colleagues (Wojcik et al., 2014) reported 
the results of two JOL tasks in children with ASD, and reported finding no metacognitive ǯ.  In their study children with ASD, 
and neurotypical children, were presented with word pairs, and were either 




immediately asked to judge whether they thought they would be able to remember the 
target words (during an immediate cue-alone JOL task) or made JOL decisions after a 
delay (during a delayed cue-alone JOL task).  Wojcik et al., (2014) found that individuals 
with ASD were as accurate as neurotypical participants at judging their future memory 
performance, across both the immediate and delayed JO tasks.  That being said, there 
was some indication that metamemory was impaired in individuals with ASD in this 
study.  Wojcik et al., (2014) found that on the immediate JOL task, on average, the ASD ǯ
task (i.e., not significantly greater than 0).  As such, JOL predictions made by individuals 
with ASD were in no way associated with their subsequent memory performance on the 
task.  Although the study found that across both tasks the ASD group did not make 
significantly less accurate JOL predictions than the neurotypical group, on the 
immediate JOL tasks the difference between gamma scores in the ASD group (Mean = 
.05, SD = .11) and neurotypical group (Mean = .27, SD = .11) was very large (Cohen d = 
2.00).  As such, at least on the immediate JOL task used in this study, it did appear that 
individuals with ASD demonstrated poor metamemory monitoring accuracy. 
Additionally, there are several potential methodological issues with Wojcik et Ǥǯ(2014) study that suggest caution should be taken when interpreting the study 
results.  Firstly, no measure of mindreading ability was used in this study.  Theoretically, 
predictions that individuals with ASD will demonstrated an impaired understanding of 
their own mental states are based on findings that individuals with ASD demonstrate 
impairments understanding mental states in others.  It is possible that ASD participants 
in this study did not demonstrate impairments in metamemory accuracy because they 
showed similar mindreading ability to the comparison individuals.  Although this is 
purely speculative, without directly measuring mindreading ability we cannot be sure 




that mindreading was impaired in the sample of ASD participants, relative to the 
comparison group.   
AǤǯinding that individuals with 
ASD are not impaired when making JOL assessments is suggestion that individuals with 
ASD used an atypical strategy during the JOL phase of the task.  In other words, it might 
be possible that participants with ASD in Wojcik et ǯperformed well on the 
delayed JOL task, despite diminished underlying metacognitive monitoring competence.  
It has been speculated that relatively accurate JOLs could be made on cue-alone JOL 
tasks simply by judging whether one can bring to mind the target word at the time a JOL 
is made.  For example, during cue-alone JOL tasks, if presented with the cue word (e.g., ǲ-ǫǳȌ
target word is at a later point, individuals might adopt the strategy of simply answering ǲǳǡǡǡǲǳ
they cannot.  As such, when making JOLs, individuals with impaired metacognition 
might still be able make relatively accurate JOLs, simply by employing this strategy.  
This may be a potential explanation for why Wojcik et al., (2014) found seemingly intact 
monitoring ability on two cue-alone JOL tasks, which seems inconsistent with other 
studies of metacognition in ASD (Grainger, Williams, & Lind, 2014; Wojcik et al., 2013).  
Participants cannot use this strategy to compensate for impairments in metacognition 
during cue-target JOL tasks (in which both cue and target words are presented during 
the JOL phase of the task), aggregate JOL tasks, or other metamemory tasks (such as 
FOK tasks).  For example, in cue-target JOL tasks individuals are not given the 
opportunity to retrieve the target word during the JOL phase, and thus they cannot rely 
on this experience when making their judgements.  Similarly, in a standard FOK task 
(such as the task employed in chapter three) judgements are made on items 




participants failed to recall, and thus again individuals cannot achieve typical 
performance on a FOK task by relying on their current memory for missing target 
words.   
The Current Study 
The current study aimed to address these issues, and explored the extent to 
which both children and adults with ASD are able to make accurate JOL assessments on 
a series of JOL tasks.  Three experiments were carried out, two exploring JOL accuracy 
in adults with ASD and one exploring JOL accuracy in children with ASD.  In these 
experiments multiple JOL tasks were employed, and the experiments were designed to 
follow on from each another, as outlined below.  Additionally, measures of mindreading 
ability were also included, firstly to confirm typical mindreading impairments in the 
sample of individuals with ASD being tested, and secondly to analyse the relation 
between performance on metamemory and mindreading tasks.   
The primary aim of both experiment 1 and experiment 2 was to thoroughly 
assess JOL ability in adults with ASD, including the relationship between mindreading 
impairments and impairments on JOL tasks.  Importantly, to date no study has 
previously assessed JOL accuracy in relation to mindreading ability, and thus it was 
important to establish to what extent performance on such tasks are related.  The final 
experiment was carried out to address alternative explanations for the earlier findings 
reported in experiments 1 and 2, and also previous findings from the literature (Wojcik 
et al., 2014). ǯ main prediction was that participants with ASD would demonstrate 
impairments in accuracy on all the JOL tasks employed.  Given the results from chapter 
three, it was also predicted that individuals with ASD would demonstrate more under-




confident errors whilst monitoring their memory, relative to neurotypical participants.  
Additionally, mindreading ability was assessed in all experiments.  It was also important ǯǡwas predicted that 
metacognitive impairments in ASD should only be apparent if mindreading 
impairments are also present.  Throughout, mindreading ability was assessed in adults 
using the Animations task (Abell et al., 2000), and in children using both the Animations 
task and the Strange Stories task (Happé, 1994).  It was predicted that individuals with 
ASD would demonstrate stereotypical mindreading impairments on all mindreading 
tasks, relative to matched neurotypical participants.  Including measures of 
mindreading also meant that the relationship between performance on the JOL tasks 
and performance on mindreading tasks could be explored.  It was predicted that 
individuals with ASD would demonstrate corresponding deficits on both the JOL and 
mindreading tasks, and that impairments in JOL accuracy would be positively related to 
impairments in mindreading accuracy.   
Experiment 1: Method 
Participants 
Eighteen adults with ASD (13 males, 5 females) and 18 neurotypical comparison 
adults (11 males, 7 females) took part, all of whom gave written, informed consent 
before participating.  Participants in the ASD group had all received formal diagnoses of 
autistic disorder (n  é ?Ȍǯȋn = 14), according to DSM-IV or ICD 
criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; World Heath Organisation, 1993).  In 
order to assess current ASD features, 15 of the 18 participants in the ASD group 
completed ADOS (Lord et al., 2000) assessments (please see chapter two for a 
description of this tool).  The remaining three participants declined to complete the 




ADOS, as they did not feel comfortable being filmed.  The three participants who did not 
complete the ADOS had rigorous diagnoses and scored above the cut-off on the Autism-
spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  All participants who completed the  ? ?ǡ-off for ASD (Lord et al., 2000).  All 
participants completed the AQ questionnaire.  Fifteen out of 18 participants with ASD 
scored above the defined cut-off for ASD on the AQ ( ? ? ?Ǣ-Smith et 
al., 2005).  Only three participants missed this cut-off.  However, all three of these 
participants scored well above the defined ASD cut-off on the ADOS (all ADOS scores  ? ? ?Ȍ.  All comparison participants scored below 
the defined cut-off for ASD. 
Table 4:  Participant Characteristics (Means, Standard Deviations and Inferential 
Statistics). 
 
Group    
 
ASD 
(n = 18) 
Neurotypical 
(n = 18) 
t p ǯ 
d 
Age (years) 
28.96 (10.28) 30.43 (14.59) 0.35 .730 0.12 
VIQ 
111.67 (14.66) 112.28 (10.87) 0.14 .888 0.05 
PIQ 
109.67 (15.75) 114.50 (10.96) 1.07 .293 0.36 
FSIQ 
112.33 (15.00) 114.94 (10.50) 0.61 .549 0.20 
AQ Total Score 
33.39 (9.24) 13.00 (6.22) 7.77 <.001 2.59 
ADOS Social + 
Communication Score* 
11.93 (2.19)     
AQ: Autism-spectrum Quotient; ADOS: Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; 
PIQ = performance IQ; FSIQ = full scale IQ; VIQ = verbal IQ  
*Based on 15/18 participants 




No participants, in either group, reported using any psychotropic medication or 
any history of neurological or psychiatric disorders (apart from ASD).  The participant 
groups were closely equated for verbal and non-verbal ability (see Table 4 for 
participant characteristics).  Groups were also closely equated for chronological age. 
Materials and procedures 
Judgement-of-learning task.  A delayed JOL design was employed, consisting of 
a learning phase, a JOL phase, and a cued-recall test phase (please see Figure 6 for a 
graphical representation of the task).  The stimuli used during the JOL task were 80 
word pairs (160 words) all of which all were concrete nouns.  Each word pair was made ǲǳǡǡǲǳǡ
phase.  Cue words and target words were matched for word frequency (Kucera & 
Francis, 1967), as reported in the MRC psycholinguistic database (Coltheart, 1981).  The 
adequacy of this matching was confirmed by a non-significant main effect of word type 
(cue/target) in an ANOVA, that included word frequency as the dependent variable, F 
(1, 158) = 1.63, p = .204,  = .01.   
Before participants completed the task the entire procedure was explained to 
them, and participants completed a practice of the task (consisting of five word pairs) 
before beginning the experimental trials.  As such, before learning the word pairs, 
participants were aware that their memory for each word pair would be tested.  The 
task was run on an LG desktop computer and lasted approximately 25 minutes. 
Learning phase.  Firstly participants completed the learning phase of the task.  
During the learning phase, participants were presented with the 80 cue-target word 
pairs.  Word pairs were presented to participants individually and participants were 




asked to memorise the word pair on the screen, and then to click the mouse whenever 
they were ready to see the next word-pair.  Whenever the mouse was clicked the next 
word-pair appeared on the screen.  As such, participants could take as long as they 
wanted to learn each word-pair.  Word pairs were presented to participants during the 





Figure 6: Graphical representation of the JOL tasks used in Experiment 1. 
 
JOL Phase.  After the learning phase, there was a five minute break.  Participants 
then completed the JOL phase.  During the JOL phase participants were individually 
presented, in a random order, with the cue words alone.  For example,  if participants 
learnt the cue-target word pair ǲ-ǳ during the learning phase then 
participants JOLs were cued by the presentation of the cue word ǲ- ǫǳǡand asked to 
judge  whether they thought they would be able to recall the correct target word 
(ǲǳ).  For each cue word, participants were asked to make a JOL (either ǲYesǳor ǲNoǳȌ as to whether they would be able to recall the associated target word, when 
prompted with the cue word at a later point.  Participants made their JOL response by 
pressing the ǲYǳkey on the keyboard if they thought they would correctly remember the 
missing target word, and the ǲNǳkey if you did not think they would know the missing 
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Cued-recall phase.  Immediately after the JOL phase participants completed a 
cued-recall test.  Participants were presented with the cue words again, in a random 
order, and were asked to recall the missing target word.  Participants typed out their 
recall response, and submitted their response by pressing the ǲenterǳkey.  Once a recall 
response was submitted, the next cue word appeared on the screen.  There was no time 
limit on this part of the task.   
Mindreading task.  The animations task (Abell et al., 2000) was administrated, 
as a measure of mindreading ability.  A full description of this task is provided in 
chapter two, p.59.   
Scoring 
Judgment-of-learning task.   
Memory (object-level) performance.  ǯ-level memory 
performance was calculated on the JOL task.  Recall ability was calculated as the 
proportion of target words participants correctly recalled during the cued-recall stage.  
The vast majority of recall responses were unambiguously correct or not correct.  
However on very few occasions there was some debate as to whether a recall response 
should be considered correct.  On such occasions recall responses were only considered 
correct if participants had a) recalled a plural of the target word (e.g., if the target word 
was ǲtreeǳǡ a recall response of ǲtreesǳwas considered correct), or b) had clearly made 
an typing error when entering their response (e.g., if the target word was ǲtreeǳǡ a recall 
response of ǲtreewǳwas also considered correct.  Recall responses that were 
semantically similar to the target word, but were not the correct target word, were 
considered incorrect (e.g., if the target word was ǲflaskǳǡ a recall response of ǲthermosǳ
was considered wrong).   




Metamemory performance.  Gamma correlation (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954) 
were calculated to provide an index of overall JOL accuracy.  Gamma correlations were 
calculated based on all JOLs made.  Please see chapter two, p.63, for a detailed 
explanation of Gamma correlations and how they were calculated.   
The number of errors made by participants in each group was calculated for two 
different types of error in JOL predictions.  The number of under-confident errors ǲǳǡ
individuals failed to predict their subsequently successful recall of a target word.  The 
number of over-confident errors participants made was calculated as the number of ǲǳǡ
would recall a word that they subsequently failed to remember.   
Animations task.  ǯ
transcribed verbatim.  These transcriptions were then scored by a second rater who 
was blind to the diagnostic status of the participants, according to the scoring criteria 
outlined in Abell et al., (2000; see also appendix one).  Inter-rater reliability for scores 
across the four animations was excellent, ǯȽ = .98.   
Experiment 1: Results 
Mindreading task 
 Table 5 shows the means and standard deviations for performance on the 
animations task.  A mixed-model ANOVA was carried out on these data with Group 
(neurotypical/ASD) entered as the between-subjects variable, and Animation Type 
(mentalising/goal-directed) entered as the within-subject variable.  There was a 
significant main effect of Group on animations scores, reflecting the fact that 
participants with ASD performed significantly less well than comparison participants on 




the task overall, F (1, 34) = 9.02, p = .005,   = .21.  There was a significant main effect of 
Animation Type, indicating that, across both groups, scores were higher in the goal-
directed condition than the mentalising condition, F (1, 34) = 72.82, p < .001.    = .68.  
There was no significant Group × Animation Type interaction, F  (1, 34) = 0.29, p = .593, 
 = .01, suggesting that individuals in the ASD group were impaired at both higher- and 
lower-level mindreading, relative to individuals in the neurotypical group.  Therefore, in 
line with one-mechanism accounts of mentalising, you would expect to see 
corresponding deficits in metamemory monitoring accuracy on the JOL, in individuals 
with ASD.   
 
Judgement-of-learning task 
Memory (object-level) performance.  Group differences in object-level 
memory performance were examined using independent-samples t-tests (see Table 5 
for descriptive and inferential statistics).  These indicated that individuals in the ASD 
group recalled significantly fewer target words than comparison participants during the 
JOL task.   
Metamemory performance.  Group differences in metamemory monitoring 
accuracy were also examined (see Table 5 for descriptive and inferential statistics).  An 
independent-samples t-test indicated that there was no significant difference in gamma 
scores between the ASD and neurotypical group.  Thus, not in keeping with predictions, 
participants with ASD were not significantly poorer at predicting their own memory 
performance than were neurotypical participants, on the JOL task.  One-sampled t-tests 
indicated that gamma scores were significantly above chance (i.e. significantly greater 
than 0) in the ASD and neurotypical groups, all ts > 21.16, all ps < .001.  An additional 




analysis was also carried out to investigate whether the significant group difference in 
object-level recall of target words confounded performance at the meta-level of the task 
(i.e., JOL accuracy).  For the purpose of this analysis, two participants from each group 
were excluded to create ASD and neurotypical groups that were matched closely for 
recall ability, t (30) = 1.31, p = .200, d = 0.47.  These sub-groups also remained matched 
for age, VIQ, PIQ, and FSIQ (all ps > .52, all ds < 0.23).  An independent-samples t-test 
indicated that even when groups were equated closely for recall ability, JOL gamma 
scores were still not significantly different in the ASD group (M = .75, SD = .13) than in 
the neurotypical group (M = .70, SD = .15), t (30) = 1.15, p = .261, d = 0.36.  
Group differences in the specific type of errors participants made on the JOL task 
were also examined.  Independent samples t-tests indicated that participants in the ASD 
group did not make significantly more under-confident JOL errors than participants in 
the neurotypical group (see Table 5 for statistics).  There was no significant group 
difference in the number of over-confident JOL errors made (see Table 5 for statistics).   
Associations between monitoring ability, and mindreading ability. 
There was no association between metamemory accuracy (Gamma scores) and 
performance on either the mentalising or goal-directed condition of the animations 
task, in the ASD group, all rs < -.35, all ps > .157.  In neurotypical participants there was 
no association between metamemory accuracy and performance on the mentalising 
condition of the animations task, r = .27, p = .276.  However there was a significant 
negative correlation between metamemory accuracy and performance on the goal-
directed condition of the animations task, r = -.47, p = .047.  This indicated that, in 
neurotypical participants, the more accurate participants JOL predictions, the poorer 
their performance was on the goal-directed condition of the animations task




















 Group     
 
 ASD 
(n = 18) 
Neurotypical 
(n = 18) 
 t p ǯ
d 
Animations task 
Mentalising condition 3.78 (1.70) 4.89 (1.71)  1.96 .059 0.65 
 
Goal-directed condition 5.83 (1.50) 7.22 (0.73)  3.52 .001 1.18 
JOL Task; Object-level 
memory performance 
Proportion of targets recalled .30 (.26) .49 (.25)  2.28 Ǥ ? ? ?  ?Ǥ ? ? 
JOL Task: Meta-
memory performance Gamma scores* 
.76 (.13) .71 (.14)  1.06 .295 0.37 
 Number of over-confident 
judgments 
7.06 (4.35) 9.06 (5.75)  1.18 .247 0.39 
 Number of under-confident 
judgments 
2.28 (3.91) 2.22 (2.04)  0.05 .958 0.02 
  
*Gamma scores index metamemory monitoring accuracy 




Experiment 1: Discussion 
The results of experiment one suggest that, despite mindreading impairments, 
adults with ASD appear as accurate as neurotypical individuals on the JOL task.  This is 
not in keeping with predictions that individuals with ASD would demonstrate poorer 
awareness of their own mental states, nor in keeping with the results reported in 
chapter three (on the FOK task).  Instead, it suggests that adults with ASD do not 
demonstrate monitoring impairments on a JOL task.   
However, it is unclear from the results reported in experiment one what strategy 
individuals with ASD, and neurotypical individuals, used whilst making their JOL 
decisions.  Despite item-by-item (cue-alone) JOL tasks being well established measures 
of metacognition, it was speculated that relatively accurate JOL assessments could have 
been made on the task used in experiment one using an alternative strategy; simply by 
judging whether one can bring to mind the target word at the time a JOL is made.  As 
such, it is possible that individuals with ASD might have been able to achieve typical 
levels of performance on the task, despite underlying impairments in metacognition.   
For this reason, aggregate JOL tasks may provide a better measure of monitoring 
ability.  Aggregate JOL assessments are thought to be based on how deeply an individual 
feels they have encoded all the items, and aǯ
experiences retrieving similar information.  Importantly, individuals cannot base 
aggregate JOLs simply on whether they can bring to mind individual missing target 
words.  If performance in the ASD group in experiment one was driven by such a 
strategy it is possible that individuals with ASD may demonstrate impairments on 
aggregate JOL task but not on item-by-item JOL tasks.   




As such, to gain a better understanding of whether typical JOL accuracy in 
individuals with ASD was the result of using this alternative strategy, 12 participants 
with ASD and 10 neurotypical participants (all of whom participated in the first 
experiment) were brought back to complete an aggregate JOL task.   
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment two reports the results of a preliminary study, exploring aggregate 
JOL accuracy in individuals with ASD.  During this task participants were presented with 
two lists of words to remember, one list of high-frequency words and a list of low-
frequency words.  Participants were given 8 minutes to memorise as many words from 
both lists as possible, and could choose how much of this time they spent learning each 
word list.  Metamemory monitoring accuracy was assessed by asking participants to 
make aggregate JOL predictions ǡǯs were then 
compared to their actual recognition performance on the task.  The design of this study 
also allowed us to investigate whether JOL assessments made by individuals with ASD 
were influenced by specific aspects of the learning material judgements were made on.  
The effect of word frequency on memory has been extensively studied, and studies have 
typically found that individuals remember high-frequency words better than low-
frequency word, but are more likely to make false-alarms for low-frequency words than 
high-frequency words (e.g., Gardiner & Java, 1990; Reder et al., 2000).  Studies have also 
shown that individuals with ASD also demonstrate typical word frequency effects in 
recognition memory (Bowler, Gardiner, & Grice, 2000).  This experiment is novel in that 
it explored whether individuals with ASD, and neurotypical individuals, are able to 
make aggregate JOL assessments that reflect this pattern, predicting better memory for 
the low-frequency word list than the high-frequency




Additionally, the design of experiment two meant it was possible to investigate 
whether individuals with ASD demonstrate specific strategy use during a JOL task.  
Some studies suggest that individuals with ASD may demonstrate difficulties 
spontaneously implementing memory strategies (e.g., Bowler, Gaigg, & Gardiner, 2008; 
Gaigg, Gardiner, & Bowler, 2008).  Given findings that individuals typically find low-
frequency words harder to remember than high-frequency words (e.g., Gardiner & Java, 
1990; Reder et al., 2000), the study explored whether individuals, in both the ASD and 
neurotypical groups, regulated their learning on the task and spent significantly more 
time learning the list of low-frequency words than the list of high-frequency words.  As 
predicted in the introduction of this chapter, it was expected that individuals with ASD 
would demonstrate impairments in monitoring accuracy on the aggregate JOL task, and 
would make less accurate JOL predictions, relative to neurotypical participants.  It was 
also predicted that individuals with ASD would not regulate their study behaviour 
during the learning phase of the task, to the extent that neurotypical participants would.  
Whilst it was expected that neurotypical participants would spend more time learning 
the list of low-frequency words, relative to high frequency words, it was predicted that 
individuals with ASD would spend an equal amount of time memorising both word lists.   
Experiment 2: Method 
Participants  
Twelve adults with ASD (8 males, 4 females) and 10 neurotypical comparison 
adults (7 males, 3 females) took part, all of whom had taken part in the previous 
experiment (please see Table 6 for details of participant characteristics).  Participant 
groups were closely equated for verbal ability, non-verbal ability and chronological age. 
  




Material and procedure. 
Aggregate JOL task.  An aggregate JOL design was employed, consisting of a 
learning phase, a JOL phase, and a recognition test phase.  The stimuli used during the 
learning phase of the task were two lists of 80 words (160 words) all of which all were 
concrete nouns.  List one consisted of 80 low-frequency word pairs, and list two 
consisted of 80 high-frequency word pairs.  A t-test confirmed that list one contained 
words with significantly lower word frequencies than list two, t (158) = 12.44, p < .001, 
d = 1.97.  Word lists were matched for syllable length, as reported in the MRC 
psycholinguistic database (Coltheart, 1981), t (158) = 0.54, p =  .581, d = 0.10.  Eighty 
lure words were also used during the recognition phase of the task.  Lure words 
Table 6:  Participant Characteristics (Means, Standard Deviations and Inferential 
Statistics). 
 
Group    
 
ASD               
(n = 12) 
Neurotypical  




27.54 (8.83) 32.27 (15.15) 0.91 .372 0.38 
VIQ 
112.25 (13.08) 113.80 (13.68) 0.27 .789 0.12 
PIQ 
108.58 (16.37) 113.70 (10.14) 0.86 .401 0.38 
FSIQ 
112.08 (13.96) 115.60 (12.24) 0.62 .541 0.27 
AQ Total Score 
32.08 (9.26) 13.80 (6.39) 5.28 <.001 2.30 
ADOS Social + 
Communication Score* 
11.60     
*Based on 10/12 participants 




consisted of 40 high frequency lure words, and 40 low frequency lure words.  Again, t-
tests confirmed that high frequency lure words significantly differed from low 
frequency lure words in word frequency t (78) =  7.03, p < .001  d = 1.57, but not in 
syllable length, t (78) = 0.30 p = .764  d = 0.07.  Before beginning the actual experiment, 
the entire procedure was explained to participants and participants completed a 
practise of the task (consisting of two words lists, each three words long).  The task was 
run on an LG desktop computer and lasted approximately 25 minutes.  
 
Figure 7: Example of the start screen used in Experiment 2.   
 
Learning phase.  Firstly participants completed the learning phase of the task.  
During the learning phase, participants were presented with the two lists of words; one 
list of low-frequency words (List 1) and one list of high-frequency words (List 2).  
Participants were told that they had eight minutes to remember as many words from 
both lists as possible.  The learning phase started once participants chose which list to 
view first, and clicked on the corresponding button (see Figure 7).  Whether List 1 or 
List 2 appeared in the right hand side of the screen was counterbalanced.  A countdown 




timer appeared on the screen throughout the learning phase.  This allowed participants 
to keep track of how much time they had spent learning each of the lists, and how much 
time remained.   
JOL Phase.  After the learning phase participants then completed the JOL phase 
of the task.  During this phase participants were asked to make three aggregate JOL 
assessments.  Firstly participants were told that in total they had been presented with 
160 words (80 on each list), and were asked to decide how many they thought they 
would be able to correctly recognise in total.  Secondly participants were asked how 
many words they thought they would be able to recognise from list one (the LF word 
list).  Finally, participants were asked to judge how many words they thought they 
would be able to recognise from list two (the HF word list).   
Recognition phase.  ǯ
words was tested using a recognition task.  Participants were individually shown words, 
and were asked to decide whether each word had aȋǲYesǳ
or ǲǳ).  Participants were presented with all 160 words as well as the 80 novel lure 
words in a random order.   
Mindreading task.  The animations task (Abell et al., 2000) was administrated, 
as a measure of mindreading ability.  A full description of this task is provided in 
chapter two, p.59.   
Scoring 
Aggregate JOL task.   
Object-level performance.  Corrected hit rates were calculated to assess 
recognition ability on the task.  Corrected hit rates were calculated using the formula H-
FA, where H represents hit rate (the proportion of word participants correctly 




identifying as having appeared previously on the lists) and FA represents false alarm 
rate (the proportion of new word participants incorrectly identifying having appeared 
previously on the lists).   
Corrected hit rates were calculated for (a) recognition ability overall on the task, 
(b) recognition ability for words in list one (low-frequency words), and (c) recognition 
ability for words in list two (high-frequency words).  For all corrected hit rates, a false 
alarm rate based on all (80) lure words was used.  However, for the purpose of 
exploring group differences in the type of words participants made false alarms on, the 
proportion of low-frequency lure words participants made false alarms for was also 
calculated, as well as the proportion of high-frequency lure words participants made 
false alarms for.   
Metamemory monitoring accuracy.  ǯ
aggregate JOL assessments three difference scores were calculated; the difference ǯ ? ? ?ȋ
lists) and their actual recognition performance for all 160 words was calculated.  The 
difference between participants aggregate JOL assessment for list one and their 
recognition ability (i.e.  corrected hit rate) for words in list one was calculated, as well 
as the difference between participants  JOL assessment for words in list two and their 
actual recognition ability (i.e.  corrected hit rate) for words from list two.   
Metamemory control processes.  Additionally, the average time participants in 
both the ASD and neurotypical group spent learning list one (LF words) and list two (HF 
words) was calculated.  This allowed us to assess the prediction that, if participants in 
either the ASD or neurotypical group were employing control processes, they would 
spend more time learning list two (high-frequency words) than list one (low-frequency 
words).   




Mindreading task.  ǯ
transcribed verbatim and scored.  These transcriptions were then scored by a rater who 
was blind to the diagnostic status of the participants, according to the scoring criteria 
outlined in chapter two.  Inter-rater reliability for scores across the four animations was 
excellent, ǯȽ = .98 
Experiment 2: Results 
Aggregate JOL task 
Memory (object-level) performance.  Table 7 shows the means and standard 
deviations for corrected hit rates on the JOL task, for both high-frequency words (List 
two) and low-frequency words (list one), and performance overall (across both lists).  
To explore group differences in recognition ability a mixed-model ANOVA was carried 
out on these data with Group (neurotypical/ASD) entered as the between-subjects 
variable, and List Type (low-frequency/high-frequency) entered as the within-subject 
variable.  There was a significant main effect of List Type on recognition ability 
(corrected hit rate), reflecting the fact that across participant groups, participants 
recognised significantly more words from list one (low-frequency words) than words 
from list two (high-frequency words) F (1, 20) = 11.48, p = .003 ,  = .37.  There was no 
significant main effect of Group, indicating that corrected hit rates in the ASD group did 
not significantly differ from those in the neurotypical group, F (1, 20) = 0.08, p = .778,   
= .004.  There was no significant Group × List Type interaction, F (1, 20) = 0.10, p = .751 
 = .005.   
Analysis was also carried out to investigate whether individuals with ASD and ǲǳ.  Table 7 also 
shows the means and standard deviations for hit rates on the JOL task, for both high-




frequency words and low-frequency words.  A mixed-model ANOVA was carried out on 
these data with Group (neurotypical/ASD) entered as the between-subjects variable, 
and List Type (low-frequency/high-frequency) entered as the within-subject variable.  
As expected, there was a significant main effect of List Type on hit rate scores, reflecting 
the fact that across participant groups, participants recognised significantly more low-
frequency words (list one) than high-frequency words (list two), F (1, 20) = 11.48, p = 
.003 ,  = .37.  There was no significant main effect of Group, indicating that individuals 
with ASD made as many hits as neurotypical individuals, F (1, 20) = 1.24, p = .280,   = 
.06.  There was no significant Group × List Type interaction, F (1, 20) = 0.10, p = .751  = 
.005.  Overall, these results indicate that individuals with ASD showed a similar pattern 
of recognition ability relative to neurotypical individuals, recognising significantly more 
low-frequency words than high-frequency words.   
Table 7 also shows the means and standard deviations for false alarm rates on 
the recognition phase of the JOL task, for both high-frequency words and low-frequency 
words.  A mixed-model ANOVA was carried out on these data with Group 
(neurotypical/ASD) entered as the between-subjects variable, and Word Type (low-
frequency/high-frequency) entered as the within-subject variable.  There was a 
significant main effect of Word Type on false alarm rate, reflecting the fact that, as 
expected, across participant groups, participants made significantly more false alarms 
for high-frequency lure words than low frequency lure words, F (1, 20) = 10.15, p = 
.005,   = .34.  There was no significant main effect of Group, indicating that individuals 
with ASD made as many false alarms on the task as neurotypical individuals, F (1, 20) = 
2.51, p = .128,   = .112.  There was no significant Group × Word Type interaction, F (1, 
20) = 0.02, p = .897  = .001.   





Table 7:  Means (SDs) and inferential statistics for group differences in ǲǳperformance on the aggregate JOL task.  
 
 Group     
 
 ASD 
(n = 12) 
Neurotypical 
(n = 10) 
 t p ǯd 
Hit rates 
Hit rate for low-frequency words (list one) .69 (.14) .64 (.07)  0.97 Ǥ ? ? ?  ?Ǥ ? ? 
 
Hit rate for high-frequency words (list two) .57 (.21) .49 (.17)  0.89 Ǥ ? ? ?  ?Ǥ ? ? 
 
Hit rate overall (performance on both lists) 
.63 (.15) .57 (.09)  1.11 .280 0.49 
False alarm rates 
False alarms for low-frequency words 
.20 (.14) .13 (.07)  1.49 .153 0.63 
 
False alarms for high-frequency words 
.29 (.15) .21 (.13)  1.31 .205 0.57 
 
Overall false alarm rate (for all words) 
.25 (.13) .17 (.09)  1.59 .129 0.72 
Corrected hit rates* 
Corrected hit rate for low-frequency words (list one) 
.44 (.19) .47 (.11)  0.43 .673 0.19 
 
Corrected hit rate for high-frequency words (list two) 
.32 (.18) .32 (.14)  0.04 .969 0.00 
 
Corrected hit rate overall (performance on both lists) 
.38 (.15) .40 (.10)  0.29 .778 0.16 
* Note: All corrected hit rates were calculated using the overall false alarm rate, based on all (80) lure words. 




Overall, these results indicate that individuals with ASD showed a similar level 
and pattern of recognition ability relative to neurotypical individuals on the task.  
Corrected hits rates (recognition ability) were similar in both groups (see Table 7).  
Additionally, both groups demonstrated typical ǲǳ on the task, showing 
better recognition for low-frequency words, and making more false alarms on high-
frequency words (see Table 7).   
 Metamemory monitoring performance.   
 
Table 8ǣȋȌǲǳ
on the aggregate JOL task.  
 
 Group     
 
 ASD 
(n = 12) 
Neurotypical 
(n = 10) 




Aggregate JOL for  low-
frequency words (list 
one) 
29.58 (10.97) 33.60 (14.02)  0.76 .459 0.32 
 Aggregate JOL for  high-
frequency words (list 
two) 
27.50 (13.06) 24.80 (13.47)  0.48 .639 0.20 
 Aggregate JOL overall 62.92 (25.45) 55.00 (28.78)  0.69 .501 0.34 
Prediction 
Accuracy 
Difference score  for  low-
frequency words (list 
one) 
.20 (.16) .14 (.13)  0.97 .346 0.41 
 Difference score for  high-
frequency words (list 
two) 
.19 (.13) .14 (.08)  0.99 .332 0.46 
 Difference score overall .20 (.15) .16 (09)  0.83 .418 0.32 




 JOL Predictions.  Table 8 shows the means and standard deviations for 
participants JOL predictions concerning how many words they thought they would 
recognise from list one (low-frequency words) and list two (high-frequency words).  A 
mixed-model ANOVA was carried out on these data with Group (neurotypical/ASD) 
entered as the between-subjects variable, and List Type (low-frequency/high-
frequency) entered as the within-subject variable.  There was a significant main effect of 
List Type on JOL prediction, reflecting the fact that across participant groups, 
participants predicted they would recognise more words from list one (low-frequency 
words) than from list two (high-frequency words), F (1, 20) = 6.85, p = .017 ,   = .26.  
There was no significant main effect of Group, indicating that across both judgements 
individuals with ASD made as high JOL assessments as neurotypical individuals, F (1, 
20) = 0.02, p = .898,   = <.01.  There was no significant Group × List Type interaction, F 
(1, 20) = 2.61, p = .122  = .115.  These results indicate that both groups correctly 
predicted they would recognise more words from the low-frequency list than from the 
high-frequency list.   
Prediction Accuracy.  Group differences in the accuracy of participants overall 
aggregate JOL assessment were examined using independent-samples t-tests (see Table 
8 for descriptive and inferential statistics).  This indicated that the difference  
 between ǯ
performance was not significantly different in the ASD group relative to the  
neurotypical group. 
 Finally, group differences in the accuracy ǯ
assessments for how many low-frequency words they would remember from List one 
and how many high-frequency words they would remember from List two were 
examined using independent-samples t-tests (see Table 8 for descriptive and inferential 





(for either the high frequency or low frequency list) and their actual recognition 
performance for each list was not significantly different in the ASD group relative to the 
neurotypical group.   
Metamemory control processes.  Group difference in the average time 
individuals spent learning list one and list two were explored.  A mixed-model ANOVA 
was carried out on these data with Group (neurotypical/ASD) entered as the between-
subjects variable, and List Type (low-frequency/high-frequency) entered as the within-
subject variable.  However, there was no significant main effect of list type, no 
significant main effect of group, and no Group × List Type interaction, all p ?Ǥ ? ? ?ǡ   ?Ǥ ? ?.  These results indicate that neither group spent significantly more time learning 
one list more than another list, and on average groups spent half their time learning list 
one (mean = 4.04 minutes)  and half their time learning list two (mean = 3.96 minutes). 
Mindreading task.   
Table 9 shows the means and standard deviations for performance on the 
animations task.  A mixed-model ANOVA was carried out on these data with Group 
(neurotypical/ASD) entered as the between-subjects variable, and Animation Type 
(mentalising/goal-directed) entered as the within-subject variable.  There was no 
significant main effect of Group on animations scores, reflecting the fact that 
participants with ASD did not performed significantly less well than comparison 
participants on the task overall, F (1, 20) = 1.61, p = .219,   = .07.  There was a 
significant main effect of Animation Type, indicating that, across both groups, scores 
were higher in the goal-directed condition than the mentalising condition, F (1, 20) = 
76.14, p < .001.    = .79.  There was no significant Group × Animation Type interaction, 




F (1, 20) = 2.82, p = .108,  = .12.  These results suggest that, on the animations task, 
individuals with ASD did not show mentalising impairments relative to the neurotypical 
individuals.   
 
Associations between monitoring ability and mindreading ability 
Exploratory correlations were run to investigate the association between 
monitoring accuracy on the JOL task (the difference between participants overall JOL 
and their overall recognition ability) and performance on the animations task.  Overall 
there was no significant correlation between performance in either the mentalising or 
goal-directed condition of the animations task and accuracy on the JOL task, in either 
the ASD or neurotypical group, all rs < -.22, all ps > .547.  It should be noted that, given 
the small sample size of participants in each group, some caution should be taken when 
making conclusions regarding these correlations.   
Experiment 2: Discussion 
The results of experiment two indicate that, as expected, both groups 
demonstrated clear ǲǳ on that task (recognising more low-frequency 
Table 9:  Means (SDs) and inferential statistics for group differences in performance 
on the animations task. 
 
Group     
 
ASD 
(n = 12) 
Neurotypical 
(n = 10) 
 t p ǯd 
Mentalising condition 3.67 (1.72) 3.80 (1.40)  0.20 .846 0.04 
Goal-directed condition 5.83 (1.47) 7.00 (0.67)  2.32 .031 1.02 




words than high-frequency words during the recognition phase of the task, and making 
more false alarms on high-frequency lure words than low-frequency lures).  Regarding 
meta-level performance on the task, individuals with ASD, and comparison individuals, 
both successfully predicted that they would remember more words from the low-
frequency word list than the high-frequency word list.  Additionally, the aggregate JOL 
assessments made by individuals with ASD were as accurate at predicting their future 
memory performance on the task as those made by neurotypical individuals.  The 
results from experiment two were in keeping with the results reported in  experiment 
one, and suggest that adults with ASD do not show impaired metamemory monitoring 
accuracy on JOL tasks.   
A number of methodological issues with experiment two should be considered.  
Firstly, a limited number of participants took part in this study (12 ASD participants, 10 
neurotypical participants).  As such, there is some concern that the study was not 
adequately powered to detect group differences on the aggregate JOL task.  When 
looking at group differences in the aggregate JOL predictions participants made for list 
one (low frequency words) and list two (high frequency word) no significant group by 
list type interaction was found.  However, participants with ASD did predict they would 
remember fewer words from the low frequency list (list one) than neurotypical 
participants predicted, and predicted they would remember more words from the high 
frequency list (list two), than neurotypical participants predicted.  This pattern of 
results does suggest that participants with ASD were less accurate at predicting their 
future memory performance, and it is possible that this interaction effect was not 
significant (p = .122) due to a lack of power.   
Additionally, in experiment two individuals with ASD did not appear to show 
impairments on the animation task.  This suggests that, in this sample of ASD 




participants, mindreading ability was not impaired relative to comparison participants.  
This presents a theoretical problem, as (according to the one-mechanism theory) one 
should only expect to find metacognitive impairments in individuals with ASD who only 
demonstrate mindreading impairments.   
Additionally, whilst experiments one and two suggest JOL accuracy is intact in 
adults with ASD, impairments in JOL accuracy maybe developmental in nature and only 
apparent in children with ASD.  Experiment three addressed this issue, and explored 
JOL accuracy in children with ASD, using two JOL paradigms.  Children with and without 
ASD were asked to complete both a cue-alone JOL task and a cue-target JOL task.  
Additionally, to provide a more sensitive measure of mindreading ability, two 
mindreading tasks were employed; the Animations Task (Abell et al., 2000) and the 
Strange Stories Task (Happé, 1994).  This allowed us to assess mindreading more 
comprehensively than in the two previous studies.  The results of experiment one and 
two suggest that JOL accuracy is typical in adults with ASD.  However, methodological 
concerns with both studies might explain intact JOL accuracy in the individuals with 
ASD.  As such predictions regarding JOL accuracy in children with ASD, on both the cue-
alone and cue-target JOL tasks, were equivocal.   
Experiment 3: Method 
Participants  
Twenty-two children with ASD and 21 neurotypical comparison children took 
part in this experiment, after their parents had given written, informed consent.  All 
participants completed the JOL tasks and the animations task.  However, due to 
restrictions that occurred during data collection three participants did not complete the 
strange stories task (two participants with ASD, one neurotypical participant).  




Participants in the ASD group had all received formal diagnoses of autistic disorder (n = 
17Ȍǯȋn = 5).  In all but one case, participants with ASD scored 
above the defined cut-off for ASD on the SRS ( ? ? ?ǢǤǡ ? ? ? ?). 
The remaining participant scored 56 on the SRS, which is just below the conventional 
ASD cut-off of 60.  This participant had a formal diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder.   
Table 10: Participant Characteristics (Means, Standard Deviations and Inferential 
Statistics). 
Parents of the neurotypical children also completed the SRS.  All but four 
participants in the neurotypical group scored below the defined cut-off for ASD.  The ǯfrom 60 to 73.  To ensure that including 
these participants in the overall sample did not affect the results of the study all 
analyses in the paper were re-run, excluding these four participants and the 
participants with ASD who scored below the recommended cut-off on the SRS.  After 
 
Group    
 
ASD 
(n = 22) 
Neurotypical 
(n = 21) 
t p ǯ 
d 
Age (years) 13.70 (1.45) 13.21 (1.18) 1.21 .234 0.37 
VIQ 100.68 (15.48) 98.76 (12.54) 0.45 .658 0.14 
PIQ 101.41 (14.80) 102.86 (14.11) 0.33 .744 0.10 
FSIQ 100.95 (14.06) 101.14 (13.68) 0.04 .965 0.01 
SRS Total Score 83.14 (9.93) 47.29 (11.66) 10.87 <.001 3.31 
SRS: Social Responsiveness Scale (Constantino et al., 2003);  VIQ = verbal IQ;  PIQ = 
performance IQ; FSIQ = full scale IQ. 
 




removing these participants, none of the experimental results reported in the paper 
changed, from being previous significant to non-significant.  Both groups were equated 
closely for VIQ, PIQ, FSIQ, and chronological age.  Participant characteristics are 
presented in Table 10. 
Materials and procedures  
Judgment-of-learning tasks.  Two sets of 22 word-pairs (44 words) were used 
as stimuli for the JOL tasks.  Both sets were matched for mean syllable length and word 
frequency (Kucera & Francis, 1967), as reported in the MCR psycholinguistic database 
(Coltheart, 1981).  To check that the words used in each set were adequately matched, a 
multivariate analysis of syllable length and word frequency across both sets was carried 
out.  ǡǯǡF (2, 85) 
= .152, p = .859,  = .004.  Participants were tested individually on both tasks during 
two separate testing sessions (please see Figure 8 for a graphical representation of both 
JOL tasks).  To control for any tasks effects, the order participants completed each JOL 
task was counterbalanced.  Before completing either task participants completed a 
practice block, consisting of five word pairs.   
Cue-alone JOL Task.  The procedure employed during the judgement-of-learning 
task used a delayed JOL design, consisting of a learning phase, a JOL phase and a cued-
recall test phase.  The task was run on a Sony VAIO laptop, and lasted approximately 15-
20 minutes.  During the learning phase participants were individually presented with 
22 cue-target word pairs for 8 seconds each.  Participants were told that their memory 
for each word pair would be tested at a later point, with the presentation of the cue 
word alone.  After the learning phase participants then completed the JOL phase of the 
task, in which they were presented, in a random order, with cue words alone (i.e., if 




participants learnt the cue-ǲ-ǳǲ- ǫǳȌ.  The only previous study of JOL accuracy (Wojcik 
et al., 2014), alongside Experiment 1, asked participants to make dichotomous (Yes/No) 
JOL assessments.  In both studies individuals with ASD did not demonstrate 
impairments in monitoring accuracy, relative to neurotypical individuals.  However, it is 
possible that categorical judgements might not provide the variation necessary to 
observe group difference in JOL accuracy.  As such, in this experiment participants were 
presented with each cue word individually for 5 seconds, and were asked to make a JOL 
on a scale of 1-5.  It was explained to participants that a JOL of 1 indicated that they 
thought they would definitely not be able to remember the missing target word, and a 
JOL of 5 indicated they thought they would definitely be able to remember the missing 
target word.  Immediately after the JOL phase participants completed a cued-recall test.  
Participants were presented again with cue words alone, in a random order, and were 
asked to recall the missing target word.  Participants were not limited in the amount of 
time they had to recall the target word for a given cue word.   
Cue-target JOL Task.  The cue-target JOL tasks followed the same procedure as 
the cue-alone JOL task.  However, during the JOL phase instead of being presented with 
cue-words alone, participants were presented with the entire word pairs again (i.e., if 
participants learnt the cue-ǲ-ǳǲ- ǳȌ.  Again, participants were asked to make a 
JOL on a scale of 1 to 5.  Apart from this difference, the procedure for each JOL task was 
exactly the same.   
Mindreading tasks.  Two measures of mindreading ability were administered: 
the animations task (Abell et al., 2000) and the strange stories task (Happé, 1996).  A 
full description of both these tasks is provided in chapter two, p.59-62. 
















Figure 8: Graphical representations of the cue-alone and cue-target JOL tasks used 
in Experiment 3. 
 
Scoring  
Judgment-of-learning task.   
Memory (object-level) performance.  ǯ-level memory 
performance was calculated on the JOL task.  Recall ability was calculated as the 
proportion of target words participants correctly recalled during the cued-recall-stage.  
Target words were considered correct if participants had a) correctly recalled the target 
word, b) participants recalled a plural of the target word (e.g., if the target word was ǲcupǳ, a recall response of ǲcupsǳwas considered correct), or c) participants had clearly 
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recall response of ǲcupzǳwas also considered correct.  Recall responses that were 
semantically similar to the target word, but were not the correct target word, were 
considered incorrect (e.g., if the target word was ǲflaskǳǡ a recall response of ǲthermosǳ
was considered incorrect).   
Metamemory performance.  Gamma correlations (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954) 
were calculated to provide an index of overall JOL accuracy.  Gamma correlations were 
calculated based on all JOLs made.  Please see chapter two, p.63, for a detailed 
explanation of Gamma correlations, and how they were calculated.   
Animations task.  ǯ
transcribed verbatim.  These transcriptions were then scored by a second rater who 
was blind to the diagnostic status of the participants, according to the scoring criteria 
outlined in chapter two.  Inter-rater reliability for scores across the four animations was 
excellentǡǯȽ éǤ ? ?Ǥ 
Strange Stories Task.  ǯ
question were transcribed verbatim.  These transcriptions were also then scored by a 
second rater who was blind to the diagnostic status of each participant, according to the 
scoring criteria outlined in chapter two.  Again, inter-rater reliability for scores across 
the four stories was excellent, ǯȽ = .92.    
Experiment 3: Results 
Judgment-of-learning tasks 
Memory (object-level) performance.  Figure 9 shows the means and standard 
deviations for recall performance on the cue-alone JOL task, and recall performance on 
the cue-target JOL task (see also Table 11).  A mixed-model ANOVA was carried out on 
these data with Group (neurotypical/ASD) entered as the between-subjects variable, 




and JOL Type (stimuli-repose/cue-alone) entered as the within-subject variable.  There 
was a significant main effect of JOL Type on recall ability, reflecting the fact that, across 
participant groups, children recalled significantly more target words in the cue-target 
JOL task than in the cue-alone JOL task, F (1, 41) = 31.14, p < .001,   = .43.  Better recall 
performance in the cue-target JOL task (Mean = .49, SD = .21) than in the cue-alone JOL 
task (Mean = .34, SD = .16) was expected, given that on the cue-target JOL task children 
were presented with the target words twice, compared to only once during the cue-
alone JOL task.  There was no significant main effect of Group, F (1, 41) = 0.01, p = .917,  
 < .001, nor Group × JOL type interaction, F (1, 41) = 1.08, p = .305  = .03.  Thus, 
children with ASD demonstrated similar levels and patterns of recall to the neurotypical 





























































Figure 9³2EMHFWOHYHO´SHUIRUPDQFHRQWKHFXH-alone and cue-target JOL tasks, in 
the ASD and neurotypical group.  Error bars represent standard error of the mean.   
 
Metamemory performance.  Figure 10 also shows the means and standard 
deviations for Gamma correlations on the cue-alone JOL task, and recall performance on 
the cue-target JOL task, for both ASD and neurotypical participants (see also Table 11).  
A mixed-model ANOVA was carried out on these data with Group (neurotypical/ASD) 
entered as the between-subjects variable, and JOL Type (stimuli-repose/cue-alone) 
entered as the within-subject variable.  There was a significant main effect of JOL type 
on gamma scores, reflecting the fact that children in both groups had significantly lower 
gamma scores (i.e., made significantly less accurate JOL assessments) on the cue-target 
JOL task than on the cue-alone JOL task, F (1, 41) = 42.62, p < .001,   = .51.  There was 
no significant main effect of group, indicating that children with ASD did not have lower 
gamma scores across both JOL tasks, relative to neurotypical children F (1, 41) = 0.46, p 
= .504,    = .01.  There was also no significant Group JOL× Type interaction, F (1, 41) = 
0.14, p = .706,  < .01, suggesting that children in the ASD group did not demonstrate 













Figure 10ǣǲǳȋȌ cue-alone and cue-
target JOL tasks, in the ASD and neurotypical group.  Error bars represent standard error 
of the mean.   
Mindreading tasks 
Animations task.  Table 11 shows the means and standard deviations for 
performance on the animations task.  A mixed-model ANOVA was carried out on these 
data with Group (neurotypical/ASD) entered as the between-subjects variable, and 
Animation Type (mentalising/goal-directed) entered as the within-subject variable.  
There was no significant main effect of Group on animations scores, reflecting the fact 
that children with ASD did not perform less well than neurotypical participants on the 
task overall, F (1, 41) = 0.04 , p =.851 ,  = .001.  There was a significant main effect of 
Animation Type, indicating that, across both groups, scores were higher in the goal-
directed condition than the mentalising condition, F (1, 41) = 100.57, p < .001  = .76.  
There was no significant Group × Animation Type interaction, F (1, 40) = .02, p = .888,  
<.001.  These results do not support predictions and suggest that the ASD group did not 
show diminished mindreading performance in either condition of the task, relative to 
the neurotypical group.   
Strange Stories task.  Table 11 shows the means and standard deviations for 
performance on the strange stories task.  A mixed-model ANOVA was carried out on 
these data with Group (neurotypical/ASD) entered as the between-subjects variable, 
and Story Type (mentalising/physical) entered as the within-subject variable.  There 
was a significant main effect of Story Type, indicating that, across both groups, scores 
were higher in the physical condition than the mentalising condition, F (1, 37) =23.22, p 
< .001  = .39.  There was no significant main effect of Group on strange stories scores, 
F (1, 37) =2.33, p = .136,  = .06.  However, there was a marginally significant Group × 




Story Type interaction, F (1, 37) = 3.83, p = .058, = .09.  Independent samples t-tests 
indicated that the ASD group performed significantly worse that neurotypical 
participants in the mentalising condition of the task, but did not significantly differ from 
neurotypical participants in the physical condition (see Table 11 for descriptive and 
inferential statistics).  Paired samples t-tests indicated that participants in the ASD 
group performed significantly worse in the mentalising condition of the task (Mean = 
1.63, SD = 1.26) than in the goal-directed condition of the task (Mean = 3.05, SD = 0.71), 
t (18) =5.20, p < .001, d = 1.39.  However, in the neurotypical group, there was no 
difference in performance on the mentalising (Mean = 2.45, SD = 1.28) and goal-directed 
(Mean = 3.05, SD = 0.89) conditions of the task, t (19) =, 1.88, p = .076, d = 0.54.  These 
results suggest that, as predicted, the ASD group demonstrated impairments specifically 
in the mindreading condition of the strange stories task.   
Associations between mindreading ability and metacognitive monitoring ability. 
A series of correlational analyses was carried out to explore the relation between 
performance in each condition of the animations (mindreading) task and performance 
on the JOL (metacognition) tasks.  In summary, JOL accuracy (gamma score) on either 
the cue-alone JOL task or the cue-target JOL task, were not significantly associated with 
performance in the mentalising condition of the animations task, or performance in the 
goal-directed condition of the animations task, among ASD or comparison participants,  
all r ?-.32, all p ?Ǥ ? ? ?.   
Additionally there was no significant association between JOL accuracy (gamma 
score) on the cue-alone JOL task, and performance in the mentalising or physical 
condition of the strange stories task, among comparison participants and ASD 
participants,  all r ?-.36, all p ?Ǥ ? ? ?.  Concerning the cue-target JOL task there was no 




significant association between JOL accuracy (gamma score) and performance in the 
mentalising or physical condition of the strange stories task, among comparison 
participants, all r ?Ǥ ? ?, all p ?Ǥ ?90.  However, for ASD participants, JOL accuracy on 
the cue-target JOL task was strongly negatively association with performance on both 
the mentalising condition of the strange stories task, r = -.63, p = .002 and the physical 
condition of the strange stories task, r = -.46, p = .050.  This indicates that, for ASD 
participants the better their accuracy on the cue-target JOL task, the poorer their 
performance on the strange stories (in both conditions).   




Table 11: Means (SDs) and inferential statistics for group differences in performance on both JOL tasks, the 
animations task and the strange stories task. 
 
 Group     
 
 ASD 
 (n = 22) 
Neurotypical  
(n = 21) 
 t p ǯ
d 
JOL Tasks: Recall 
performance 
Cue-alone recall performance .32 (.11) .36 (.21)  0.65 Ǥ ? ? ?  ?Ǥ ? ? 
 Cue-target recall performance .50 (.21) .47 (.21)  0.33 Ǥ ? ? ?  ?Ǥ ? ? 
JOL Tasks: Meta-
memory performance 
Cue-alone gamma scores* .89 (.12) .92 (.12)  0.67 .505 0.25 
 Cue-target gamma scores* .45 (.41) .53 (.45)  0.56 .582 0.19 
Animations task Mentalising condition 1.27 (1.20) 1.29 (1.06)  0.04 .970 0.02 
 Goal-directed condition 3.41 (0.73) 3.48 (0.60)  0.33 .745 0.10 
Strange Stories Task** Mentalising condition 1.62 (1.20) 2.52 (1.29)  2.35 .024 0.72 
 Physical condition 3.05 (0.71) 3.05 (0.89)  0.01 .992 0.00 
  
*Gamma scores index metamemory monitoring accuracy 
**Based on 19 participants in the ASD group, and 20 participants in the neurotypical group.   
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Experiment 3: Discussion 
In this experiment, children in the ASD group did demonstrate mindreading 
impairments on the strange stories task.  However, the results of Experiment 3 
indicated that children with ASD do not demonstrate diminished metacognitive 
accuracy, relative to neurotypical children, even when either cue-alone or cue-target 
JOL assessments.  This was in keeping with the results of the previous two experiments, 
but not in keeping with the studyǯ a priori predictions, nor predictions made by the 
one-mechanism account.   
General Discussion  
Until now, only one study has previously explored JOL accuracy in individuals 
with ASD (Wojcik et al., 2014).  Given methodological concerns with this paper, the 
primary aim of this chapter was to establish whether individuals (both children and 
adults) with ASD are genuinely impaired at accurately judging how well they have 
learnt a piece of information.   
It was predicted that individuals with ASD would show significant impairments 
in JOL accuracy, relative to neurotypical participants.  However, there was no evidence 
to support this prediction; the results from all three JOL experiments clearly found no 
significant differences in JOL accuracy among either children or adults with ASD, 
relative to age- and IQ- matched controls.  Likewise there was no evidence to suggest 
that mindreading performance was significantly positively related to JOL accuracy in 
any of the three experiments.  As such, the two main prediction main in this chapter 
were not supported by the results.   
One result was in keeping with the study predictions.  In experiment two, 
although individuals in the ASD group predicted they would remember more words 
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from the low-frequency word list than the high-frequency word list, they did not 
demonstrate signs of strategy use during the learning phase of the task.  Individuals 
with ASD spent an equal amount of time learning both word lists.  However, 
importantly, neurotypical individuals in this study also failed to show any sign of 
strategy use concerning the time spent learning different lists.  Thus the failure to find 
evidence of study time strategy use among participants with ASD is instead most likely 
due to methodological issues associated with the procedure.   
One potential explanation, that was proposed in the introduction to explain 
unimpaired accuracy on a JOL task in individuals with ASD, was that individuals may 
only demonstrate metamemory impairments if they also demonstrate mindreading 
impairments.  According to one-mechanism accounts of the relation between 
mindreading and metacognition (e.g., Carruthers, 2009) both abilities rely on the same 
underlying mechanisms.  Thus, proponents of this theory would predict impaired 
metacognition only in individuals with ASD who also demonstrate clear mindreading 
impairments.  However, this explanation cannot explain the results from these studies.  
Despite mindreading impairments, adults and children with ASD, in both experiment 
one and three, demonstrated typical JOL accuracy (gamma scores).  As such, even when 
individuals with ASD demonstrate impairments in mindreading, they still do not appear 
to demonstrate impairments in monitoring on JOL tasks.   
Alternatively, it was also suggested that intact performance on JOL tasks in 
individuals with ASD, may not be the result of typical metacognitive competence.  
Instead, it was hypothesised that individuals with ASD may rely on their current 
memory for target words, when making JOL assessments, to make relatively accurate 
JOL predictions despite impaired monitoring on the task.  However, the results of the 
final experiment are not in keeping with this suggestion.  Whilst both groups 
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demonstrated poorer metamemory accuracy on the cue-target JOL task, the individuals 
with ASD did not demonstrate significantly greater difficultly on the cue-target task, 
relative to neurotypical children (as would be expected if gamma scores on the cue-
alone task were specifically ǯ
words, in individuals with ASD).  Instead, these results again support suggestions that 
the metacognitive monitoring processes required to make accurate judgments of 
learning are not impaired in ASD.   
All results from this chapter seem to suggest that monitoring accuracy on JOL 
tasks is unimpaired in ASD.  Interestingly, this is not in keeping with the results of 
chapter three, which found impairments in monitoring accuracy on a FOK task.  Nor is 
this fǡǯ
mental states is impaired in ASD (Williams & Happé, 2009b, 2010).  One potential 
explanation for differences in metamemory accuracy in ASD, across different 
metamemory paradigms, is that metamemory impairments in ASD may arise due to 
impairments in basic memory ability, not meta-monitoring ability (Wojcik et al., 2014).  
Wojcik suggests that recollection ability in particular may mediate different 
metamemory judgements (e.g., Hicks & Marsh, 2002; Souchay, Moulin, Clarys, Taconnat, 
& Isingrini, 2007), and that some judgements, particularly those made at retrieval (such 
as FOK judgements) may rely heavily on the recollection of contextual information 
recollected about the target word.  Judgements made before retrieval (such as JOLs) 
may not rely on recollection to the same extent.  This suggestion is of course 
speculative, and needs to be researched further, but could potentially explain 
discrepancies between metamemory monitoring accuracy in ASD, across different 
metamemory tasks (this issue is considered in further detail in the general discussion, 
please see  p.248- 252). 
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The results of this chapter have theoretical implications.  The one-mechanism 
account would have predicted such associations between metamemory and 
mindreading, and so the current results did not support the theory in this respect.  
Indeed in experiment three, on the cue-target JOL task, gamma scores were strongly 
negatively associated with performance on both the mentalising condition and the 
physical condition of the strange stories task, in children with ASD.  For ASD 
participants the better their monitoring accuracy on the cue-target JOL task, the poorer 
their performance on the strange stories.  This is certainly not in keeping with either the ǯpredictions, or one-mechanism accounts.  However, this association was not 
specifically found for performance on the mentalising condition of the strange stories 
task alone, but was found in both conditions (mentalising and physical) of the task.  This 
would suggest that the association between performance on the strange stories and JOL ǯǡ
by different cognitive processes. 
As things stand two studies of metamemory accuracy have been carried out in 
this thesis, with contradictory results.  Whilst clear impairments in FOK accuracy were 
found in chapter three, the results from this chapter show that both adults and children 
with ASD appear to make accurate JOL assessments.  The following chapter also 
explores metamemory in children with ASD.  Alongside exploring metamemory 
monitoring accuracy on a JOC task,  chapter five also explores an aspect of 
metacognition not yet explored in ASD, metacognitive control processes, and the extent 
to which children monitoring judgments influence their control processes on a task.   
  




METACOGNITIVE MONITORING AND CONTROL PROCESSES IN CHILDREN WITH 
AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER: DIMINISHED JUDGEMENT OF CONFIDENCE 
ACCURACY 
Introduction ǯȋȌǡǯ
monitor and control their own cognitive processes (often referred to as metacognitive 
skill).  With regard to metacognitive skills, accurate monitoringȀǯ
cognition is thought to facilitate effective control over cognition and subsequent 
behaviour (e.g., Nelson & Narens, 1990).  Certainly, both monitoring and control 
processes play a key role in self-regulated learning, and have been shown to influence 
study behaviour and test performance in neurotypical children (e.g., Hacker, Bol, 
Horgan, & Rakow, 2000).   
The accuracy ǯǯǯ.  Studies assessing judgments 
of confidence (JOC) typically involve participants answering questions about recently-
studied material or stored semantic knowledge, and then reporting their confidence in 
the answers they provided.  ǯ-monitoring ability is high, then their 
confidence judgements should discriminate accurately between correct and incorrect 
answers.  In some studies, participants are subsequently given the opportunity to 
exclude some of their answers, such that those answers will not contribute to the ǯǲǳ.  This aspect of self-monitoring is particularly important, 
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because confidence judgements are often used by individuals to control their behaviour 
(see Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). 
 
Metacognition in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a developmental disorder diagnosed on the 
basis of social-communication deficits, and fixated interests and repetitive behaviours 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  It is widely acknowledged  that individuals ǯ
states (see Yirmiya et al., 1998).  Furthermore, there is a growing body of research that 
suggests individuals with ASD may also demonstrate impaired awareness of their own 
mental states (Grainger et al., 2014; Williams & Happé, 2009b; Wojcik et al., 2013).  
These findings, among others, are in keeping with the view that metacognition and 
mindreading ability rely on the same underlying cognitive processes/mechanisms (e.g., 
Carruthers, 2009; Frith & Happé, 1999; Williams, 2010).   
However, the evidence to suggest that metacognitive monitoring is definitively 
impaired in ASD is far from conclusive.  To date, four studies have assessed JOC 
accuracy among individuals with ASD, with mixed results (Sawyer et al., 2014; 
Wilkinson et al., 2010; Wojcik et al., 2011; Elmose & Happé, 2014).  In Wilkinson et al., 
(2010; Exp.  1), children with ASD, as well as age- and IQ-matched neurotypical 
comparison participants, were tested for their ability to recognise (via an old/new 
recognition test) recently-presented faces.  After each response, during the recognition 
test phase, participants made a confidence judgement about their answer, reporting 
whether they were ǲcertainǳǡǲsomewhat certainǳǡ or ǲguessingǳ.  Wilkinson et al., (2010) 
found that the confidence judgments made by children with ASD were significantly less 
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accurate than those made by neurotypical children, implying diminished metacognitive 
monitoring in ASD.  However, the same procedure among adults (Exp.  2) revealed no 
significant between-group differences in JOC accuracy, leading Wilkinson et al., to 
conclude that metacognition was not diminished among adults with ASD.  Despite this 
conclusion, it is notable that, although not statistically significant, more than a quarter 
of the answers adults with ASD reported they were certain of were, in fact, incorrect.  
While neurotypical adults got 85% of the answers they reported they were certain of 
correct, adults with ASD only got 72% of their ǲcertainǳanswers correct, and this 
difference was moderate in size (ǯd = 0.53).  This suggests at least a subtle 
diminution of meta-monitoring ability even in adults with ASD.  Additionally, a narrow 
(three-point) response scale was used in both experiments, which may have reduced 
response variability and, thus, masked group differences on the task.   
In a second study, Wojcik et al., (2011) asked children to make confidence 
judgements about whether they had correctly performed a series of recently-observed 
actions.  ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ
between-group differences in JOC accuracy, implying that meta-monitoring is 
undiminished in ASD.   
Recently, Elmose and Happé (2014) have also investigated JOC accuracy in 
children with ASD.  In this study, during the study phase of each trial, children were 
presented with a series of six pictures (on some trials pictures of buildings, on other 
trials pictures of faces). After completing a short distractor task, participants then 
completed a recall phase in which they were asked to select the six pictures that had  ? ?ȋǲǳǡǡ
anȌǡǤǯ
metacognitive monitoring accuracy on the task was measured in three ways: 
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1) Firstly, after the learning phase (but before the recall phase) participants ǲs do you think you will be able to place in the same ǫǳǤ (see 
chapter four, for a discussion). Metacognitive accuracy on this question was assessed by 
calculating the difference betwǯ
would recall correctly and how many pictures they did in fact recall correctly.  
2) Secondly, after participants had completed the recall stage of each trial, ǲhink you have placed ǫǳ
This type of judgement can be considered an aggregate JOC assessment. Again, 
metacognitive accuracy on this question was assessed by calculating the difference ǯs they had recalled correctly, 
and how many pictures they had in fact recall correctly.  
3) Finally, after participants had completed the recall stage of each trial 
(with either building stimuli or face stimuli) and after they made an aggregate JOC 
surrounding their performance on the task (see above), they were asked to judge how 
confident they were that each of the pictures they had selected was correct. This type of 
judgement can be considered an item-by-item JOC.  Participants were asked to judge 
their levǲǳǡǲǳǡǲǳǤFor the item-by-item 
JOC decisions, metamemory accuracy was assessed using a coding scheme. Participants 
scored 0 if their confidence judgement matched their recall ability (e.g., they said they ǲǳȀǲǳǡȌǤ ?
their confidence judgement was somewhat in accordance with their recall performance ȋǤǤǡǲǳǡ
placed correctly). Finally participants scored 2 if their confidence judgement was not in 
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keeping with their recall performance at all (e.g., they said ǲǳ
that was incorrect). 
Overall, Elmose and Happé (2014) report that children with ASD made as 
accurate judgements of confidence as children without ASD (regardless of the type of 
stimuli used during the task or whether JOCs were aggregate/ item-by-item). 
Participants were also as accurate at judging overall how many stimuli they would get 
correct on each trial.  This suggests that children with ASD do not show diminished 
meta-memory. However, there are three potential methodological issues with the study 
that should be considered when interpreting the results.  These issues concern the 
criteria used to assess item-by-item JOC accuracy.  
Firstly, one problem with the criteria used to assess accuracy on the task was 
that ǯobject level recall responses were still considered somewhat accurate 
even when they recalled the correct picture in the wrong location. In contrast, 
participantsǯ assessments concerning how confident they were that their recall of a 
given picture was correct presumably reflected how confident they were that they had 
provided the correct picture and placed it in the correct location. Given that participants 
were not told that previously-studied pictures recalled out of serial order would still be 
considered partly correct, they could not have taken this into account when making 
confidence judgements. ǯ
scores during the task.  
Secondly, Elmose and Happé (2014) employed a non-standard means of 
measuring metacognitive accuracy.  Most studies in the literature on metacognitive 
monitoring employ gamma correlations, which take into account each ǯ
individual response criteria when assessing accuracy (and thus take into account 
participants who do not respond using the full range of JOC responses available). For 




score would be 1 (reflecting perfect monitoring accuracy on the task). However, using 
the scoring criteria used in Elmose and Happé, a response ǲǳa correct 
response was not considered accurate. Thus, a major problem with the scoring criteria ±ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǯ
individual response criteria. As such, it is possible, that group difference in accuracy 
may have been apparent, if gamma correlations were used to assess accuracy on the 
task.  
One final issue with the method employed in the study is with the response 
options participants were given during the item-by-item JOL phase of the task. As ǡǲǳǡǲǳǡǲǳǤǡ
opportunity to respond that they were extremely unconfident that an answer they had Ǥǡǲǳ
not certain the answer is correct, but equally not certain the answer is incorrect. This 
represents a serious methodological problem with rating scales used in this task. 
Additionally, only providing three response options for participants to judge their 
confidence on may have reduced response variability on the task (see a similar critique 
of Wilkinson et al., 2010 above). 
Finally, Sawyer et al., (2014) employed a JOC task that assessed both monitoring 
and control in adults with ASD.  In this study, participants were asked to complete an 
emotion recognition task involving facial stimuli.  Participants were instructed that the 
aim of the study was to submit as many correct responses as possible.  For each emotion 
recognition judgement, participants rated how confident they were that they had 
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selected the correct response.  Participants were then given the opportunity to submit 
each answer towards their total score (and gain a point for each correct answer), or 
discard the answer (and avoid losing a point for getting an answer wrong).  This 
provided a measure of metacognitive control.  In a second experiment, the same ǯ
knowledge questions, rather than emotion recognition.   
In both experiments, Sawyer et al., reported no significant between-group 
differences in JOC accuracy, implying undiminished meta-monitoring ability in ASD.  
However, it is important to note that the between-group difference in JOC accuracy on 
the general knowledge task was associated with a one-tailed p value of .06, potentially 
implying a subtle monitoring impairment in ASD.   
In terms of metacognitive control, Sawyer et al., (2014) found no between-group 
differences on their key index (d'), implying undiminished metacognitive control in ASD.  
However, Sawyer et al., performed additional post-hoc tests, which suggested that a 
significantly higher proportion of ASD participants (n = 12) than neurotypical 
participants decided not to withhold any answers.  This could imply that these 12 ASD 
participants were not showing any metacognitive control at all.  Alternatively, it could 
reflect a mere failure to understand the task demands among these participants.  On this 
basis, the extent to which metacognitive control is diminished in ASD is still not clear.  
What is particularly notable is that these 12 ASD participants did appear to show 
diminished monitoring ability relative to the neurotypical control group, the difference 
in gamma score being associated with a ǯd value of 0.62 (although, of course, we 
are not aware whether these participants were matched with the neurotypical 
controls).   
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Although the study by Sawyer et al., (2014) was exemplary in many respects, 
there are additional issues that might suggest caution should be taken when 
interpreting the results.  Firstly, participant groups were not matched for age or 
performance IQ (note that this may apply to Wojcik et al., 2011 with respect to verbal 
IQ).  Between-group differences in baseline variables could well explain the 
experimental findings of the study (see Mervis & Klein-Tasmin, 2004).  Indeed, Dr 
Sawyer very kindly provided us with additional unreported data about this.  In Sawyer 
et al., age was significantly negatively associated with d' among participants with ASD, r 
= -.37, p = .04 (A. Sawyer, personal communication, August 22nd, 2014).  Thus, 
differences in age (ASD participants were older than comparison participants) could 
well explain the trend towards group differences in metacognitive control in this study.   
Apart from methodological differences (and potential difficulties) between 
existing studies, one explanation for inconsistencies in the literature could be that the 
samples of participants in each study differed in their mindreading ability.  To our 
knowledge, mindreading ability was not assessed in any of these studies.  Yet, as 
discussed above, according to one major theory (e.g., Carruthers, 2009) we should only 
expect to find metacognitive impairments in individuals with ASD who also have 
diminished mindreading.  Given that some studies do not find diminished mindreading 
task performance in high-functioning individuals with ASD, it is conceivable that ASD 
participants in Wojcik et al., (2011), Elmose and Happé (2014) and Sawyer et al., (2014) 
did not show impairments in JOC accuracy because they would have shown 
undiminished mindreading task performance.  To date, no study has directly examined 
JOC accuracy alongside mindreading ability.   
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The Current Study 
The central aim of this study was to extend the current findings concerning 
metacognition in ASD, by examining both monitoring and control accuracy in children 
with ASD.  To examine this the study employed a JOC task, during which children were 
asked a series of questions about recently-studied material, and were then asked to 
judge how certain they were that the answers they had provided were correct 
(providing a measure of metacognitive monitoring accuracy).  Additionally, children 
were told that for each correct answer they submitted they would receive a point, but 
for each incorrect answer they would lose a point.  At the end of the task children were 
given the opportunity to remove any of the answers they had previously provided 
(providing a measure of metacognitive control accuracy).  The main prediction was that 
participants with ASD would demonstrate impairments in metacognitive monitoring 
ability.  This was predicted on the basis of theoretical inclinations concerning the 
underlying mechanisms involved in mindreading/metacognition, as well as an 
interpretation/critical analysis of the few previous studies of this ability in ASD.  
Predictions concerning group differences in metacognitive control ability were less 
straightforward.  The only study ever (by Sawyer et al., 2014) to explore this ability in 
ASD reported a trend toward a group difference in this ability, but there are arguably 
some difficulties with Ǥǯ
being drawn (see above).  Thus predictions concerning this aspect of the study were 
non-directional.  The issue of whether metacognitive monitoring and/or control is 
diminished in ASD is separate from the issue of whether monitoring is used for the 
purpose of control by people with ASD.  For example, it is possible that monitoring 
ability is undiminished in ASD, but not used appropriately for the purpose of 
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metacognitive control.  Alternatively, even if monitoring ability is diminished in ASD, 
residual monitoring ability might influence control processes to the same extent among 
individuals with ASD as among neurotypical individuals.  Given these possibilities and 
given the fact that no previous study has explored the extent to which monitoring 
influences control in ASD, a non-directional prediction with respect to this aspect of the 
study was also made.   
Two measures of mindreading ability were also included in the study.  These 
were included to establish (a) whether the sample of ASD participants was typical in 
displaying diminished mindreading, and (b) the size of any association between 
mindreading and metacognition in neurotypical children and children with ASD.  To our 
knowledge, no study has examined whether performance on a JOC task (either 
monitoring or control accuracy) relates to mindreading ability.  It was predicted that 
mindreading ability would be associated significantly with metacognitive monitoring 




Thirty-two children with ASD and 30 neurotypical children took part in this 
study, after their parents had given written, informed consent.  Participants in the ASD ǯǡ
established criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; World Heath Organisation, 
1993).  To assess severity of ASD features, parents of participants with ASD completed 
the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS; Constantino et al., 2003).  In all but one case, 
participants with ASD scored above the defined cut-off for ASD on the SRS ( ?
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60; Constantino et al., 2003).  The remaining participant scored 55 on the SRS, which is 
just below the conventional ASD cut-off of 60.   
Table 12: Participant Characteristics (Means, Standard Deviations and Inferential 
Statistics). 
Parents of the neurotypical children also completed the SRS.  All but four 
participants in the neurotypical group scored below the defined cut-off for ASD.  The ǯ ? ? ? ?.  To ensure that including 
these participants in the overall sample did not affect the results of the study all 
analyses in the paper were re-run, excluding all five participants who scored outside the 
expected range on the SRS.  After removing these participants from analyses, none of 
the results (nor study conclusions) changed substantively (i.e., no p value changed from 
significant to non-significant or vice versa, and no effect size changed category Ȃ small, 
moderate, large).  The participant groups were closely equated for verbal and non-
verbal ability (see Table 12 for participant characteristics), using the Wechsler 
 Group    
 ASD  
(n = 32) 
Neurotypical  





Age (years) 13.59 (1.36) 13.27 (1.06) 1.01 .315 0.26 
VIQ 101.28 (16.69) 103.87 (14.92) 0.64 .524 0.16 
PIQ 100.72 (13.39) 105.67 (14.32) 1.41 .165 0.36 
FSIQ 101.19 (14.85) 105.53 (15.27) 1.14 .261 0.29 
SRS Total Score 84.16 (8.79) 45.67 (10.50) 15.69 < .001 3.98 
SRS: Social Responsiveness Scale (Constantino et al., 2003); VIQ = verbal IQ; PIQ = 
performance IQ; FSIQ = full scale IQ. 
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Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999).  Both groups were also 
equated closely for chronological age.   
Materials and Procedures 
Judgement-of-confidence task.  This task was designed to assess the accuracy ǯǡ
used in previous studies of metacognition in neurotypical children (e.g., Krebs & 
Roebers, 2010; Roebers, Schmid, & Roderer, 2009).  The task consisted of a study phase, 
a test phase, a JOC phase (during which confidence in the accuracy of recall was 
assessed) and a metacognitive control phase (during which the accuracy of 
metacognitive control processes were assessed).  In total, the task took approximately 
twenty minutes to complete.   
Study phase.  Participants were shown a short (4 minute) video, presented to 
them on a laptop computer.  This video was downloaded from a website of educational 
videos, suitable for 11- to 16-year-olds.  The experimenter explained to each participant 
that the video they were about to watch was about kangaroos and about how kangaroos 
survive in the Australian outback.  Participants were told to pay full attention to the 
video, because afterwards they would be asked some questions about the information 
presented in it.   
Test phase.  After watching the video, participants were given a short 
worksheet, which consisted of 16 test questions, for which the answer had been 
explicitly presented in the video, during the study phase.  Additionally, the sheet 
included eight questions to ensure that participants understood the rating scale for 
their subsequent confidence judgements.  	ǲǳ
it was almost certain participants would know the answers to them (e.g., how many 
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ǫȌǲǳons were included so that it 
would be very unlikely children would know the correct answers (e.g., what is the Latin 
species name for kangaroo?).  If participants were not able to make the blatant 
distinction in their judgements of confidence between answers to easy and impossible 
questions, then one could not be sure they understood the nature of the task at all.   
For the test phase, the edge of the worksheet containing the JOC scale was folded 
over, so that it was not visible (please see Figure 11).  Once presented with the 
worksheet, participants were given a pen, and were asked to write down an answer for 
each question.  It was explained to participants that it was important they provided an 
answer for every question, and that if they did not know the correct answer they should 
take a guess.  Participants were given an unlimited amount of time to answer the 
questions on the worksheet.   
 
Figure 11: Pictures of the worksheet used during the JOC task.  A) Picture of the JOC 
sheet presented to participants during the test phase of the task, with the JOC rating scales 
covered.  B) Picture of the JOC worksheet presented during the JOC phase of the task. 
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JOC Phase.  After the experimenter checked that participants had provided an 
answer for all the questions on the worksheet, they turned over the section of the 
worksheet that had previously been folded over, making the JOC scale visible.  It was ǲǳ.  Participants were asked to judge their 
confidence for each answer on a 7-point likert scale, ranging from 1-7 (extremely 
unsure to extremely sure).  The experimenter fully explained the confidence scale to 
participants, explaining that higher numbers on the scale indicated a higher certainty 
that the answer provided was correct.  Participants gave confidence judgments for each 
answer on a scale next to that answer on the worksheet.  The experimenter made sure 
that each participant provided a JOC for each answer. 
Metacognitive Control Phase.  Finally, participants were told that at a later 
point the experimenter would mark each of the answers on the worksheet.  It was 
explained to participants that for each correct answer they had given they would get 
one point, but for each incorrect answer one point would be taken away from them.  
Participants were then given a different coloured pen and told that they had the 
opportunity to improve their performance on the task.  Participants were told that they 
were now able to cross out any of their answers.  If they crossed out an answer they 
would not get a point for this answer if that answer was correct, but nor would they lose 
a point if the answer was incorrect.  Participants were told that they could cross out as 
many or as few answers as they liked.   
Animations task.  During the Animations task, participants were required to 
provide a verbal description of four silent video clips, each of which displayed an 
interaction between a large red triangle and a small blue triangle.  These clips were 
taken directly from Abell et al., (2000).  ȋǲǳǲǳ
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animations), an adequate ǯ
attribution of propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, intentions, and/or desires.  As in Ǥǯǡǲǳȋ-
level mindreading).  ȋǲ	ǳǲ	ǳȌǡǯ
attribution of goal states, but did not necessarily require the attribution of propositional 
attitudes/epistemic mental states.  As in Abell et al., (2000), these clips comprised a ǲ-ǳ.   
Each clip was presented to participants on a laptop computer.  Before 
undertaking the experimental trials, participants also completed two practice trials, to 
familiarise themselves with the task (one goal-directed and one mentalising).  
Experimenter feedback was given on practice trials.  For each of the experimental 
animations, participants watched each clip twice.  First, participants watched the clip 
through ǲǳ.  ǲǳ.  Participants ǯ
presentation of the clip.  For the experimental trials, a digital audio recording of ǯ.  No feedback was given on the 
experimental trials.   
Strange Stories Task.  The Strange Stories task (Happé, 1994) was used as a 
second measure of mindreading ability.  During the Strange Stories task participants 
were presented with four short vignettes (two mentalising stories and two physical 
stories).  These stories were taken from Happé (1994).  Correct answers to the 
mentalising stories required the attribution of mental states to story characters, 
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whereas correct answers to physical stories required an understanding of physical 
causality only.  First, each story was individually presented on cards to participants.  
Children either read the story aloud or, if children did not feel comfortable reading 
aloud, the experimenter read each story to them.  After each story had been read the 
experimenter produced a second card and presented participants with a question about 
the content of the story (e.g., Why did the prisoner say that?).  The experimenter read 
this question aloud, and participants provided a verbal response to each question.  
Before undertaking the experimental trials, participants also completed one practice 
trial, to familiarise themselves with the task (one mentalising story).  During practice 
trials, participants read a story and provided an answer to the practise question.  The ǯ.  
Fǡǯ
made for later transcription, and no feedback was given2.   
Scoring 
Judgement-of-confidence task.   
Object-level test performance.  ǯobject-level memory 
performance was calculated on the JOC task.  Participants recall ability was calculated as 
the proportion of answers participants correctly remembered during the recall stage of 
the task.   
                                                        
2 Due to restrictions that occurred during data collection, six participants did not 
complete the Strange Stories task (four participants with ASD and two neurotypical 
participants). 
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JOC rating scale use.  The average confidence judgements given by participants 
for answers to the ǲeasyǳand ǲimpossibleǳ calculated.   
Metamemory monitoring accuracy.  Firstly, the average confidence judgement 
participants gave for their correct answers was calculated, as well as the average 
confidence judgement participants gave for their incorrect answers.  This provided a 
basic measure of metacognitive accuracy.  The better participants monitoring accuracy, 
the larger the difference should be between their confidence ratings for correct answers 
than incorrect answers.  For the purpose of correlational analyses a difference score 
was calculated, by subtracting the average confidence rating participants gave for 
incorrect answers, from the average confidence rating participants gave for correct 
answers. 
Secondly, gamma scores (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954) were calculated to provide 
an index of JOC accuracy for each participant.  This type of analysis is recommended by 
Nelson (1984; Nelson, Narens, & Dunlosky, 2004) and is commonly used to analyse 
monitoring accuracy on JOC tasks (e.g., Roebers et al., 2009).  Gamma correlations range 
between + 1 and -1; a score of 0 indicates chance-level accuracy, in which confidence 
judgements are not associated in any way with whether an answer is correct or not.  A 
large positive gamma value indicates a good degree of accuracy in JOC judgments and a 
large negative value indicates less than chance-level performance on the task.  Gamma ǡǯ
to the 16 experimental questions and corresponding confidence judgments.   
Metamemory control accuracy.  Control effectiveness was calculated using the 
measure of d-prime (d').  This measure is how control accuracy was assessed in Sawyer 
et al., (2014), and is calculated using participants ǲhit-rateǳ(H) and ǲfalse-alarm rateǳ
(FA).  Hit rate was calculated as the number of answers participants removed that were 
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incorrect (and thus correctly removed) plus the number of answers participants kept 
that were correct (and thus correctly kept), divided by the total number of answers.  
False alarm rate was calculated as the number of answers participants removed that 
were in fact correct divided by the total number of correct answers participants 
provided.  d' was calculated using the following formula: 
 
d' = Z(H) - Z(FA) 
 
A d' score of 0 indicates no difference between hit rate and false alarm rate, 
demonstrating ineffective control measures on the task.  In contrast, the higher the d' 
value, the greater the tendency to remove incorrect answers and keep correct answers, 
thus the greater the effectiveness of the control strategy on the task.   
The effect of monitoring processes on control accuracy.  The average 
confidence judgment participants gave for the answers they removed was calculated, as 
was the average confidence judgement participants gave for the answers they kept.  
These scores were calculated to provide a measure of how participants monitoring 
judgements influenced their control performance.  If participants control processes 
were strongly influenced by their JOC ratings, then they should remove answers they 
had the lowest confidence in, and keep answers they had highest confidence in.  For the 
purpose of correlational analyses a difference scores was calculated, by subtracting the 
average confidence judgement for removed answers from the average confidence 
judgement for kept answers.  Two participants (1 ASD, 1 neurotypical) chose not to 
remove any of their answers and thus difference scores for these participants could not 
be calculated. 
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Animations task.  ǯ
transcribed verbatim.  These transcriptions were then scored by a second rater who 
was blind to the diagnostic status of the participants, according to the scoring criteria 
outlined in Abell et al., (2000).  Inter-rater reliability for scores across the four 
animations was excellent, ǯȽ = .93 
Strange Stories Task.  ǯ
question were transcribed verbatim.  These transcriptions were also scored by a second 
independent rater who was blind to the diagnostic status of each participant, according 
to the scoring criteria outlined in White, Hill, Happé and Frith (2009).  Again, inter-rater 
reliability for scores across the four stories was excellent, ǯȽ = .92 
Results 
Mindreading performance  
Strange Stories task.  Table 13 shows the means and standard deviations for 
performance on the Strange Stories task.  A mixed-model ANOVA revealed significant 
main effects of Group, F (1, 54) = 6.19, p = .016,  = .103, and Condition, F (1, 54) = 
49.05, p < .001  = .476.  However, these were qualified by a significant Group × Story 
Type interaction, F (1, 54) = 4.13, p = .047, = .071.  Paired samples t-tests indicated 
that both groups performed less well in the mentalising condition than in the physical 
condition, all ps< .003, all ds > 0.77.  Independent samples t-tests indicated that the ASD 
group performed significantly less well than neurotypical participants in the 
mentalising condition of the task, but not the physical condition (see Table 13).  As 
predicted, the ASD group demonstrated selective impairments in the mindreading 
condition of the task.   




 Animations task.  Table 13 shows the means and standard deviations for 
performance on the Animations task.  A mixed-model ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of Animation Type, indicating that, across both groups, scores were higher 
in the goal-directed condition than the mentalising condition, F (1, 60) = 130.10, p < 
.001  = .684.  No other effects were significant, suggesting that the ASD group did not 
show diminished performance on this mindreading task, all ps > .41. 
 Judgment of confidence task 
Table 14 shows descriptive statistics and the results of independent-samples t-
tests for all aspects of the experimental JOC task.  Given the predicted group differences 
in meta-level performance on the JOC task, all p values associated with group 
differences on this aspect of the task are reported one-tailed.  Before reporting the main 
results, it is important to ensure that participants were able to use the JOC rating scale 
appropriately.  Thus, an initial analysis of group differences in the average JOC rating for 
Table 13: Means (SDs) and inferential statistics for group differences in performance on 
the Animations task and Strange Stories task. 
Experimental 
Measure 
Condition Group     






Mentalising  1.41 (1.24) 1.60 (1.19)  0.63 .534 0.16 
 Goal-
directed  
3.34 (0.75) 3.47 (0.68)  0.68 .501 0.18 
Strange 
Stories task 
Mentalising  1.54 (1.20) 2.43 (1.17)  2.82 .007 0.75 
 Physical  2.96 (0.92) 3.21 (0.83)  1.07 .292 0.29 
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the four ǲeasyǳand four ǲimpossibleǳquestions was conducted.  A mixed-model ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of Question-type, reflecting that JOC ratings were 
significantly higher for ǲeasyǳquestions than for ǲimpossibleǳquestions, F (1, 60) = 
678.21, p <.001  = 0.91.  Crucially, neither the main effect of Group nor the Group × 
Question-type interaction were significant, Fs <0.57, ps > .45.  This suggests that both 
groups were able to use the rating scale appropriately. 
Cognitive (object-level) test performance.  An independent-samples t-test 
revealed no significant between-group difference in the proportion of answers correctly 
recalled (see Table 14). 
Metamemory monitoring performance.  An independent-samples t-test 
revealed significantly lower gamma scores among ASD than neurotypical participants.  
This suggests that metamemory monitoring accuracy is impaired in children with ASD 
relative to the neurotypical participants.  Table 14 shows the means and standard 
deviations for the average JOC rating for correct and incorrect answers.  A mixed-model 
ANOVA was also carried out on these data with Group (neurotypical/ASD) entered as 
the between-subjects variable, and Answer Type (correct/incorrect) entered as the 
within-subject variable.  There was a significant main effect of Group on JOC ratings, 
reflecting the fact that participants with ASD made significantly higher JOC ratings than 
neurotypical participants on the task overall, F (1, 60) = 8.82, p = .004,  = 0.13.  There 
was also a significant main effect of Answer Type, indicating that, across both groups, 
JOC ratings were significant higher for correct answers than incorrect answers, F (1, 60) 
= 643.97, p <.001  = 0.91 Importantly, there was a significant Group by Answer Type 
interaction, F (1, 60) = 12.02, p = .001, = 0.16.  To investigate this interaction further a 
series of t-tests were carried out.  Paired samples t-ǯ
ratings were significant higher for correct answers than incorrect answers, in both the 
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ASD and neurotypical group, all ps < .001, all ds > 2.95.  Independent samples t-tests 
indicated that the ASD group provided significantly higher confidence ratings for the 
answers they had got incorrect, relative to neurotypical participants, but did not 
significantly differ in their confidence for correct answers relative to neurotypical 
participants (see Table 14 for descriptive and inferential statistics).  These results 
suggest that individuals with ASD demonstrated impairment in metacognitive 
monitoring, and reported subjectively higher confidence in answers they had got 
incorrect, relative to neurotypical participants.   
Metamemory control performance.  An independent-samples t-test indicated 
that d' was lower among participants with ASD than among neurotypical participants.  
However, the between-group difference in d' was not significant (see Table 14)  
The influence of monitoring on control processes.  Table 14 presents the 
average JOC rating for answers participants kept, and answers participants removed, for 
both the ASD and neurotypical group.  In our opinion, this contrast examines the extent 
to which childreǯ.  A 
mixed-model ANOVA was carried out on these data with Group (neurotypical/ASD) 
entered as the between-subjects variable, and Answer Type (kept/removed) entered as 
the within-subject variable.  Three ASD participants and one neurotypical participant 
chose not to remove any answers to the 16 experimental questions.  Thus this ANOVA 
was based on 29 participants in the ASD group and 29 participants in the neurotypical 
group.  Again, there was a significant main effect of Group on JOC ratings, reflecting the 
fact that participants with ASD made significantly higher JOC ratings than neurotypical 
participants on the task overall, F (1, 56) = 4.24, p = .044,  = 0.071.  There was also a 
significant main effect of Answer Type, indicating that, across both groups, JOC ratings 
were significantly higher for kept answers than incorrect answers, F (1,56) = 807.32, p 
C h a p t e r  F i v e :  J O C  a c c u r a c y  i n  A S D  | 162 
 
 
<001.   = 0.93 There was a significant Group by Answer Type interaction, F (1, 56) = 
5.90, p = .018, = 0.09.  Paired samples t-tests indicated that both the ASD and 
neurotypical group gave significantly higher JOC ratings for answer they subsequently 
kept than answers they subsequently removed, all ps < .001, all ds>3.36.  Independent 
samples t-tests indicated that the ASD group provided higher confidence ratings for the 
answers they subsequently removed, relative to neurotypical participants, but were 
equally as confident in the answers they kept.  These results suggest that, at least when 
judging which answers to remove, individuals in the ASD group relied on their JOC 
ratings less than neurotypical individuals.   
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Note: ASD = autism spectrum disorder; JOC = Judgment of confidence 
ap values reported one-tailed, because the direction of the effect was predicted a priori 
*Gamma scores index metamemory monitoring accuracy 
**d-prime scores index metamemory control accuracy 
Table 14: Means (SDs) and inferential statistics for group differences in performance on the JOC task. 
Experimental Measure Dependent variable Group     
  ASD Neurotypical  t p  ǯd 
Object-level 
performance 
Proportion of answers recalled .58 (.18) .60 (.12)  0.57 .572 0.13 
Monitoring 
performance 
Average JOC for correct answers 6.22 (0.63) 6.16 (0.52)  0.41 .341 a 0.10 
 Average JOC for incorrect answers 3.59 (1.09) 2.70 (0.77)  3.70 <.001 a 0.94 
 Gamma score* .84 (.16) .90 (.13)  1.75 .043a 0.41 
Control performance d-prime** 4.15 (1.56) 4.74 (1.54)  1.48 .145 0.38 
Influence of monitoring 
over control 
Average JOC for kept answers 5.80 (0.84) 5.79 (0.67)  0.08 .937 0.01 
 Average JOC for removed answers 2.55 (1.13) 1.85 (0.72)  2.80 .007 0.74 
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Associations between metamemory monitoring ability, metamemory control ability 
and mindreading ability.   
A series of correlational analyses was carried out to explore the relations among (a) 
metacognitive monitoring ability (gamma score; difference between JOC for correct answers 
and JOC for incorrect answers), (b) metacognitive control (d'), (c) the extent to which 
monitoring influenced control (difference between JOC ratings for kept answers and JOC 
ratings for discarded answers), and with mindreading ability (Strange Stories 
mentalising/physical; Animations mentalising/goal-directed).  Only one correlation reached 
conventional levels of statistical significance.  In the ASD group only, the difference in JOC 
ratings for kept and removed answers was associated significantly with performance in the 
goal-directed condition of the Animations task, r = .43, p = .019.  This association was not 
predicted and would not survive correction for multiple comparisons.  Contrary to 
predictions, no other associations were statistically significant in either group, r ?Ǥ ? ?ǡp ?
.12 
Discussion 
As predicted, this study found that participants with ASD showed diminished 
metacognitive monitoring accuracy, as reflected by significant between-group differences in 
gamma scores and in the difference score between JOC ratings for correct versus incorrect 
answers.  These ǯpredictions and the findings of 
Wilkinson et al., (2010), who also found that confidence judgments made by children with 
ASD were less accurate than those made by neurotypical children.  However, these results are 
not in keeping with three previous studies, that concluded JOC accuracy was unimpaired in 
children (Wojcik et al., 2011; Elmose & Happé, 2014) and adults with ASD (Sawyer et al., 
2014).  Importantly, in this study participants with ASD were (a) closely-matched with 
neurotypical participants in terms of age, VIQ, and PIQ, and (b) showed characteristic 
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mindreading impairments (on the Strange Stories task, at least).  Moreover, the seven point 
response scale that was employed in this study provided greater opportunity for detecting 
variation in metacognitive monitoring ability than the narrower scales used in some previous 
studies.  This may explain the differences in results between this study, on the one hand, and 
those of Wojcik et al., Elmose & Happé (2014) and Sawyer et al., on the other hand.   
Although evidence that metacognitive monitoring is diminished among children with 
ASD was found in this study, the study found little evidence to support the idea that 
metacognitive control was similarly diminished; the between-group difference in d' did not 
approach statistical significance.  Having said this, it is notable that d' was lower among 
participants with ASD than among neurotypical participants (albeit non-significantly so) and 
that the effect size associated with the between-group difference (d = 0.38) was strikingly 
similar to the effect size for the group difference in control ability reported by Sawyer et al., 
(2014; d = 0.32, averaged across general knowledge and emotion recognition conditions).  On 
the one hand, this consistency across the only two studies to have explored metacognitive 
control ability in ASD might suggest that this ability is subtly diminished in ASD.  On the other 
hand, one should be wary about a general tendency in the field  to interpret any hint of 
difference between ASD and comparison groups as a sign of an impairment in ASD.  Therefore, 
whilst this consistency across studies is noted, it is likely that  if such a diminution exists, it is 
questionable whether it is clinically significant, given the small magnitude of the effect. 
  Clearer evidence of a meaningful difference between the groups was found with 
regard to the extent to which metacognitive monitoring influenced metacognitive control.  
Here, the mean difference between JOC ratings for kept and removed answers was 
significantly smaller among ASD participants than among comparison participants, indicating 
that the extent to which monitoring influenced control was diminished in participants with 
ASD to a significantly lesser extent than it did among comparison participants.  This suggests 
that the means by which individuals achieved control over their behavioural choices (i.e., of 
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which answers to remove) was different among ASD and comparison groups.  It is possible 
that children with ASD employed a compensatory strategy on the JOC task, allowing them to 
perform relatively well on the control aspect of the task despite impaired monitoring ability.  	ǡǯ
determined simply on whether they could bring to mind an answer or not.  For example, when 
presented with the question ǲǫǳǡ
to keep their answer only if they could bring to mind a picture of a dingo (which had been 
presented in the video).  This kind of all-or-nothing strategy would be successful for many 
aspects of control, but would likely come unstuck when the demands of the situation were 
complex enough to require a graded monitoring of internal states.  As yet, it is not clear what 
information children with ASD based their control performance on and what the processing 
costs associated with using alternative strategies to influence control performance are.  As 
such, future research is needed to investigate what underlying processes influence control 
performance in individuals with ASD.   
Finally, contrary to predictions, no evidence of a significant association between 
mindreading and metacognition abilities was found.  It is important to note that this study 
was suitably powered to detect at least a moderate sized (r = 0.30) predicted association 
between these abilities if one existed ( éǤ ? ?ǡǯ ? ? ? ? ?Ǥ ? ?). Indeed, although group sizes of 30+ participants might be 
considered relatively small by the standards of many general cognitive psychology studies, a 
sample this size is relatively large for studies of cognition in ASD, which is strength of the 
study.  Thus, the failure to find a significant association is unlikely to be due to insufficient 
power.   
Overall, the results are mixed with respect to the debate regarding the connection 
between mindreading and metacognitive monitoring.  Findings of diminished metacognitive 
monitoring in ASD are consistent with one mechanism accounts of the relation between these 
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two abilities (Carruthers, 2009, 2012; Frith & Happé, 1999; Williams, Lind, & Happé, 2009).  
However, they do not definitively confirm that these abilities are not underpinned by two 
separate mechanisms (e.g., Goldman, 2006).  It may be that both systems (one underpinning 
mindreading and the other underpinning metacognition) are impaired in ASD.  Equally, the 
finding that mindreading performance and metacognitive monitoring performance were not 
associated significantly in this sample does not rule out one system theories of the relation 
between these two abilities.  Cognitive measures are rarely (if ever) process pure and thus an 
association or lack thereof should not be taken in-and-of-itself as evidence for/against the 
notion that the underlying cognitive abilities are/are not associated.  Fortunately, the purpose 
of this paper was not to decide between these competing theories of the relation between 
mindreading and metacognition (for reasons just discussed, this study was not fit for that 
purpose).  Rather, the aim was to understand the nature of metacognition in ASD.   
  The results of this study support the notion that metacognitive monitoring is 
diminished in ASD and that what residual monitoring is available to individuals with ASD is 
used for the purpose of metacognitive control to a lesser extent than are the monitoring 
resources available to neurotypical individuals.  It is important future research explores 
metacognition in ASD further, particularly exploring both metacognitive monitoring and 
control processes, and how these processes relate to each other.  Assessing awareness of 
memory performance in populations with memory difficulties is a critical matter.  Studies 
have shown that memory awareness is linked to memory rehabilitation effectiveness (e.g., 
Clare et al., 2000).  As such, it is essential to create a clearer picture of memory awareness 
impairments in individuals with ASD.  Additionally, research within the typically developing 
literature suggests that metacognition (confidence judgments in particular) plays an 
important role in everyday functioning and decision making (see e.g., Yeung & Summerfield, 
2012).  Metacognition, control processes in particular, also play a vital role in self-regulation, 
and self-regulated learning.  Given memory impairments in individuals with ASD (see Boucher 
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& Bowler, 2008) future research should aim to establish a comprehensive account of 
metacognition in ASD, with the aim of informing intervention efforts designed to remediate 
cognitive impairments in this disorder.   
 Chapters three, four and five all employed typical metamemory paradigms to explore 
psychological/ private self-awareness in ASD.  ǡǯǡ
there are several aspects of self-awareness which do not ǯ
self.  The following two chapters report the results of studies exploring aspects of ecological 
self-awareness in individuals with ASD, and investigate the extent to which individuals with 
ASD are aware of their own physical selves.  




ONLINE ACTION MONITORING AND MEMORY FOR SELF-PERFORMED ACTIONS IN 
AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER3 
Introduction 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a developmental disorder diagnosed on the basis of 
behavioural impairments in social-communication, and by fixated interests and repetitive 
behaviours (e.g., American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  On the cognitive level, it has been 
suggested that ASD is characterised by diminished self-awareness (e.g., Hobson, 1990; 
Russell, 1996; Williams, 2010) and, more recently, that specific aspects of self-awareness are 
selectively diminished in this disorder.  For example, it has been suggested that individuals 
with ASD have diminished awareness of psychological aspects of the self (e.g., awareness of ǯǡǤȌǡphysical 
aspects of self (e.g., awareness of one's own physical appearance; Lind, 2010; Williams, 2010).  
In keeping with this proposal, studies have shown that individuals with ASD demonstrate 
difficulties representing and reporting their own thought processes (e.g., Hurlburt et al., 
1994), intentions (e.g., Williams & Happé, 2010), emotional feelings (e.g., Ben Shalom et al., 
2006; Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004) and beliefs (e.g., Williams & Happé, 2009b), all of which 
supports the suggestion that individuals with ASD show diminished psychological self-
awareness.  In contrast, several lines of evidence suggest that awareness of the physical self is 
relatively unimpaired in individuals with ASD.  For example, individuals with ASD typically 
show undiminished performance on mirror self-recognition tasks(Ferrari & Matthews, 1983), 
                                                        
3 This chapter has been adapted from Grainger, C., Williams, D.M. & Lind, S.E. (2013). Online 
action monitoring and memory for self-performed actions in autism spectrum disorder.  Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorder, 44 (5), pp. 1193-1206.  It has been modified to fit the format of 
this thesis. 
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delayed video self-recognition tasks (Lind & Bowler, 2009a), and action imitation tasks 
(Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2007).   
However, some researchers have queried whether awareness of physical aspects of ǡǲǳ(Russell & Jarrold, 1998, 1999).  Russell and Hill (2001, p.317) define ǡǲǡ-
observation, (a) for which changes in perceptual input they are responsible and (b) what they ǳ.  As such, action monitoring allows an individual to ǲ-ǳ
externally-caused.  Thus, action monitoring gives rise to the experience of agency.  If 
individuals with ASD do show impairments in action monitoring this contradicts theories that 
suggest awareness of the physical self is not impaired in ASD, despite limitations in awareness 
of psychological aspects of self (e.g., Lind, 2010; Williams, 2010).   
Action monitoring ability is commonly assessed through tasks that examine an ǯǤ  Typically, individuals are able to 
correct errors so rapidly that they cannot simply be relying on visual feedback alone.  Instead 
correcting errors at this speed is thought to depend on monitoring so called ǲefference copiesǳ
of motor plans.  This enables errors to be corrected before a motor command for the 
particular action is initiated.  Typically, error correction problems are found in individuals 
with schizophrenia (e.g., Frith & Done, 1989), and are normally interpreted as reflecting 
diminished action monitoring .  Studies have also indicated that individuals with ASD show 
impairments in correcting errors (e.g., Russell & Jarrold, 1998).  As such, this is one source of 
evidence that suggests action monition may be impaired in ASD.  Another source of evidence, 
which has been taken as evidence that ASD involves diminished action monitoring ability, 
concerns findings from studies that have assessed relative memory for self-performed actions 
versus memory for observed actions.  It is well established that neurotypical individuals show 
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reliably superior memory for actions that they themselves have performed than actions that 
they have observed other people perform (e.g., Baker-Ward et al., 1990; Engelkamp, 1998).  
Superior memory for self-performed actions over other-performed actions is referred to as ǲǳtoric components involved 
in performing an action leading to those actions being more deeply encoded than observed 
actions (e.g., Engelkamp & Zimmer, 1989).  The fact that several studies have reported 
reduced or absent enactment effects in ASD has led to the suggestion that ASD may be 
characterised by diminished action monitoring (Farrant et al., 1998; Hala et al., 2005; 
Millward et al., 2000; Russell & Jarrold, 1999; Wojcik et al., 2011; Zalla et al., 2010).  Indeed, ȋǤǤǡǲǳǢ
superior memory for observed actions than self-performed actions) in ASD, suggesting a 
marked atypicality in physical self-awareness in this disorder (Millward et al., 2000; Russell & 
Jarrold, 1999).  All of these studies have leǲǳȋǤǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ p.6).   
However, there are grounds for questioning whether the results from these studies, 
and thus the conclusion that action monitoring is diminished in ASD, are indeed valid and 
reliable.  In the studies by Farrant et al., (1998) and Hala et al., (2005), participants with ASD 
showed a flat profile of memory for self-performed and observed actions.  However, in both of 
these studies comparison participants did not show a significant enactment effect either.  
Rather, they too showed a flat profile of performance and there were no significant between-
group differences in this respect in either of the studies.  Therefore, the failure of individuals 
with ASD to show an enactment effect in these studies cannot be taken to support the view 
that action monitoring/physical self-awareness is diminished in this disorder.  Instead, 
because neurotypical individuals in these studies also failed to show enactment effects, the 
failure to find an enactment effect among participants with ASD is likely to be due to 
methodological issues associated with the procedure/stimuli used in the studies.   
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In the study by Millward et al., (2000), comparison participants did show a significant 
enactment effect, whereas participants with ASD showed an atypical observer effect.  This 
does indicate that action monitoring may be impaired in individuals with ASD.  However, one 
major problem with this study is that Millward et al., (2000) did not match ASD and 
comparison participants for VIQ.  Although the groups were matched for verbal mental age, 
the comparison group had a mean chronological age that was seven years below that of the 
ASD group.  Thus, as Lind (2010) highlights, participants with ASD had VIQ scores that were 
approximately 54 points below those of comparison participants.  As such, it is simply not 
possible to compare meaningfully the experimental task performance of ASD and comparison ǤǯǤ  Matching for VIQ is essential in studies of cognitive 
function in individuals with ASD.  It is possible that differences between groups in this respect 
can potentially entirely explain between-Ǥǡǯ
task (see Mervis & Klein-Tasman, 2004).   
In an attempt to overcome this limitation, Millward et al., (2000) conducted a second 
study.  This study assessed a sample of children with intellectual disability who, like the ASD 
group in their Study 1, had lower verbal mental ages than chronological ages.  However, no 
ASD or neurotypical comparison groups were included, and the group with intellectual 
disability in Study 2 was not comparable to the ASD or neurotypical groups from Study 1 in 
terms of either verbal mental age or chronological age.  Furthermore, the group of children 
with intellectual disability in Study 2 experienced a different set of events in different 
locations to those used in Study 1.  As such, it is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions 
from this study.  In a more recent study Wojcik et al., (2011) also failed to find significant 
enactment effects among children with ASD.  In contrast, on the same task neurotypical 
children showed a clear enactment effect.  However, the study does not report whether 
groups were matched for verbal intelligence.  As is the case with Millward et al., (2000) it thus 
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remains unclear whether group differences in VIQ could potentially account for group 
differences in memory performance.   
It is difficult to draw conclusions from the studies by Farrant et al., (1998), Hala et al., 
(2005), Millward et al., (2000) and Wojcik et al., (2011) because of the methodological 
problems that are arguably inherent in the design of each study.  In contrast, the studies by 
Russell and Jarrold (1999), and Zalla et al., (2010) both used sound experimental procedures.  
In both studies, individuals with ASD and comparison participants were closely matched for 
age and verbal intelligence, and comparison participants in each study did show significant 
enactment effects.  As such, if reliable, the findings of reduced/reversed enactment effects in 
ASD in these studies provide a serious challenge to theories that action monitoring ability is 
typical in individuals with ASD.  However, there is reason to question the reliability of the 
results reported by Russell and Jarrold.  Using a slightly modified version of Russell and ǯǡ±(2009a) found that participants with ASD showed 
a typical enactment effect in a source memory task.  They did not observe significant 
differences between the (well-matched) groups of ASD and comparison participants, in this 
respect.  Ƭǯs (1999) may not be replicable.   
The fact that Williams & Happé (2009a) could not replicate the results of Russell and 
Jarrold (1999) highlights the importance of replicating methodologically rigorous studies 
with well-designed methods.  With this in mind, the current study represents an attempt to 
replicate, the only other methodologically rigorous study that has failed to find an enactment 
effect in ASD;  Zalla et al., (2010).  Zalla and colleagues explored whether adults with ASD 
would show an enactment effect when their memory was tested for actions they themselves 
had performed than actions that they had observed someone else perform in a video clip.  ǯ
tasks; a free recall task, a recognition task and a source memory task.  Zalla et al., (2010) 
found that participants with ASD showed similar performance to control participants on the 
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recognition and source memory tests, showing better memory for actions they had performed 
than actions they had observed being performed by someone else.  However on the free recall 
task participants showed no significant difference in the proportion of enacted actions they 
recalled than the proportion of observed actions they recalled.  In contrast, control 
participants recalled significantly more actions that they had performed than those they had 
observed.   
As such, in order to provide clearer evidence of whether action monitoring abilities are 
diminished in ASD, the first experimental task reported in this chapter attempted to replicate 
the findings of Zalla et al.,. In so doing, ǯǡǡǯ(1999) findings, they could not 
be replicated.  If individuals with ASD do show impairments in their ability to monitor their 
own actions then you would expect to find a reduced or absent enactment effect on this task.  
However if, as predicted, action monitoring remains unimpaired in individuals with ASD, then 
performance on the task should be similar in both the neurotypical and ASD participants.   ǡǲǳ
employed by Williams and Happé (2009a; Experiment 1) was also included.  According to 
Russell (Russell & Jarrold, 1999), tasks which require individuals to discriminate online 
between their own actions and actions initiated by something/someone else provide a direct 
measure of action monitoring ability.  Following Russell and Hill (2001), Williams and Happé 
employed a task that involved participants moving a computer mouse (which was placed 
inside a box, obscuring it from view) and were asked to decide which, from a number of 
moving coloured squares displayed on a computer screen, was the stimulus being controlled 
by their own hand movements.  Success on the task relied on participants deciding which of 
the movements on the screen corresponded with their own proprioceptively experienced 
movements.  The study also included a second ǲOtherǳcondition.  In this condition 
participants placed their hand on the computer mouse, but the movements of the mouse were 
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controlled by the experimenter.  Thus, in this condition, participants experience no motor 
intentions for the movements of the mouse in the Other condition, and so cannot rely on 
feelings of agency to determine which of the stimuli is being controlled by the mouse.  For an 
individual with an unimpaired sense of their own agency, this condition should be 
significantly more challenging than the Self condition.  In contrast, if individuals are unable to 
accurately monitor their own actions then it should not matter who controls the mouse, 
because in both cases participants cannot rely on an experience of agency to perform the task, 
and instead can only rely on their ability to match felt actions with the observed consequences 
of these actions.  Williams and Happé (2009a) did not observe any significant between-group 
difference in either the level or pattern of performance shown by individuals with and 
without ASD on the task.  Additionally, (when diagnostic groups were collapsed) Williams & 
Happé (2009a) found that performance on the self condition of the Squares task was 
significantly associated with source memory for self performed actions, independently of 
verbal mental age.  ǯ
greater the enactment effect shown by participants on the memory task.  Thus, Williams and 
Happé found a direct link between online action monitoring and the enactment effect.  This 
squares task was included to provide an additional measure of action monitoring ability to the 
measures used by Zalla et al., (2010).  Including this test of action monitoring also allowed us 
to investigate whether action monitoring ability as assessed by an online measure relates to 
action monitoring ability assessed by the enactment effect.  It was predicted that individuals 
with ASD would show similar performance on the Self condition of the task as comparison 
participants, and that both groups would find the Self condition considerably easier than the 
Other condition.  ǯ
experimental tasks would be related.  All predictions were in keeping with suggestions that, 
regardless of whether it is assessed online or via memory, action monitoring ability should be 
unimpaired in individuals with ASD.   





Ethical approval for this study was obtained from Durham University ethics 
committee.  Seventeen adults with ASD and 17 neurotypical comparison adults took part in 
this study, all of whom gave written informed consent before participating.  Participants in the 
ASD group had all received formal diagnoses of autistic disorder (n  é ?Ȍǯ
disorder (n = 13), according to conventional criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; 
World Heath Organisation, 1993).  Participants with ASD were recruited via an advertisement 
on The National Autistic Society website; ASD support groups; Durham University Service for 
Students with Disabilities; and word of mouth.  The majority of comparison participants were 
recruited through advertisements in local newspapers.  However, a small number took part in 
order to receive course credits in partial fulfilment of their undergraduate psychology 
degrees.   
Fifteen of the 17 participants in the ASD group were administered with the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000).  The ADOS is an in-depth observational 
assessment of ASD characteristics.  Two participants did not wish to complete the ADOS, 
because they did not feel comfortable being filmed.  The mean ADOS total score for the ASD 
group was in the autism range (see Table 15).  All participants who completed the ADOS 
received a total  ? ?ǡ-off for ASD (Lord et al., 2000).  Additionally, all 
participants in the ASD group completed the Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001), a self-report questionnaire that assesses ASD characteristics.  Fourteen out of 17 
participants scored above the defined cut-off for ASD on the AQ ( ? ? ?Ǣ-
Smith et al., 2005).  Three participants did not self-report a score above this cut-off.  However, 
all three of these participants scored well above the defined ASD cut-off on the ADOS (all  ? ? ?ȌǤ   
 
C h a p t e r  S i x :  A c t i o n  M o n i t o r i n g  i n  A S D  | 177 
 
 
All comparison participants completed the AQ and all scored below the defined cut-off 
for ASD.  No participants, in either the ASD or neurotypical group, reported using any 
psychotropic medication.  Additionally, none of the participants reported a history of having a 
neurological or psychiatric condition (apart from ASD).  The participant groups were closely 
equated for verbal and non-verbal ability, as assessed using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999).  Groups were also closely matched for chronological age 
(see Table 15 for participant characteristics).   
Design and Procedure 
Enactment effect task.  The procedure for the enactment task employed by Zalla et al., 
(2010) was replicated as closely as possible.  This task consisted of a study phase and test 
phase.  During the study phase participants were presented verbal descriptions and videos of 
30 actions, 15 of which they simply observed being performed and 15 of which they observed 
Table 15: Participant Characteristics (Means, Standard Deviations and Inferential 
Statistics). 
 Group    
 ASD (n = 17) Neurotypical (n = 17) t p ǯd 
Age 29.11 (10.55) 29.43 (14.95) 0.07 .944 0.02 
VIQ 113.06 (13.83) 111.00 (10.77) 0.48 .632 0.17 
PIQ 110.71 (15.58) 113.24 (11.20) 0.54 .591 0.19 
FSIQ 114.53 (14.51) 113.59 (10.94) 0.21 .832 0.07 
AQ Total Score 33.71 (9.23) 12.65 (5.22) 8.19 <.001 2.81 
ADOS Total Score* 11.13 (3.58)     
 
AQ: Autism-spectrum Quotient; ADOS: Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule  
*Based on 15/17 participants 
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being performed and performed themselves.  Participants were informed that after the study 
phase they would be asked about what they had heard, seen and acted out, but were not 
explicitly told that their memory for the action phrases would be tested.  Eight different 30-
item lists of actions were used during the task, and list presentation was counterbalanced 
across all participants.  Each 30 item-list consisted of actions phrases drawn from an overall 
set of 60 action phrases.  Four lists were created using action phrases from one half of this set, 
and another four lists were created using action phrases from the other half of this set.  Each 
list presented the action phrases in a different randomised order, and in each list 15 actions 
were randomly selected as the actions assigned to be performed.  All eight lists were equated 
for mean syllable length of items and mean spoken word frequency as indexed by Kucera and 
Francis (1967), all of which were reported in the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 
1981).  The adequacy of this matching was confirmed by a non-significant effect of List in a ȋǯȌ
frequency as the dependent variables, F (14, 464) = 0.31, p = .993,   = .01. 
During the study phase actions were presented to participants on a computer screen 
which participants stood approximately 1.5 meters away from.  Participants were instructed 
that the beginning of each trial would be signalled by the presentation of either a green or red 
dot at the top of the screen.  Both green and red dots were identical in size (2x2cm) and 
appeared at the top of the computer screen for the entirety of a trial.  After the dot (either red 
or green) had been presented for 1000ms it was followed by a recording of a male voice 
describing an action phrase (e.g., ǲǳȌǤ  All voice clips used in the task were 
2000ms long.  Immediately after auditory presentation of the action phrase participants were 
then presented with a video of an actor performing the appropriate action.  All video clips 
were 6000ms long, during which a male actor acted out the appropriate action and then 
adopted a neutral stance for the remainder of the clip.  Figure 12 shows a representation of 
stimuli presentation on each trial of the task.   
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Participants were instructed that if a green dot appeared on the screen at the start of a 
trial they should listen to the action and then simultaneously mimic the action described 
while the video was being presented.  If a red dot appeared at the start of a trial participants 
were instructed simply to listen to the action phrase and then watch the video clip of the actor 
performing the phrase.  During these trials participants were asked to stand in a neutral 
position.  At the end of each trial the experimenter clicked the mouse, after which the next 
trial began immediately.  During green dot trials the experimenter moved onto the next trial 
only after the video had been fully presented and they had observed the participant 
adequately perform the appropriate action.   
 
Figure 12: Graphical representation of the procedure used during a trial of the action 
monitoring task.   
 
After a short 5 minute break participants completed the test phase.  Firstly ǯ
participants were given five minutes to write down as many of the action phrases as they 
could remember.  Secondly participants completed a recognition and source memory task.  In 
1000ms Cue  
'ƌĞĞŶƐŝŐŶĂůƐ ‘WĞƌĨŽƌŵ ? 
ZĞĚƐŝŐŶĂůƐ ‘KďƐĞƌǀĞ ? 
2000ms Voice clip 6000ms Video clip 
Experimenter 
ends trial  
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this task participants were presented with 60 action phrases (15 they had performed, 15 they 
had observed and 30 novel ǲlureǳphrases).  One of the remaining stimuli lists was used to 
make up the 30 novel actions phrases, and so novel phrases were matched to the ǲoldǳaction 
phrases for syllable length and word frequency (as stated above).  Participants were asked to 
judge whether each action phrase was ǲoldǳ(had been presented to them previously during 
the study phase) or ǲnewǳ(had not been presented in the study phase).  If participants 
thought that an action phrase was old they were also asked to decide whether they thought 
the action was one they had performed, or one they had observed being performed but not 
performed themselves.  During this task participants were presented with each action phrase 
individually on the computer screen, and an experimenter recorded their responses, and then 
moved onto the next trial.   
Action monitoring task.  The action monitoring task employed in this study was 
based on the task used in Williams and Happé (2009a).  There were two conditions (Self and 
Other) in the task.  In each condition, a series of different coloured squares moved across a 
computer screen.  All the squares moved whenever the mouse was moved and froze 
whenever the mouse was not being moved.  However, during each trial only one of the 
squares (the target square) consistently moved in accordance with the movements of the 
mouse.  In other words, only the target square was directly controlled by the participant.  The 
remaining squares in each trial (the distractor squares) moved in a pseudo-random fashion.   
In both the Self and Other conditions of the task there were a total of 18 levels, which 
increased in difficulty (Table 16 summarises each level of the task).  Participants completed 
five 30s trials at each level, and moved onto the next level only if they successfully completed 
more trials than would be expected by chance.  For example at level 1 four squares were 
presented on the screen, one of which was the target square and three of which were 
distractor squares.  Across five trials, if an individual randomly chose squares, by chance they 
would be expected to successfully identify the target square on one in every four trials.  As 
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such, to pass level 1 a participant had to successfully identify the target square at least twice 
(in five trials) to perform above chance on this level.  The number of distractor squares 
increased as levels got harder.  At level two there were 8 distractors, at level three there were 
15 distractors, at level four there were 24 distractors, at level five there were 35 distractors 
and at level six there were 48 distractors. 
Task difficulty was also manipulated by varying the degree of similarity between the 
movement of the target square and the movements of the distractor squares.  The vector 
movements of the distractor squares could be varied between 0° to 360° relative to the target  
square.  If the movements of the distractor squares varied by 0° degrees from the target 
Table 16: Stimulus characteristics for each level of the action monitoring task. 
Level No.  of distractor squares 
 
Minimum no.  of trials required 
to move onto next level (out of 
5) 
Distractor movement arc  
(°) 
 
1 3 2 360 
2 8 1 360 
3 15 1 360 
4 24 1 360 
5 35 1 360 
6 48 1 360 
7 3 2 180 
8 8 1 180 
9 15 1 180 
10 24 1 180 
11 35 1 180 
12 48 1 180 
13 3 2 90 
14 8 1 90 
15 15 1 90 
16 24 1 90 
17 35 1 90 
18 48 1 90 
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square all the squares would move the same, and so the task would be impossible.  In 
contrast, if the movement of the distractor squares varied by 360° the distractor squares 
could move in any direction relative to the movement of the target square.  If participants 
successfully completed levels 1 to 6 with the distractor squares set at a movement arc of 360° 
they moved onto level 7, which was the same as level 1 (i.e., one target and three distractor 
squares), but the movements of the distractor squares were contained to an 180° movement 
arc.  Levels 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were the same as levels 2, 3, 4 5, and 6, respectively, expect 
that the movements of the distractor squares were also contained to a 180° arc.  If 
participants completed these levels successfully they moved onto level 13, which again was 
the same as level 1 but with the movements of the distractor squares contained to a 90° arc.  
Again levels 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 were the same as levels 2, 3, 4 5, and 6 respectively, except 
that the movement of the distractor squares was now restricted to 90°.  Table 16 summarises 
each level of the task. 
Participants always completed the Self condition of the task first.  In this condition 
participants moved the mouse and were instructed to press the spacebar once they thought 
they had identified that target square.  Once the spacebar was pressed all squares on the 
screen froze and did not move when the mouse was moved, allowing participants to then click 
on the square they thought was the target square.  The next trial began immediately after 
participants clicked on a square.  If participants did not press the spacebar within 30s the trial 
ended and participants moved onto the next trial.  This was considered an incorrect trial.  
Before participants completed the experimental trials, they were shown a demonstration of 
the task.  The experimenter demonstrated two trials at level 1, explaining to the participant ǲI 
think I know which square I am controlling so I am going to press the spacebar.  Then I can 
indicate which square I think I was controlling by clicking on itǳǤParticipants then completed 
two practice trials at level 1 followed by the experimental trials.  On all trials the mouse was 
placed inside a cardboard box, which could be reached through openings at both ends of the 




ensure that participants did not succeed at the task simply by matching their hand 
movements with the movements of the square on the screen.  If participants did not 
successfully complete enough trials for their performance to be better than chance at a 
particular level a ǲGame Overǳscreen appeared, signalling the end of that condition.   
After completing the Self condition participants then completed the Other condition of 
the task.  This condition was identical to the Self condition except that as well as the 
participant placing their hand on the mouse, the experimenter took hold of the mouse from 
the opposite end and gripped the top of the mouse with their index and thumb fingers.  This 
allowed the experimenter to control the movements of the mouse.  The participant was 
instructed to allow the experimenter to control the movements of the mouse, and not to try 
and move the mouse themselves.  During each trial the experimenter continuously moved the 
mouse, first up and down and then left and right.  The same mouse movements were 
standardised across all participants and trials.  Once the participant thought they had 
identified the target square they were instructed to press the spacebar.  Like before, all 
squares on the screen froze and the participant were then able to control the movements of 
the mouse, and click on the square they thought was the target square.  As before, the 
experimenter demonstrated the task and participants then completed two practise trials at 
level one, before beginning the experimental trials.   
Scoring 
For the enactment effect memǯ
as the proportion of actions individuals correctly recalled, both for enacted actions and 
observed actions.  As a measure of recognition performance two separate corrected hit rates 
were calculated1.  Corrected hit rates were calculated using the formula H-FA, where H 
represents hit rate (the proportion of old items participants correctly identifying as ǲoldǳȌ and 
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FA represents false alarm rate (the proportion of new actions participants incorrectly 
identifying ǲoldǳȌ.  Two corrected hit rate scores were calculated, using separate hit rates for 
enacted and observed actions.  A single false alarm rate was used to calculate both corrected 
hit rates, since false alarm rates were derived from performance on distractor items which by 
definition were neither enacted nor observed.  Source monitoring performance was calculated 
as the proportion of action phrases participants made correct source attributions for (i.e.  
correctly identified performed actions as ǲperformedǳǡ and observed actions as ǲobservedǳȌ, 
for both enacted and observed action phrases.   
During both conditions of the action monitoring task the computer automatically 
recorded which squares participants clicked on during each trial, and whether this was the 
correct target square.  For each participant the total number of successfully completed trials 
(from a maximum of 90 trials) and the total number of successfully completed levels (from a 
maximum of 18 levels) in both the Self and Other condition was calculated. 
Results 
Enactment Task 
Free Recall.  Table 17 shows the average proportion of actions that individuals in the 
ASD and neurotypical group recalled correctly, for both enacted and observed actions.  A 2 
(Group: ASD/neurotypical) × 2 (Condition: Enacted/Observed) ANOVA was conducted on the 
proportion of actions correctly recalled.  A significant main effect of Condition was found, F (1, 
32)= 28.42, p < .001,  = .47, reflecting the fact that across groups individuals recalled 
significantly more actions that they had performed than actions they had observed.  There 
was no significant main effect of Group, F (1, 32) = 1.31, p = .261,  = .04, and no significant 
interaction between Group and Condition F (1, 32) = .01, p = .906, < .01.  This reflected the 
fact that participants in both groups showed the same pattern of performance on the recall 
C h a p t e r  S i x :  A c t i o n  M o n i t o r i n g  i n  A S D  | 185 
 
 
task, and recalled significantly more enacted actions than observed actions (showing a 
statistically significant enactment effect).   
 
Recognition.  Corrected hit rates for enacted and observed actions among ASD and 
comparison participants are reported in Table 174.  A 2 (Group: ASD/neurotypical) × 2 
(Condition: Enacted/Observed) mixed ANOVA was conducted on these data.  A significant 
main effect of Condition was found, F (1, 32) = 58.96, p < .001,  = .65, reflecting superior 
recognition of enacted items than observed items.  There was no significant main effect of 
                                                        
4 It should be highlighted that Zalla et al., (2010) used the nonparametric measures of ܣᇱ and ܤԢԢ஽  to assess participants recognition discrimination. However, when ܣᇱ scores were calculated for 
recognition performance in this study, one sample t-tests indicated that scores did not significantly 
differ from ceiling level accuracy (100% discrimination accuracy) for enacted actions in both in the TD 
group, t (16) = 1.97, p = .06, and ASD group, t (16) = 1.87, p = .08.  As such, to maximise the rigour of 
our statistical analysis, corrected hit rates were used as an alternative measure of recognition 
performance on the task.   
Table 17: Memory performance on the recall, recognition, and source monitoring tasks 
for enacted and observed action phrases in the ASD and neurotypical groups. 
  Group 
  ASD  Neurotypical 
Recall performance Enacted .63 (.13) .62 (.14) 
 Observed .37 (.13) .38 (.14) 
Recognition performance Enacted .95 (.09) .97 (.05) 
 Observed .83 (.14) .81 (.13) 
Source monitoring 
performance 
Enacted .95 (.06) .96 (.07) 
 Observed .80 (.20) .81 (.11) 
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Group, F (1, 32) = 0.004, p = .952, < .01, and no significant interaction between Group and 
condition F (1, 32) = 2.09, p = .158,  = .06.  This reflected the fact that both groups showed a 
similar pattern of recognition performance, demonstrating better recognition discrimination 
for enacted actions than actions they had observed.   
Source Monitoring.  Table 17 also shows the average proportion of actions that 
participants in the ASD and neurotypical group made correct source memory judgements for, 
for both enacted and observed actions.  A 2 (Group: ASD/neurotypical) × 2 (Condition 
enacted/observed) mixed ANOVA was conducted.  A significant main effect of Condition was 
found, F (1,32) = 25.9, p <.001,  = .45, reflecting the fact that, across groups, individuals 
made more correct source judgements for enacted actions than actions they had observed.  
There was no significant main effect of Group, F (1, 32) = 0.04, p = .844, < .01, and no 
significant interaction between Group and condition F (1, 32) = .01, p = .944, < .01.  This 
reflected the fact that both groups made more correct source monitoring judgments for 
enacted actions than observed action.  A series of one sample t-tests was carried out, to 
establish whether performance on the enactment task was at floor or ceiling level, for any of 
the memory measures.  These t-tests indicated that, in both the ASD and neurotypical groups, 
performance on the recall, recognition, and source monitoring tasks significantly differed 
from floor or ceiling level performance, all ts > 2.38, all ps < .030. 
To summarise, on all three tests of memory (recall, recognition, and source 
monitoring) participants in both the ASD and neurotypical groups showed better memory for 
actions that they had enacted than actions they had observed.  This pattern of memory 
performance did not differ between ASD participants and neurotypical participants on any 
measure, as indicated by no ǯ
and their memory for enacted/observed actions.   
 




Table 18 shows the mean number of levels and trials completed in both the Self and 
Other conditions of the task, for both ASD and neurotypical participants.  Firstly a 2 × 2 mixed 
ANOVA was carried out, with the  number of trials completed in each condition (Self/Other) 
entered as a within-subjects variable and diagnostic group (ASD/neurotypical) entered as a 
between subject variable.  There was a significant main effect of condition on the number of 
trials completed, F (1, 32) = 75.66, p < .001, = .70.  This reflected superior performance in 
the Self condition than the Other condition.  There was no significant main effect of group, F 
(1, 32) = 0.46, p = .503, = .01, indicating, across both conditions, that participants in the ASD 
group showed similar performance to comparisons participants.  There was also no 
significant interaction between group and condition, F (1, 32) = 1.45, p = .237, = .04.   
Another  2 × 2 mixed design ANOVA was carried out, with the number of levels 
participants successfully completed in each Condition (Self/Other) entered as a within-
subjects variable, and Group (ASD/neurotypical) entered as a between subjects variable.  
Again, there was a significant main effect of condition on the number of levels successfully 
completed, F (1, 32) = 87.23, p < .001, = .73.  There was no main effect of Group, F (1, 32) 
=1.54, p = .223, = .05.  However, the interaction between Group and Condition was 
marginally significant, F (1, 32) = 3.95, p = .056, = .11.  To investigate this interaction further 
a series of independent sample t-tests was carried out.  These indicated that within the Self 
condition there was no significant group difference in the number of levels successfully 
completed, t (32) = 1.67, p = .105, d = 0.57.  This was also the case in the Other condition, t 
(32) = 1.63, p = .112, d = 0.56.  Paired-samples t-tests showed there was a significant 
difference between the number of levels completed in the Self condition, relative to the Other 
condition, in both the ASD group, t (16) = 4.83, p <.001, d =  2.87, and the neurotypical group , 
t (16) = 8.73, p <.001, d = 1.75.  The significant interaction between Group and Condition 
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appeared to be driven by the relatively larger difference between performance on the Self and 
Other conditions of the task shown by ASD participants relative to neurotypical participants.  
On average individual in the neurotypical group completed 7.29 (6.22) more levels on the Self 
condition of the task relative to the Other condition, whereas individuals in the ASD group 
completed on average 11.24 (5.31) more levels on the Self condition relative to the Other 
condition.  Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the number of participants in each group that 












 Table 18: Mean (standard deviation) number of levels and trials completed in 
the Self and Other condition, by both the ASD and neurotypical group. 
  Group 
  ASD  Neurotypical  
Trials Completed Self 40.59 (20.77) 33.53 (22.43) 
 Other 3.59 (2.98) 5.53 (4.00) 
Levels Completed Self  12.59 (5.42) 9.41 (5.69) 
 Other 1.35 (1.11) 2.12 (1.58) 




Figure 13: Number of participants in each group who successfully completed each level in 
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Relations between action monitoring ability on the Enactment task and Squares task 
On the Squares task, the size of the effect of action monitoring was calculated by 
subtracting the number of successful trials participants made in the Other condition from the 
number of successful trials participants made in the Self condition of the task.  This difference 
score represented the size of the advantage of action monitoring on the Squares task.  The 
greater the score, the more sensitive action monitoring ability was on the task. 
On the Enactment task, the size of the enactment effect participants showed was ǯ
memory scores for enacted actions.  Three separate difference scores were calculated for 1) 
recall memory, 2) recognition memory and 3), source monitoring memory.  For all three 
scores the greater the score, the greater the memory advantage for enacting actions than 
observing them.   
To investigate the relation between the effect of action monitoring on the Squares task 
and extent to which participants showed an enactment effect on the Enactment task, a series ǯǤ  There was no significant relation between the size 
of the effect of action monitoring (on the Squares task) and the extent to which participants 
showed enactment effects on the recall, recognition and source monitoring tests (on the 
Enactment task), among either ASD or comparison participants, all rs < .28, all ps > .279.   
Discussion 
Individuals with ASD showed no evidence of action monitoring impairments in this 
study.  Results from the Squares task indicated that the ASD group were as able as comparison 
individuals to detect which square was controlled by their own actions.  Importantly, both 
groups of participants also found it significantly easier to identify the target square when it 
was controlled by their own intentional movements than when the movement of the target 
square was controlled by the experimenter.  Thus, individuals with ASD were able to monitor 
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their own motor commands and benefit from the feelings of agency that were unique to the 
Self condition of the task.  Indeed, there was some evidence that individuals with ASD were 
somewhat more sensitive to their agency than comparison participants; when the number of 
successful levels completed on the Squares task was taken as the dependent measure of 
performance.  These results are in keeping with previous suggestions that individuals with 
ASD may in fact make more efficient use of non-visual, motor cues than neurotypical 
individuals, and rely relatively less on visual cues (Frith & Hermelin, 1969).  This suggests 
that, far from being impaired, individuals with ASD might show heightened physical self-
awareness.  Regardless of whether this is the case, the results from this study certainly do not 
suggest that individuals with ASD are impaired at online action monitoring.   
During the enactment task, as predicted, adults with ASD showed better memory for 
actions they had enacted than actions they had observed, on all three memory tests.  On the 
recall, recognition, and source monitoring tests, memory performance was both qualitatively 
and quantitatively similar in the ASD and neurotypical groups; individuals with ASD showed 
enactment effects of a closely similar magnitude to those shown by neurotypical individuals.  
This is in keeping with many previous studies that have reported finding typical enactment 
effects in individuals with ASD (e.g., Hare et al., 2007; Lind & Bowler, 2009c; Maras et al., 
2012; Summers & Craik, 1994; Williams & Happé, 2009a), and also in keeping with many 
studies in the broader action monitoring literature (e.g., Blakemore et al., 2006; David et al., 
2008).  Indeed, with respect to the recognition and source memory tasks, these results 
replicate those of Zalla et al., ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǢǤǯǡ
enactment effects for recognition and source memory were observed among individuals with 
ASD.  Nonetheless, in their discussion of their data, Zalla et al., mainly focussed on the only 
difference they observed between the groups, which was in free recall only.  It was in this 
respect the results of the study did not ǤǯǤ   
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In the introduction it was argued that only two studies (Russell & Jarrold, 1999; Zalla 
et al., 2010) have reported finding that individuals with ASD do not show a typical enactment 
effect, using samples we know are well matched.  ǯ
replicated by Williams and Happé (2009a).  Similarly, in this paper, the only finding that the 
study failed to replicate was atypical memory performance in individuals with ASD on the 
recall test (the only results in the paper that in any way indicated action monitoring is 
impaired in ASD).  As such, it is argued that this study, and the enactment effect literature in 
general, provides support for theories that suggest action monitoring should remain 
unimpaired in individuals with ASD (e.g., Lind, 2010; Williams, 2010).   
A number of studies have now explored whether individuals with ASD demonstrate 
typical enactment effects.  A summary of the results from these studies is shown in Table 19.  
This table shows that, in fact, the majority of these studies are in keeping with the results of 
this study, and report similar performance in ASD and comparison participants (with both 
groups either showing an enactment effect of similar magnitude, or both groups showing no 
enactment effect).  Across these studies, when you look at the average size of the memory 
advantage individuals demonstrate for self-performed items than other-performed items, 
there is no significant difference between ASD and neurotypical participants, t (38) = .40, p = 
.692, d =0.11.  On average, across all studies looking at the enactment effect, ASD participants 
remembered 10% more actions that they performed than actions they observed.  Comparably, 
on average, neurotypical participants remembered 11% more actions when they enacted 
them.  This lends more support to the view that action monitoring (and physical self-
awareness, more generally) is undiminished in ASD. 
Potential reasons for why both Russell & Jarrold (1999) and Zalla et al., (2010) found 
discrepant results, compared to other studies of the enactment effect in individuals with ASD, 
should be considered.  One potential reason for discrepancies between studies could be 
differences in the developmental ability of participants in different studies.  It is possible that 
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problems with action monitoring may be evident in individuals with ASD who have low verbal 
mental ages.  The average verbal mental age (VMA) of the children with ASD in Russell & ǯȋ é ?Ǥ ? ?Ȍ
Williams & Happé (2009a) study (VMA= 8.44 years), potentially explaining why only Williams 
and Happé observed an enactment effect among their sample of ASD participants.  However, 
the developmental level (i.e., VMA) of participants is unlikely to be the sole explanation for 
differences across studies, because other studies have reported a typical enactment effect 
among children with ASD whose VMAs were on average lower than participants in Russell & ǯǤ  For example, Lind and Bowler (2009b) found that a sample of children with 
ASD with an average VMA of 6.66 years showed typical enactment effects than comparison 
participants.  ǯ
enactment effect among individuals with ASD may be to do with the verbal intelligence, rather 
than developmental level, of participants.  That is, problems with action monitoring may be 
evident only among intellectually low-functioning individuals with ASD.  In Russell and ǯǡ ? ?Ǥ ? ?5, which is 
notably low, relative to other relevant studies.  However, it is also notable that a large ±ǯ
considered relatively intellectually low-functioning (the mean VIQ among participants with 
ASD was 73.50), but nonetheless showed typical enactment effects.  Moreover, reference to ǯȋ é ? ? ?Ǥ ?Ȍ 
                                                        
5 The average VIQ for participants in the ASD group is not reported in Russell and Jarrold 
(1999). However, Russell and Jarrold (1999) reports the average VMA (7.13 years) and the average 
chronological age (CA; 13.23) for participants in the ASD group. These were used to estimate the 
average VIQ of the ASD group, using the formula VIQ = VMA/CA × 100. 
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enactment effect on the recall task.  As such, developmental differences in VMA/ VIQ cannot 
fully explain discrepancies between each ǯǤ   
Within the literature, three studies (the current study; Williams and Happé 2009a; 
Russell & Hill, 2001) have now used the Squares task (or a variation of it) to investigate action 
monitoring ability in individuals with ASD.  All three of these studies find convergent results, 
indicating undiminished task performance among adults and children with ASD.  That being 
said, the current study did not find a significant correlation between the effect of action 
monitoring on the Squares task and the extent to which participants showed an enactment 
effect on the action memory task , in either the ASD or the neurotypical group.  In this respect, 
this ±ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  The enactment tasks that 
was used was based as closely as possible on the method used in Zalla et al., (2010) and thus 
was not the same task as the task used by Williams & Happé.  As such, it may be the case that 
the enactment task used in the current study measured distinct aspects of action monitoring 
to that used in Williams and Happé.  Furthermore, this study assessed action monitoring 
ability in adults, whereas Williams & Happé assessed action monitoring ability in children.  
Any of these differences between the study designs/methods could explain the discrepancy 
between the results in terms of this specific finding.  However, what is more notable is the 
high consistency of findings across these two studies.  Despite the differences in methods 
used, the results from the two studies converge in most respects.   
In terms of the broader literature concerning self-awareness in ASD, the majority of 
evidence (including the results from both tasks in this study) suggests that physical self-
awareness is undiminished in ASD.  In contrast, studies have indicated that autobiographical 
(episodic) memory (Crane & Goddard, 2008; Crane, Pring, Jukes, & Goddard, 2012), and 
episodic future thinking, is impaired in ASD ( Lind, Williams, Bowler, & Peel, Lind & Bowler, 
2010; 2014), and arguments have been put forward to suggest that such impairments may 
(partially) result from impairments in self-awareness (see Lind, 2010).  However, diminished 
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memory for personally experienced events, and the diminished ability to imagine events in 
the future, is likely to rely on an awareness of a psychological, temporally-extended self.  Thus, 
it appears that individuals with ASD may demonstrate selective impairments only in 
psychological self-awareness.   
Theoretically, the results of this study can also inform cognitive theories surrounding 
the sense of agency.  Within the literature debate exists concerning how different aspects of 
social cognition, such as agency, imitation and mentalising relate to one and other.  Arguably, 
if a sense of agency acts as a precursor to mentalising ability (Russell, 1996), then 
stereotypical mentalising deficits in individuals with ASD (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; 
Yirmiya et al., 1998) should be associated with similar deficits in action monitoring.  These 
results, alongside results from several other studies (e.g., David et al., 2008; Hamilton et al., 
2007; Sebanz, Knoblich, Stumpf, & Prinz, 2005) suggests that a dissociation may exist between 
the sense of agency and mentalising ability, which is stereotypically impaired in individuals 
with ASD.  Instead, these results support suggestions (e.g., David et al., 2008) that social-
cognitive deficits associated ASD occur at a higher-level than that needed for a sense of 
agency.   
As well as having theoretical implications, establishing the extent of action monitoring 
abilities in ASD has practical importance.  It is well established that neurotypical individuals 
show better memory for information they have enacted.  On the basis that individuals with 
ASD also benefit from self-enactment then strategies aimed at improving learning and 
memory in ASD should focus on encouraging approaches that capitalise on this particular 
memory strength (i.e., encouraging motor participation in the learning process).  More 
generally, it may be possible to improve everyday functioning in individuals with ASD if 
memory can be enhanced by physical self-enactment.  Additionally, establishing whether 
individuals with ASD show an intact ability to accurately determine the source of actions gives 
rise to potential forensic implications.  For example, being able to accurately recall an event 
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one was involved in, and distinguish between actions carried out by oneself and others, 
influences the reliability of eyewitness testimonies (see Maras et al., 2012).  This study 
indicates that action monitoring is a relative strength in ASD, something that should be taken 
into account in future research.
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Table 19: Summary of studies reporting memory for self-performed items in individuals with ASD and neurotypical comparison participants.  This table reports the 
group size for each study, and the average difference in memory performance between the proportion of self-performed items remembered compared to the proportion of other-
performed items remembered. 
 
 Memory Test Report a significant difference in the 
size of the enactment effect shown 
by ASD and neurotypical 
participants 
Proportion change across 
conditions (Self-Other) 
n 
ASD Neurotypical ASD Neurotypical 
Summers & Craik (1994)a Free Recall  No .20 .05 8 8 
 Recognition No .17 .24 8 8 
Farrant, Boucher & Blades (1998) Source memory No -.18 -.06 15 15 
Russell & Jarrold (1999)b Source memory  Yes -.03 .02 22 22 
Millward, Powell, Messer & Jordan (2000)c Recall Yes / / 12 12 
Hill & Russell (2002) Source memory No .06 .01 20 20 
Hala, Rasmussen & Henderson (2005) Source memory No .16 .05 13 13 
Hare, Mellor & Azmi (2007) Free recall No .06 .12 12 14 
 Cued Recall No .17 .23 12 14 
Williams & Happé (2009a)b Source memory No .04 -.01 16 16 
Lind & Bowler (2009b) Recognition No .19 .22 53 50 
 Source memory No .12 .07 53 50 
Zalla, Daprati, Sav, Chaste, Nico & Leboyer (2010) 
Free Recall Yes .08 .24 18 18 
Recognition No .10 .14 18 18 
 Source memory No .09 .13 18 18 
Wojcik, Allen, Brown & Souchay (2011) Free Recall Yes .00 .03 16 16 
Maras, Memon, Lambrects & Bowler (2012) Free recall No .25 .20 18 18 
 Cued Recall No .02 .05 18 18 
Grainger, Williams & Lind (current study) Free Recall No .26 .24 17 17 
 Recognition No .12 .16 17 17 
 Source memory No .15 .15 17 17 
  Average across all studies (SD): .10 (.10) .11(.09) 18.46 (11.02) 18.38 (10.15) 
  
Total no.  of participants in all studies:   240 239 
a In this study there was no other-performed condition, but instead self-performed items were compared to verbally presented items.   
b For both Russell & Jarrold (1999) and Williams & Happé (2009a) the statistics reported here refer to differences in memory for cards turned over by participants themselves (on behalf of themself and their doll) compared to ȋǯl).  In the case of Russell & Jarrold (1999) the statistics refer to proportion change across both conditions (expected/unexpected) of the task.   
c Millward et al., (2000) do not report means and standard deviations for their results, making it not possible to calculate effect sizes and proportion differences between the Self and Other condition. 




THE INTENTION-SUPERIORITY EFFECT IN CHILDREN WITH AUTISM SPECTRUM 
DISORDER 
Introduction 
In chapter six, evidence was presented that suggested adults with ASD 
demonstrate typical enactment effects, demonstrating superior memory for actions they 
performed themselves than for actions they viewed someone else perform.  However, 
within the typically developing literature studies have shown that it is not just 
memories for actions one has performed in the past that hold a privileged status in 
memory, but also memory for actions one intends to perform in the future (e.g., Goschke 
& Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998).  For example, in a seminal study, Goschke 
and Kuhl (1993) found that across four experiments, participants were significantly 
faster and more accurate at recognising words from descriptions of actions participants 
intended to perform at a later point, relative to words from descriptions of actions 
participants did not intend to perform.  ǲ-ǳ
robust, and a series of studies have now shown that individuals tend to demonstrate 
superior memory for content associated with uncompleted intentions, evidenced by 
better recall (Jahn & Engelkamp, 2003; Koriat, Ben-Zur, & Nussbaum, 1990; Maylor, 
Chater, & Brown, 2001), better recognition (Jahn & Engelkamp, 2003), faster 
recognition latencies (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993) and faster lexical decision latencies 
(Marsh et al., 1998) for content associated with actions individuals intend to perform 
than actions they do not intend to perform.   
The ǯ.  However, whilst 
this effect certain involves some aspect of self-awareness, it does not necessary rely on 
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forming meta-representations of oǯ.  Instead, it is possible that 
this effect relies on imagining oneself completing the action at a future point.  If this is 
the case, then it is probable that intention superiority relies on intact extended self-
awareness.   
The intention superiority effect and extended self-awareness 
Extended self-awareness involves an awareness of the self that encompasses ǯǡ.  As such extended self-awareness involves 
the understanding that several alternative representations of the self can reflect 
different representation of the same enduring self (across time).  One explanation of the 
ISE it that it relies on extended self-awareness and occurs due to prospection, 
sometimes also referred to as episodic future thinking.  Episodic future thinking 
involves imagining anticipated future events (Ƭǯǡ ? ? ? ?; Buckner & Carroll, 
2007).  Through the simulation of possible future scenarios, one can hypothetically test 
alternative plans of action which may considerably improve behavioural flexibility and 
self-control (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).   It is distinctly possible the future thinking 
system plays an important role in forming/encoding intentions.  Whilst encoding a 
prospective intention it may be necessary to mentally imagine the future activity that 
one is going to perform.  Fǯǡ
explaining the ISE.  Theoretically, it has been suggested (see Gilbert, Armbruster, & 
Panagiotidi, 2012) that the chances of a delayed intention being carried out increase 
when the context an intention is encoded in is similar to the context it will be retrieved 
in (Gilbert et al., 2012).  Studies have suggested that imagining a future activity 
produces similar brain activity to actually performing that activity (see e.g., Stokes, 
Thompson, Cusack, & Duncan, 2009).  As such, whilst encoding a prospective intention, 
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mentally imagining performing that intended action in the future may increase the 
chances of the intention being carried out, as imagining performing the future intention 
should increases the similarity between encoding and retrieval contexts. 
Intuitively, it makes sense that the same cognitive processes are engaged during 
the ISE and episodic future thinking.  However, surprisingly this relation has never been 
explicitly examined among neurotypical adults or adults with ASD.  As such, the 
question of whether the episodic future thinking system is responsible for successful 
intention-superiority effects remains hypothetical, and still needs to be established.   
Can the ISE be considered an enactment superiority effect?   
Whilst parallels can be drawn between the cognitive processes engaged during 
the ISE and episodic future thinking several other theories have been proposed to 
explain the intention superiority effect.  Another plausible and very different 
explanation for the ISE has suggested that this effect occurs due to encoding additional 
motor information associated with the to-be-performed action (Freeman & Ellis, 2003; 
Koriat et al., 1990).  More specifically, it has been suggested that when an individual 
encodes an intention to perform an action, they activate motor information associated 
with performing that action in the future.  Thus, the future action is encoded in multiple 
formats, including an action-based format.   
As discussed in chapter six, it is well established that neurotypical individuals 
show significantly better memory for actions that they have performed than actions that 
they have simply read or observed (Baker-Ward et al., 1990; Engelkamp, 1998).  Such 
superior memory for self-ǲǳ
is thought to result from additional motoric components involved in performing an 
action leading to that action being more deeply encoded than actions simply studied 
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(Engelkamp & Zimmer, 1989).  In a similar fashion, it has been suggested that the ISE 
could be considered an intention enactment effect, and superior memory for intended 
actions is the result of sensorimotor information encoded when an intention is formed 
(Freeman & Ellis, 2003).   
An action superiority interpretation of the ISE gains support from a study 
conducted by Freeman and Ellis (2003, experiment 3).  In this experiment Freeman and 
Ellis manipulated whether participants simply read actions or performed them during 
the encoding stage (to assess the ISE), but also manipulated whether participants 
expected to perform these actions at a later point or whether they expected to simply 
verbally recall the actions.  Freeman and Ellis reasoned that if the ISE occurred due to 
sensorimotor information being encoded, participants should demonstrate no 
difference in their memory for actions they intended to perform but had not enacted 
than actions they intended to perform but had enacted.  Additionally, they predicted 
that participants would demonstrate general ǲaction superiorityǳeffects and would 
show similar memory advantages for actions whenever the actions were to be enacted 
(either during enactment at encoding or enactment at a later point).  Interestingly, 
Freeman and Ellis found exactly this pattern of memory in neurotypical adults lending 
support to their suggestion that the ISE is underpinned by enactment superiority.   
However, whether ǲaction superiorityǳcan adequately account for the ISE is not 
yet certain.  It has been argued that often the specific motor components associated 
with a future intention are not known to an individual when they encode the intention, 
and some intentions may be too rich/complex to be represented through sensorimotor 
encoding (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007).  McDaniel and Einstein (2007) question whether 
individuals engage in sensorimotor encoding of complex intention such as the intention 
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to take a trip (which itself encompasses the intention to perform several actions e.g., to 
pack your bag, check in to your flight, cancel your mail etc.).   
Intention superiority in individuals with ASD 
To date, no study has investigated the ISE directly among people with ASD.  
However, there are reasons to predict that individuals with ASD will demonstrate 
diminished intention superiority effects.  A growing body of evidence suggests 
individuals with ASD demonstrate impairments in extended self-awareness.  Evidence 
of this comes from studies that report individuals with ASD demonstrate impairments 
in prospective memory tasks (i.e., tasks that require participants to actually carry out an 
intended action at specific point in time; see e.g., Altgassen, Koban, & Kliegel, 2012; 
Williams, Boucher, Lind, & Jarrold, 2013; Williams, Jarrold, Grainger, & Lind, 2014), as 
well as studies that find individuals demonstrate impairments on measures of EFT 
ability (see e.g., Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lind, Bowler, & Raber, 2014; Lind, Williams, et al., 
2014; Terrett et al., 2013).  One potential explanation for such these findings is the 
suggestion that individuals with ASD are impaired at mentally projecting the self into a 
different, future situation (reflecting diminished extended self-awareness).  Given the 
earlier suggestion that the ISE may directly rely on EFT/extended self-awareness, there 
are thus reasons to believe that individuals with ASD will demonstrate reduced or 
absent intention superiority. 
However, the prediction that individuals with ASD will show a diminished ISE is 
based on the theory that this effect relies on EFT/ extended self-awareness.  If, instead, 
the ISE is merely a variant of the enactment effect (see Freeman & Ellis, 2003), then 
there is no reason to suppose that it will be diminished in ASD (given the robust 
evidence of undiminished enactment effects in this disorder; see chapter six).  Thus, the 
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study of the ISE in ASD has the potential to inform general theory concerning the 
cognitive underpinnings of this effect.   
The Current Study 
To date, no study has explored the ISE in individuals with ASD.  As such the 
primary aim of this study was to assess whether individuals with ASD demonstrate 
superior memory for actions they intend to perform.  To explore the ISE, children with 
ASD were presented with a series of written action phȋǤǤǡǲǳȌ.  
Participants were asked either to read the action statement aloud (Read condition), 
perform the action stated (Perform condition), or to plan to perform the stated action at 
the end of the task (Plan condition), thus forming an intention to perform that action.  ǡǯ
conditions was assessed.  As such, the study employed a task that assessed both the ISE 
and the enactment effect in children with ASD and neurotypical children.  Thus, the 
current study aimed to explore the ISE in ASD, but also aimed to extend the results of 
research conducted in chapter six, which explored the enactment effect in adults with 
ASD.  Whilst the results of chapter six indicated that adults with ASD demonstrate 
typical enactment effect, it is possible (though no predicted) that children with ASD may 
demonstrate diminished enactment effects, and impairments in enactment effects are 
developmental in nature.  By exploring the enactment effect alongside the ISE effect, this 
study addressed this issue.  
 In keeping with the results of chapter six, it was predicted that children with 
ASD would also demonstrate typical enactment effects on the task.  However, given 
research that suggests extended self-awareness may be impaired in ASD it was 
predicted that the ISE would be diminished among children with ASD, relative to the ISE 
C h a p t e r  S e v e n :  I n t e n t i o n  S u p e r i o r i t y  i n  A S D  | 204 
 
 
among age and IQ-matched neurotypical participants.  This prediction was however 
tentative, given the debate concerning the underlying processes engaged during 
intention superiority.   
Additionally, by exploring the ISE alongside the enactment effect in individuals 
with ASD the current study provides the potential to inform the theoretical debate 
surrounding the underlying processes involved in the ISE.  As discussed, individuals 
with ASD appear to demonstrate intact physical self-awareness and motor planning 
skills (see chapter six) but diminished extended self-awareness.  If individuals with ASD 
do demonstrate typical intention superiority, this would support motor planning 
theories of the ISE.  In contrast, diminished intention superiority effects in ASD, despite 
intact enactment effects, would support suggestions the ISE is not simply an extension 
of the enactment effect.  Instead this pattern of results would support the suggestion 
that the ISE involves self-prospection, and episodic future thinking.  It is of course 
possible that children with ASD may demonstrate typical intention superiority effects, 
yet such effects will rely on atypical underlying processes.  It was predicted that, if 
children with ASD did demonstrate typical intention superiority effect, these effect 
would relate differently to motor planning skills, relative to neurotypical comparison 
children.   
Method 
Participant 
 Twenty two children with ASD and 20 neurotypical comparison children took 
part in this experiment, after their parents had given written, informed consent.  
Participants in the ASD group had formal diagnoses of Autistic Dǯ
disorder, according to established criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; 
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World Health Organisation, 1993).  To assess severity of ASD features, parents of 
participants with ASD completed the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS; Constantino et 
al., 2003).  In all but one case, participants with ASD scored above the defined cut-off for 
ASD on the SRS (total  ? ? ?ǢǤǡ ? ? ? ?). The remaining participant 
scored 55 on the SRS, which is just below the conventional ASD cut-off of 60.  This 
participant had a formal diagnosis of Autistic Disorder.  Parents of neurotypical children 
also completed the SRS.  All but one participant in the neurotypical group scored below 
the defined cut-off for ASD, with one participant scoring just above the cut off (66).  
After removing these participants from analyses, none of the results (or the study 
conclusions) changed substantively, and thus these participants were included in 
analysis.  Using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Psychological 
Corporation, 1999), the groups were equated closely for verbal IQ (VIQ), performance 
IQ (PIQ), and full-scale IQ (FSIQ).  Both groups were also equated closely for 
chronological age.  Participant characteristics are presented in Table 20. 
Table 20: Participant Characteristics (Means, Standard Deviations and Inferential 
Statistics). 
 Group    
 ASD (n = 22 ) Neurotypical (n = 20) t p ǯ
d 
Age (years) 13.42 (1.12) 13.22 (1.01) 0.62 .539 0.19 
VIQ 106.00 (19.34) 106.90 (14.43) 0.21 .838 0.05 
PIQ 106.05 (12.90) 109.80 (14.48) 0.89 .379 0.27 
FSIQ 106.73 (11.84) 109.50 (15.00) 0.67 .508 0.20 
SRS Total Score 83.59 (9.87) 43.25 (7.86) 14.45 <.001 4.52 
SRS: Social Responsiveness Scale (Constantino et al., 2003); VIQ = verbal IQ; PIQ 
= performance IQ; FSIQ = full scale IQ.   
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Materials and Procedures 
Intention Superiority Task.  The Intention Superiority Task consisted of a 
study phase and a test phase.  During the study phase participants were presented with 
45 action phrases, 15 of which they read (Read condition), 15 of which they performed 
(Enactment condition), and 15 of which they made the intention to perform at the end 
of the task (Intend condition).  Three different 15-ȋǤǤǡǲǳȌsk.  A set of 45 
novel actions was also compiled, which was used for the purpose of providing ǲlureǳ
items during the test phase of the task.  All four lists were equated for mean syllable 
length and mean spoken word frequency of action phrases, as indexed by Kucera and 
Francis (1967) and reported in the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981).  
The adequacy of this matching was confirmed by a non-significant effect of List in a 
multivariate ANOVA (using ǯȌ
word frequency as the dependent variables, F (3, 86) = .20, p = .894,   = .007.  During 
the study phase, each of the 15 item lists was assigned to a different condition (Read, 
Intend, or Enactment), and the order in which lists were assigned to each condition was 
counterbalanced across all participants.  This created six different conditions of the task.  
During each condition, action phrases were presented to participants in a different, 
pseudo-randomised order, in which no more than two action phrases from any one 
condition appeared on successive trials (i.e., participants were never presented with  
more than two action phrases from the same condition one after another).   
Figure 15 shows a graphical representation of stimuli presentation on each trial 
of the task.  During the study phase, actions were presented to participants on a 
computer screen which participants stood approximately 1 meter away from.  
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Participants were instructed that the beginning of each trial would be signalled by the 
presentation of one of three instructions (Read/Plan/Perform), which would appear 
individually at the top of the screen.  Participants were told that after the instruction 
word had been presented, it would be followed by an action phrase, presented directly 
below the instruction.  Participants were told that if the instruction ǲReadǳappeared on 
the screen they should read the action phrase aloud.  If the instruction ǲPerformǳ
appeared on the screen participants were told that they should mime (act out) the 
action phrase.  Finally, participants were instructed that if the instruction ǲPlanǳ
appeared on the screen they should make a plan to perform the action at the end of the 
task.  During each trial of the task the instruction word was presented individually on 
the screen for 1500ms, followed by the action phrase, which was presented below the 
instruction word for another 5000ms.   
Before completing the study phase of the task, participants completed a practice 
task, which consisted of six trials (two ǲReadǳtrials, two ǲIntendǳtrials, and two ǲEnactmentǳtrials).  None of the action phrases that appeared in the practice task 
appeared during the experimental trials.  After participants had completed the practice 
task they completed the experimental trials.  During the experimental trials the 
experimenter observed the participant to check that they performed the appropriate 
action on Enactment trials of the task.  If a participant did not perform an action during 
an Enactment trial the experimenter took note of this trial and the trial was 
subsequently removed during data analysis.  Similarly, if participants accidentally 
performed an action during a ǲReadǳor ǲIntendǳtrial the experimenter took note of this, 
and this action phrase was also removed during data analysis.  Errors in following the 
condition instructions correctly were very rare (and only occurred on three trials).  
Participants were informed before starting the experimental trials that after the study 
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phase had been completed they would be asked some questions about what they had 
read, planned and performed, but were not explicitly told that their memory for the 
action phrases would be tested.   
After the study phase, participants completed the test phase.  ǯ
recognition and source memory for the action phrases was tested during this phase.  
During the test phase, participants were shown an action phrase individually on the 
computer screen and were asked to judge whether each action phrase was ǲoldǳ(had 
been presented to them previously during the study phase) or ǲnewǳ(had not been 
presented in the study phase).  If participants responded that an action phrase was old, 
they were asked to decide whether they thought the action was one that they had read, 
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Figure 15: Graphical representation of the procedure used during the study phase of the Intention Superiority Task (providing 
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Intention Superiority Task.  Performance on the Intention Superiority Task 
was analysed using the measure of d-prime (d'), a parametric measure of item 
discrimination.  As a measure of recognition performance three separate d-prime scores 
were calculated using the formula below.  In this equation H represents a hit rate (the 
proportion of old items participants correctly identifying as ǲoldǳȌ and FA represents 
false alarm rate (the proportion of new actions participants incorrectly identifying ǲoldǳȌ.   ݀ᇱ ൌ ݖሺܪሻ െ ݖሺܨܣሻ 
Three separate d' scores were calculated, using separate hit rates based on the 
proportion of performed actions correctly recognised, the proportion of planned actions 
recognised, and the proportion of read actions recognised.  A single false alarm rate was 
used to calculate all three d' scores, since false alarm rates were derived from 
performance on distractor items, which by definition were neither read, planned nor 
performed during the task.  Source monitoring performance was also assessed using  d' 
and scores were calculated separately based on hit rates for the proportion of read 
actions participants made correct source monitoring judgements for, the proportion of 
planned actions participants made correct source monitoring judgments for and the 
proportion of performed actions participants made correct monitoring judgements for.   
For the purpose of correlation analyses, two difference scores were calculated; 
one to indicate the size of the enactment effect and one to indicate the size of the 
intention superiority effect.  The difference between d' for actions participants 
performed (enactment condition) minus d' for actions they had simply read (read 
condition) was used to calculate the size of participants enactment effect.  The 




difference between d' for actions participants had planned to perform at the end of the 
task (intend condition) minus d' for actions participants read (read condition) 
represented the size of participants intention superiority effect.  These difference scores 
were calculated for both recognition and source memory performance.   
Results 
Intention Superiority Task  
 
Performance in each condition of the intention superiority task in the ASD and 
neurotypical group can be seen in Table 21.  Before analysing group difference in 
performance a series of one-sample t-tests was carried out, to establish whether 
performance on the intention superiority task was at floor or ceiling level, for any of the 
Table 21: Means (SDs) and inferential statistics for group differences in performance 
on the intention superiority task ȋǯȌǤ 
Memory Type Action 
condition 
Group     




 t p ǯ 
d 
Recognition  Read 1.75 (0.73) 2.02 (0.65)  1.25 .220 0.39 
 Intend 2.06 (0.60) 2.26 (0.65)  1.04 .304 0.32 
 Enactment 3.03 (0.83) 3.38 (0.74)  1.48 .147 0.45 
Source 
Monitoring  
Read 0.84 (0.83) 1.13 (0.94)  1.05 .300 0.36 
Intend 1.76 (0.83) 1.94 (0.79)  0.70 .488 0.19 
Enactment 2.67 (0.84) 2.94 (0.88)  1.00 .322 0.31 




memory measures.  These t-tests indicated that, in both the ASD and neurotypical 
groups, the proportion of actions correctly recognised in each condition significantly 
differed from floor or ceiling level performance, all t ? ?Ǥ ? ?ǡl p ?Ǥ ? ? ?ǡ
proportion of actions participants made correct source monitoring judgements for all ts  ? ?Ǥ ? ?ǡps < .001.   
Recognition memory.  D-prime scores for recognition performance in each 
condition of the task (Read/Plan/Perform) are reported in Table 21, among both the 
ASD and neurotypical group.  A 2 (Group: ASD/neurotypical) × 3 (Condition: 
Read/Intend/Enactment) mixed ANOVA was conducted on these data.  A significant 
main effect of Condition was found, F (2, 80) =118.50, p < .001,  = .75.  This reflected 
the fact that across both groups, recognition memory was significantly greater for 
actions participants had enacted than for actions participants had planned, and 
recognition memory for actions participants had planned was significantly greater than 
actions participants had read, all ts  ? 3.13, all p ?Ǥ ? ? ?ǡd ? 0.42 (see Figure 16 
for a graphical representation of these results). 
However, there was no significant main effect of Group, F (1, 40) =2.09, p = .156, 
= .05, and no significant interaction between Group and Condition F (2, 60) = 0.38, p = 
.685,  = .01.  These results are not in keeping with predictions, and suggest that the 
ASD group demonstrated a similar pattern of recognition memory to neurotypical 
children on the task (demonstrating typical enactment effects and typical intention 
superiority effects).   
Source Monitoring.  D-prime scores for source monitoring performance in each 
condition of the task (Read/ Intend/Enactment) are also reported among both the ASD 
and neurotypical group in Table 21.  A 2 (Group: ASD/neurotypical) × 3 (Condition: 
Read/Plan/Perform) mixed ANOVA was conducted on these data.  A significant main 




effect of Condition was found, F (2, 80) = 122.82, p <.001,  = .75.  This reflected the fact 
that participants, across both groups, demonstrated significantly better source 
monitoring performance for actions they had performed than for actions they had 
planned to perform, and significantly greater source monitoring performance for 
actions participants had planned to perform, than actions they had read, all ts  ? ?Ǥ ? ?ǡ
ps < .001, and all d ? ?Ǥ ? ?ȋFigure 16 for a graphical representation of these 
results). 
However, again there was no significant main effect of Group, F (1, 40) = 1.15, p = 
.290, = .03, and no significant interaction between Group and Condition F (2, 80) = 
0.13, p = .879,  <.01.  As such, there were no significant differences between the groups 
in either overall levels of performance or patterns of performance across conditions.   
Figure 16ǣʍȋȌf the 
task, for both recognition and source monitoring performance.  Error bars represent 























To summarise, on all both tests of memory (recognition and source monitoring) 
participants in both the ASD and neurotypical groups showed better memory for actions 
that they had enacted than actions they had read or actions they planned to perform 
(thus demonstrating clear enactment effects).  Additionally, on all both tests of memory 
participants in both groups showed better memory for actions that they had planned to 
perform than actions they had simply read (demonstrating intention-superiority 
effects).  This pattern of memory performance did not differ between ASD participants 
and neurotypical participants on any measure, as indicated by no significant ǯ
read/planned/performed action for either recognition or source monitoring 
performance.    
Associations between the enactment effect and the intention-superiority effect 
A series of correlations was carried out to assess the extent to which the size of 
the enactment effect was associated with the size of the ISE among either group of 
participants (see Table 22).  Among ASD participants, the size of the enactment effect 
was strongly positively correlated with the size of the ISE, in both recognition memory, 
r = .646, p = .001, and source memory r = .858, p < .001.  For neurotypical participants, 
the size of participants enactment effect was also strongly positively correlated with the 
size of the ISE, in both recognition memory, r = .593, p = .006, and source memory r = 
.483, p = .031.  	ǯ Z test indicated that the size of this correlation in recognition 
performance did not differ between the ASD group and neurotypical group, z = 0.26, p = 
.79.  However, the relationship between the size of participants enactment effect and 
their ISE was significantly greater in the ASD group than the neurotypical group, when 
looked at in source monitoring z = 2.27 p = .02.   






Until now, no study has explored the ISE in ASD.  As such, the primary aim of this 
study was to explore the extent to which individuals with ASD demonstrate typical 
intention superiority effects.  In terms of the central experimental finding, the study 
found that children with ASD demonstrated no evidence of a diminished ISE, which was 
not in keeping with the ǯtentative predictions.  In contrast, in source monitoring 
and recognition memory, individuals with ASD clearly demonstrated superior memory 
Table 22:  Correlations matrix showing the relationship between the size of the enactment 
effect and size of the intention superiority effects demonstrated by ASD and neurotypical 















ASD ISE- Source 
monitoring 
1    
 ISE- Recognition .76** 1   
 EE -Source 
monitoring 
.86** .69** 1  
 EE Ȃ Recognition .50* .65**   .69** 1 
Neurotypical ISE- Source 
monitoring 
1    
 ISE- Recognition .39 1   
 EE -Source 
monitoring 
.48* .12 1  
 EE Ȃ Recognition .10 .59** .35 1 
 
*Correlation is significant at the .05 level 
**Correlation is significant at the .001 level.   
a ISE = Size of the intention superiority effect 
b EE=  Size of the enactment effect 




for actions they intended to perform at the end of the task than actions they had simply 
read (demonstrating clear intention superiority effects). 
In the introduction it was also predicted that children with ASD would 
demonstrate typical enactment effects.  In keeping with this prediction, this study also 
found no impairments in the size of the enactment effect demonstrated by children with 
ASD.  This is in keeping with the results of chapter six, which demonstrated adults with 
ASD show typical enactment effects, and is also in keeping with the results of several 
studies from the literature (as reviewed in chapter six).  These results are also in 
keeping the idea that individuals with ASD do not demonstrate impairments in 
physical/ecological self-awareness 
A sǯ
superiority effects related to the size of the enactment effects they demonstrated.  In 
terms of the correlational results the study found a strong relationship between the size 
of the enactment effect participants demonstrated on the task and the size of the ISE 
they demonstrated, in both ASD and neurotypical participants.  These findings provide 
strong support for the suggestion that the ISE may occur due to encoding additionally 
motor information associated with the to-be-performed action (Freeman & Ellis, 2003).  
Finding a strong positive correlation between the ISE and enactment effect supports an 
action superiority interpretation of the ISE.  Indeed, these results concur with the 
results of other studies within the literature, which also suggests that the ISE relies on 
motor encoding (see e.g., Freeman & Ellis, 2003).  To explore the extent to which the ISE 
relied on motor encoding Freeman and Ellis carried out an innovative experiment.  
During this experiment, participants were presented with two lists of actions, which 
they were asked to memorise.  Participants were told that their memory for one of these 
lists would be tested by a recognition test, whereas their memory for the other list 




would be tested by a recognition test and a recall test, in which participants would be 
asked to verbally recall the actions on the list (thus participants formed intentions to 
recall the actions on this list, but not the other).  However, this study was novel in that 
immediately after participants studied the list of actions they were given one of two 
distractor tasks.  Participants were asked either to continuously count backwards from 
ten (a verbal distractor task) or to draw imaginary circles in the air (a motor distractor 
task).  Whilst the aim of the motor distractor task was to impair encoding motor 
information associated with the actions on the list, the verbal distraction task aimed to 
impair verbal encoding of information associated with the actions on the list.  Freeman 
and Ellis (2003) found that participants who had performed the motor distraction task 
after learning (but not the verbal distraction task) failed to demonstrate intention 
superiority effects.  Alongside the results of this study, the findings of the current study ǯ
actions.   
Importantly, the results indicated that, at least with respect to source memory, 
the ISE demonstrated by children with ASD related more strongly to the size of the 
enactment effect they demonstrated, relative to neurotypical children.  This suggests 
that in the ASD group this effect relied more on motor information associated with to-
be-performed actions, relative to the neurotypical group.  It is possible that children 
with ASD engaged in more motor encoding relative to neurotypical participants during 
the task, given relative strengths in motor processing in ASD and potential impairments 
in EFT ability (although this suggestion is not empirically supported, given no direct 
measure of self-prospection/EFT was employed).   
The prediction that individuals with ASD would show a diminished ISE was 
based on the theory that this effect relies on EFT, and mentally imaging oneself perform 




an intended action.  Individuals with ASD typically demonstrate impairments on 
measures of EFT ability (see e.g., Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lind, Bowler, et al., 2014; Lind, 
Williams, et al., 2014; Terrett et al., 2013).  As such, findings that individuals with ASD 
demonstrate entirely typical intention superiority effects support the suggestion that 
this effect does not solely rely on EFT.  However, one problem with this suggestion is 
that studies of EFT in ASD have not always found consistent evidence of impairments in 
this disorder.  In one study Lind & Bowler (2010) asked participants with ASD to 
provide verbal descriptions of a series of past events, as well as a series of potential 
future events.  Lind and Bowler found that descriptions of both past and future events 
provided by individuals with ASD were significantly less detailed and specific than those 
provided by neurotypical participants.  However in contrast a more recent study by 
Crane, Lind & Bowler (2013) found no evidence of EFT (or episodic memory) 
impairments.  In this study Crane and colleagues presented participants with the ȋǤǤǡǲǥǳȌ asked participants to complete the 
sentence.  Using this method Crane et al., (2013) found that individuals with ASD 
performed similarly to neurotypical individuals.  Given that studies have not 
consistently found evidence of EFT impairments in ASD, it is of course possible that EFT 
abilities were not impaired in the ASD group, relative to the neurotypical group, tested 
in this study.  As such, without a measure of EFT ability in the ASD group, it is not 
possible to firmly conclude that the ISE does not rely on EFT.   
As well as having theoretical implications concerning the underlying bases of the 
ISE, the study informs the literature on self-awareness in ASD.  In terms of the broader 
literature concerning self-awareness, the majority of evidence (including the results 
from this study and the results of chapter six) suggests that physical self-awareness is 
undiminished in ASD.  In contrast, as discussed in the introduction, other studies have 




indicated that autobiographical episodic memory (memory for events one has 
experienced in the past) and episodic future thinking (the ability to imagine event that 
might plausibly happen at a future time) are likely impaired in ASD.  Diminished 
memory for personally experienced events, and the diminished ability to imagine events 
in the future, is likely to rely on an awareness of the extended self.  The result of this 
study support suggestions that physical self-awareness is intact in ASD, and that 
impairments in self-awareness in ASD may be selective in nature.  This idea is explored 
further in the following chapter.  The final chapter of this thesis explores self-conception 
in adults with ASD, and whether individuals with ASD hold both typical psychological 
self-concepts and typical physical self-concepts.    




ǲǫǳ	 CONCEPTUAL SELF-AWARENESS IN ADULTS WITH 
AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER 
Introduction 
Within the field of psychology, the concept of ǲthe selfǳhas been widely 
discussed.  This term is often used to refer to multiple different phenomena and thus a 
single definition of ǲthe selfǳis not possible.  Indeed, in early conceptualisations James 
(1890) proposed that the self could not be considered a single entity; instead the self is 
multifaceted, and consists of several different dimensions including the physical self, 
mental self, spiritual self, and the ego.  Similarly, Neisser (1988) defined five different 
aspects of the self and self-awareness.  One important aspect of the self defined by 
Neisser is that of the conceptual self.  The conceptual self can be considered the self as 
defined in terms of the theories and assumptions an individual holds about themselves.  
Just as it is difficult to provide one single definition for the term ǲthe selfǳǡ so individuals 
do not hold one single self-concept.  Instead, individuals tend to conceptualise 
themselves in multiple different ways, and define themselves in terms of physical, 
social, psychological, and emotional characteristics. 
 Within the typically developing literature, research exploring the development 
of self-conception is vast.  Damon & Hart  (1982) provide perhaps the most 
comprehensive account of the development of self-understanding.  These researchers 
suggest that children as young as two years of age demonstrate behavioural signs that 
they attribute certain characteristics to themselves and hold some form of self-concept 
(Kagan, 1982).  Studies of self-conception have mostly employed methods that ask 
individuals to provide verbal descriptions of themselves (Damon & Hart, 1988).  Such, 
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studies have shown that young neurotypical children tend to primarily describe 
themselves in terms of physical self-concepts, shifting towards describing themselves 
more in terms of psychological and social self-concepts over the course of the early 
school years (see e.g., Selman, 1980).  By adulthood individuals have typically formed 
robust and complex self-concepts about themselves.   
Self-conception in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
There are several reasons to predict that individuals with ASD will demonstrate 
diminished conceptual self-awareness.  In early descriptions of childhood ASD both 
Kanner (1943) and Bosch (1970) noted a lack of self-awareness in children with this 
disorder, and such observations have been supported by a number of empirical studies 
that suggest that individuals with ASD lack typical conceptual self-awareness.  Early 
manifestations of conceptual self-awareness can be seen in the use of personal 
pronouns, which demonstrates an explicit understanding of the distinction between self 
and other.  Several studies have shown that personal pronoun use is atypical in ASD 
(Hobson et al., 2010; Jordan, 1989; Lee et al., 1994; Lind & Bowler, 2009a; Loveland & 
Landry, 1986).  Additionally, studies have found that individuals with ASD typically 
show reduced or absent self-reference effects (Henderson et al., 2009; Lombardo et al., 
2007; Toichi et al., 2002), another indication that the concept of the self may be 
diminished in ASD (see chapter 1; p.23).   
On a theoretical level, there are also reasons to predict that individuals with ASD 
will demonstrate impairment in self-knowledge.  Several theories (e.g., Williams, 2010; 
Carruthers, 2009; Frith & Happé, 1999) suggest that individuals with ASD are as 
impaired at understanding their own mental states as they are at understanding mental 
states in others.  If individuals with ASD are impaired at understanding their own 
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mental states, it follows they will hold poorly established psychological (but not 
necessarily physical) self-concepts.  However, whilst previous studies suggest that 
individuals with ASD demonstrate a diminished awareness of their own knowledge and 
mental states (Perner et al., 1989; Williams & Happé, 2009b), surprisingly few studies 
have explored whether individuals with ASD demonstrate diminished and/or 
qualitatively atypical self-concepts (Kristen et al., 2014; Lee & Hobson, 1998; Tanweer 
et al., 2010).  Additionally, no studies have explored whether different aspects of 
conceptual self-awareness in ASD are related to the extent to which individuals can 
understand mental states (in themselves or other).   
Another index of conceptual self-awareness is that of autobiographical semantic 
memory.  Autobiographical semantic memory refers to ǯ
information about themselves.  If individuals with ASD lack self-knowledge, they should 
demonstrate impairments in autobiographical semantic memory.  Crane and Goddard 
(2008) assessed both autobiographical semantic memory and autobiographical episodic ȋǯȌin adults with ASD 
by asking them series of questions.  Whilst autobiographical episodic questions asked 
participants to recall specific past events (e.g., Can you tell me all the things you did 
before you went to bed last night?) autobiographical semantic questions asked 
participants to remember information about themselves (e.g., Can you tell me where 
your secondary school was?).  Crane and Goddardǯ study found that whilst adults with 
ASD demonstrated clear episodic memory impairments, semantic knowledge remained 
intact in high-functioning adults with ASD.  Such findings suggest that conceptual self-
awareness is not impaired in ASD.  However, a study by Bruck and colleagues (Bruck et 
al., 2007) ǯǡ
ASD were significantly poorer than neurotypical children at answering such questions.  
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This indicates that children with ASD are impaired at autobiographical semantic 
memory.  As such, the results of studies of episodic semantic memory suggest that self-
concept development may be delayed in ASD, yet by adulthood impairments in semantic 
memory abilities appear to have recovered (see Lind, 2010).  Alternatively, 
contradictory results may reflect methodological issue with one or more of the studies 
discussed.   
To date, three studies have also explored conceptual self-awareness in ASD by 
asking individuals (both children and adults) to provide verbal descriptions of 
themselves (Kristen et al., 2014; Lee & Hobson, 1998; Tanweer et al., 2010).  In an early ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ-understanding 
interview to explore self-understanding in children with ASD.  The self-understanding 
interview is a semi-structured interview that consists of a series of questions 
participants are asked about themselves (e.g., ǲWhat are you like?ǳ; ǲHow did you get to 
be the way you are?ǳ).  During this interview, it was found that children with ASD 
described themselves significantly more using physical characteristics, relative to 
neurotypical children.  Additionally, whilst children with ASD did not produce fewer 
psychological descriptions of themselves, those they did provided differed qualitatively 
from those provided by neurotypical children.  Namely, children with ASD produced far 
fewer psychological descriptions of themselves that referred to social categories (e.g., I 
like being with friends).  Ƭǯevidence for the 
suggestion that children with ASD demonstrate impairments in aspects of conceptual 
self-awareness (at least concerning psychological aspects of the self-concept).   
In a more recent study Tanweer and colleagues (Tanweer et al., 2010) also 
explored whether individuals with ASD define themselves in a similar way to 
neurotypical individuals.  This study used the twenty statements task (TST; Kuhn & 
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McPartland, 1954), an open-ended task in which individuals are asked to respond to the ǡǲǫǳǡǲǳǡ
provide an accurate description of their long-term self.  These statements were then 
coded into eight distinct categories; traits, social identities, evaluations, physical 
descriptions, emotional descriptions, peripheral information, and global descriptions.  
Additionally, as well as coding statements for specific categories, Tanweer and 
colleagues explored whether statements provided by individuals were abstract 
statements, alongside whether statements were autonomous or social (autonomous 
statements were those that did not make references to others, or specific social 
contexts).  Tanweer and colleagues found that adults with ASD provided significantly 
more abstract statements relative to neurotypical adults, and provided statements that 
were significantly more autonomous.  Findings that adults with ASD provided 
significantly more autonomous statements than neurotypical adults are in keeping with 
the results of Lee and Hobson (1998) who reported that children with ASD tended to 
provide fewer social descriptions relative to neurotypical children.   
Additionally, the study found that the statements provided by adults with ASD 
did not cover as wide a range of categories as those provided by the neurotypical group, 
suggesting that adults with ASD provide diminished identity complexity, relative to 
comparison adults.  However, unfortunately the paper does not report whether 
significant group differences in identity complexity (the number of categories 
participantsǯ statements fell into) were driven by group differences in specific 
categories or not.  It is possible that participants with ASD did not produced statements 
that fell into as many categories as neurotypical participants because they consistently 
failed to provide descriptions of their own psychological traits/ social identities.  As 
such, it is not clear from this study (Tanweer et al., 2010) whether adults with ASD 
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show a similar pattern in the type of self-concepts they use to describe themselves, as 
Lee and Hobson (1988) found children with ASD did.   
Finally, Kristen and colleagues (Kristen et al., 2014) assessed self-conception in 
adults with ASD using a version of a mind-mindedness task (Meins & Fernyhough, 
2010).  During this task adults were asked to answer the question ǲǫǳ.  ǯǡ
behaviours, physical descriptions, or general descriptions.  Kristen et al., (2014) found 
that adults with ASD described themselves significantly less in terms of mental state 
terms than neurotypical adults.  However, adults with ASD provided a similar number of 
physical descriptions of themselves, relative to neurotypical control participants.  These 
findings are relatively in keeping with the results of Lee & Hobson (1998), who found 
that children with ASD tended to provide more physical self-descriptions than 
neurotypical children (both results indicate that physical self-concepts remain intact in 
ASD).  However, this study used a relative sparse coding scheme, and did not code 
statements on whether they referred to social categories.  As such, it is not possible to 
tell whether the impairments in mental self-conception demonstrated by adults with 
ASD in this study are similar to the pattern of results demonstrated by children with ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ.   
The Current Study  
It is clear that relatively few studies have explored self-descriptions in 
individuals with ASD, and those that have report mixed results.  Additionally, to date, no 
study has explored the relationship between the ability to understand mental states in ȋȀȌǯfines 
themselves in terms of mental states or psychological terms.  As discussed, theories that 
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suggest individuals with ASD are impaired at understanding their own mental states 
(e.g., Williams, 2010; Carruthers, 2009) predict that individuals with ASD should 
demonstrate less elaborate psychological self-concepts.  However, such theories do not 
predict poorer physical self-concepts in ASD.  Although Kristen et al., (2014) measured 
participants mindreading ability, unfortunately they do not report whether 
mindreading abilities related to the extent participants conceptualised themselves in 
terms of mental terms. 
To address these questions the current study explored conceptual self-
awareness in adults with ASD using the twenty statements task (Kuhn & McPartland, 
1954).  This task benefited from being open-ended and thus allowed participants to 
describe themselves using any characteristics they believed to represent their long-
term identity well.  ǯ
scheme, similar to that employed in Tanweer et al., (2010).  However, statements were 
also coded based on whether they were psychological or physical in nature, allowing for 
a direct comparison of psychological and physical self-concepts in ASD.   
It was predicted that adults with ASD would demonstrate poorly established 
psychological self-concepts, and would describe themselves less in terms of 
psychological characteristics relative to neurotypical adults.  However, it was expected 
that there would be no difference in terms of the extent to which adults with ASD 
described themselves using physical descriptions.  Following the results of Lee and 
Hobson (1998), and Tanweer et al., (2010), alongside characteristic impairments in 
social understanding in ASD, it was also predicted that participants with ASD would not 
describe themselves as much in terms of social categories relative to neurotypical 
participants.   
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To date, the relationship between mindreading ability and conceptual self-
awareness has not been explored in ASD.  As such, to explore this relationship, the study 
also included a measure of mindreading ability (the animations task).  In terms of the 
relationship between mindreading ability and conceptual self-awareness it was 
predicted that performance on the animations task would significantly relate the extent 
to which participants described themselves in terms of psychological characteristics, 
but not to the extent participants described themselves in terms of physical 
characteristics.   
Method 
Participants 
Fifteen adults with ASD and 20 neurotypical comparison adults took part, all of 
whom gave written, informed consent before participating.  Participants in the ASD ǯǡ
established criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; World Heath Organisation, 
1993).  In order to assess current ASD features, 13 of the 15 participants in the ASD 
group completed Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-Generic (ADOS; Lord et al., 
2000) assessments.  The remaining two participants declined to complete the ADOS, as 
they did not feel comfortable being filmed.  The two participants who did not complete 
the ADOS had rigorous diagnoses and scored above the cut-off on the Autism-spectrum 
Quotient (see immediately below).  All participants who completed the ADOS received a  ? ?ǡ-off for ASD (Lord et al., 2000).  All participants completed 
the Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), a self-report 
questionnaire that assesses ASD/ASD-like features.  Thirteen out of 15 participants with 
ASD scored above the defined cut-off for ASD on the AQ ( ? ? ?Ǣ-
C h a p t e r  E i g h t :  S e l f - c o n c e p t s  i n  A S D  | 228 
 
 
Smith et al., 2005).  Only two participants missed this cut-off.  However, both of these 
participants scored well above the defined ASD cut-off on the ADOS (ADOS scores for 
both participants were 12).  All comparison participants scored below the defined cut-
off for ASD.   
No participants, in either group, reported using any psychotropic medication or 
any history of neurological or psychiatric disorders (apart from ASD).  The participant 
groups were closely equated for verbal and non-verbal ability (see Table 23 for 
participant characteristics).  Verbal IQ (VIQ), performance IQ (PIQ), and full-scale IQ 
Table 23: Participant characteristics (means, standard deviations and inferential 
statistics). 
 Group    
 ASD 
(n = 15) 
Neurotypical  
(n = 20) 
t p ǯ
d 
Age (years) 29.88 (10.44) 29.43 (14.14) 0.10 Ǥ ? ? ?  ?Ǥ ? ? 
VIQ 112.47 (14.99) 111.30 (10.77) 0.27 .790 0.09 
PIQ 110.20 (15.56) 113.85 (10.57) 0.83 414 0.27 
FSIQ 112.87 (15.34) 114.10 (10.26) 0.29 .777 0.09 
AQ Total Score 33.40 (9.01) 13.50 (6.12) 7.78 <.001 2.58 
ADOS Social + 
Communication Score* 
11.62 (2.02)     
 
AQ: Autism-spectrum Quotient; ADOS: Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; PIQ = 
performance IQ; FSIQ = full scale IQ; VIQ = verbal IQ  
*Based on 13/15 participants 
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(FSIQ) were assessed using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; 
Wechsler, 1999).  Groups were also closely equated for chronological age.   
Materials and Procedures 
Twenty statements task.  Following the method employed in Tanweer et al., 
(2010) the Twenty Statements Task (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) was administered, to ǯ.  The twenty statements task is a relatively simple, 
open-ended task that encompasses the idea that the self is multifaceted.  During the task 
participants weǲǫǳǡǲǳ.  Participants 
were asked to write statements that best defined their long-term identify and to avoid 
writing statements that described non-permanent, short-term/temporary aspects of 
their current self (e.g., I am tired, I am hungry).  There was no time limit to how long 
participants could take to complete the task.   
Animations task.  As a measure of mindreading ability the animations task  
(Abell et al., 2000) was administered.  A full description of this task is provided in 
chapter two (please see p.59).   
Scoring  
Twenty statements task.  ǯ
modified coding system outlined in Rhee et al., (Rhee, Uleman, Roman, & Lee, 1995; 
please see appendix three).  This coding system was the same as the one used in 
Tanweer et al., (2010).  Statements were coded into one of eight categories; 1) traits; 2) 
social identities; 3) specific attributes; 4) evaluative descriptions; 5) physical 
description; 6) emotional states; 7) peripheral information and 8) global descriptions.   
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Each category was also divided into several distinct subcategories that 
statements were categorised into (please see p.275 for details of these specific 
subcategories).  An additional subcategory of sexual orientation, which not included in 
previous coding schemes, was added as a social identity subcategory, as statements 
concerning sexual orientation did not easily fit into the other predefined subcategories 
used in previous coding systems.  Following Tanweer et al., (2010) and Rhee et al., 
(1995) statements were also either classed as autonomous or social (social statements 
referenced other people or social context), and either abstract or specific.   
Not all participants were able to produce 20 statements.  As such, proportion 
scores were calculated that represented the proportion of statements participants 
produced for each category (e.g., if a participant provided 16 statements overall, 8 of 
which were trait descriptions, their overall trait description score would be 0.5).  The 
proportion of autonomous statements participants provided was also calculated.  
Additionally, following Tanweer et al., (2010) and Rhee et al., (1995), an ǲidentity 
strengthǳscore was calculated as the total number of statements generated overall, and 
an ǲidentity complexityǳscore was calculated as the total number of different categories ǯ.  An ǲidentity qualityǳscore was 
also calculated as the proportion of statements participants generated that were 
abstract.  Unlike previous coding systems the proportion of overall descriptions that 
were physical was calculated as well as the proportion of overall descriptions that were 
psychological in nature (please see appendix three, p.275 for a list of the categories 
considered psychological and physical).  Finally, following Rhee et al., (1995) responses 
that did not make sense were coded as ǲnonsenseǳǡ and statements that participants 
repeated were only coded once.  Additionally, on the rare occasion that participants 
provided more than one meaning in a statement (e.g., ǲI am a good person, as I usually 
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intend wellǳȌ the statement was classified based on the first meaning provided.  25% of 
participants were randomly selected and their statements were also coded by a second 
rater who was blind to the diagnostic status of the participants.  Inter-rater reliability 
was good, ǯȽ = .80. 
Animations task.  ǯ
transcribed verbatim.  These transcriptions were then scored by a second rater who 
was blind to the diagnostic status of the participants, according to the scoring criteria 
outlined in Abell et al., (2000).  Inter-rater reliability for scores across the four 
animations was excellent, ǯȽ = .93 
Results 
Twenty statements task  
Table 24 shows the means and standard deviations for overall performance on 
the twenty statements task.  Independent t-tests indicated that adults with ASD 
produced significantly fewer statements during the task, relative to neurotypical 
participants, as evidenced by significantly lower identity strength scores on the task.  
However, there was no difference in the mean identity complexity scores in the ASD and 
neurotypical groups.  This indicates that the statements adults with ASD provided 
ranged across as many categories as those provided by neurotypical participants.  
Additionally, the proportion of abstract statements (measured by identity quality 
scores) and autonomous statements provided by adults with ASD was similar to the 
proportion of abstract and autonomous statements provided by neurotypical adults. 
 
 




Figure 17 shows the mean proportion of statements ASD and neurotypical 
participants produced in each of the eight statement categories.  To explore group 
differences in the types of statements provided by ASD and neurotypical participants a ȋǯmbda criterion) was carried out, which included 
the eight overall statement categories (traits, social identities, specific attributes, 
evaluative descriptions, physical descriptions, emotional descriptions, peripheral 
information and global descriptions) as dependent variables.  This indicated that there 
was no significant effect of group (ASD/neurotypical), F (8, 26) = 1.34, p = .317,  =.28.  
This suggests that the types of statements produced by participants in the ASD group 
did not significantly differ from the types of statements produced by neurotypical 
participants.  
Table 24: Means (SDs) and inferential statistics for group differences in 
performance on the twenty statements task. 





 t p ǯd 
Identity strength  12.07 (4.48) 15.25 (4.31)  2.13 .041 0.72 
Identity complexity 6.20 (3.14) 6.60 (1.90)  0.47 .643 0.15 
Identity quality .35 (.31) .43 (.25)  0.81 .423 0.28 
Prop.  autonomous 
statements  
.53 (.24) .59 (.25)  0.72 .480 0.24 





Figure 17:  The proportion of statements ASD and neurotypical participants produced, in each of the overall statement 
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Further analysis was carried out to directly explore predictions that 
individuals with ASD would demonstrate specific impairments in their awareness of 
psychological self-concepts, but not physical self-concepts.   
Figure 18 shows the mean proportion of statements ASD and neurotypical 
participants produced that were either physical or psychological in nature.  A mixed-
model ANOVA was carried out on these data with group (neurotypical /ASD) entered as 
the between-subjects variable, and statement type (psychological/physical) entered as 
the within-subject variable.  There was a significant main effect of Statement Type, F (1, 
33) = 43.80, p < .001,  = .570, reflecting the fact that across both groups, participants 
provided a significantly higher proportion of psychological statements than physical 
statements.  However, there was no significant main effect of group, F (1, 33) = 2.59, p = 
.117,  = 0.073, and no significant Group × Statement Type interaction, F (1, 34) = 1.78, 
p = .191, = .051.  These results are not in keeping with predictions, and suggest that 
ASD participants did not define themselves less in terms of psychological self-concepts 
than neurotypical participants.   
 
Figure 18: The proportion of statements ASD and neurotypical participants 






























Table 25 shows the means and standard deviations for performance on the 
animations task.  A mixed-model ANOVA was carried out on these data with Group 
(neurotypical/ASD) entered as the between-subjects variable, and Animation Type 
(mentalising/goal-directed) entered as the within-subject variable.  There was a 
significant main effect of Group on animations scores, reflecting the fact that 
participants with ASD performed significantly less well than comparison participants on 
the task overall, F (1, 33) = 16.56, p = < .001,  = .33.  There was also a significant main 
effect of Animation Type, indicating that, across both groups, scores were higher in the 
goal-directed condition than the mentalising condition, F (1, 33) = 78.22, p < .001.   = 
.70.  There was no significant Group by Animation Type interaction, F  (1, 33) = 0.06, p = 
.815, = < .01, suggesting that individuals in the ASD group were impaired at both 
higher- and lower-level mindreading, relative to individuals in the neurotypical group. 
 
Table 25: Means (SDs) and inferential statistics for group differences in 
performance on the animations task. 
 





 t P ǯd 
Overall 8.93 (2.63) 12.05 (1.90)  4.07 <.001 1.36 
Mentalising condition 3.40 (1.35) 4.90 (1.65)  2.87 .007 1.00 
Goal-directed condition 5.53 (1.46) 7.15 (0.75)  4.28 <.001 1.40 
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Associations between mindreading ability and performance on the twenty 
statements task 
A series of correlational analyses was carried out to explore the relation between 
performance in each condition of the animations (mindreading) task and the proportion 
of physical/psychological self-related statements participants produced.  Neither 
performance in the mentalising or goal-directed condition of the animations task 
correlated with the proportion of psychological or physical self-concepts participants 
with ASD produced, all r ?Ǥ ? ?ǡp ?Ǥ ? ? ?.  In the neurotypical group performance in 
the mentalising condition of the animations tasks did not correlate with either the 
proportion of physical or psychological self-concept participants produced, r ?Ǥ ? ?ǡ
p ?Ǥ ? ? ?ǡ-directed condition correlate with the 
proportion of physical self-concepts participants produced, r = -.017, p = .944.  However, 
performance on the goal-directed condition of the task was significantly negatively 
correlated with the proportion of psychological statements neurotypical participants 
produced, r = -.525, p = .017.  This suggests that unexpectedly, the poorer neurotypical 
participants performed on the goal-directed condition of the animation task, the more 
psychological self-concepts they produced.   
Discussion 
The results of this study suggest that individuals with ASD demonstrated 
undiminished self-concepts relative to neurotypical participants.  Unexpectedly, the 
self-concepts provided by the ASD group were in general qualitatively similar to those 
provided in the neurotypical group and ASD participants provided statements that were 
distributed across similar categories to those provided by neurotypical adults.  The 
results also indicated that individuals with ASD reported self-descriptions that were as 
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diverse and abstract as those provided by neurotypical adults.  These results are not in 
keeping with the findings from previous studies that suggest individuals with ASD tend 
to define themselves more using abstract descriptions (e.g., Tanweer et al., 2010).  Nor 
are they in keeping with other findings that suggest both children and adults with ASD 
tend to describe themselves less in terms of social categories than neurotypical 
individuals (e.g., Lee & Hobson, 1998; Tanweer et al., 2010).   
Additionally, the study found no evidence for the suggestion that psychological 
self-concepts are diminished in individuals with ASD.  These results are not in keeping 
with the study predictions, nor previous findings within the literature.  Both Kristen et 
al., ( ? ? ? ?Ȍǡǯȋ ? ? ?8) studies suggested that psychological self-
knowledge may be diminished in ASD, whilst physical self-knowledge remains intact.  
This pattern of results is also mirrored in the results of other measures of conceptual 
self-awareness, that find individuals with ASD demonstrate diminished self-reference 
effects (Henderson et al., 2009; Lombardo et al., 2007; Toichi et al., 2002)and pronoun 
use (Hobson et al., 2010; Jordan, 1989; Lee et al., 1994; Lind & Bowler, 2009a; Loveland 
& Landry, 1986) yet unimpaired mirror self-recognition (Dawson & McKissick, 1984; 
Ferrari & Matthews, 1983; Neuman & Hill, 1978; Spiker & Ricks, 1984). 
One possible explanation for these results is the suggestions that perhaps impairments 
in acquiring typical psychological self-concepts are developmental in nature.  Indeed, 
this suggestion is in keeping with findings from studies exploring semantic 
autobiographical memory in ASD (a different index of self-knowledge), which suggest 
semantic knowledge about oneself is impaired in children with ASD, yet appears to 
resolve by adulthood (see Lind, 2010).  As stated by Williams and Bowler: 
We should never forget that the clinical picture we see among individuals with a 
diagnosis of ASD represents a particular point in an atypical developmental 
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trajectory, in which both the clinical features and any putative underlying factors 
may be in a process of change.  The challenge to understand how this process of 
change operates will no doubt add an additional layer of complexity to the 
picture, but we have little doubt that this layer will be necessary.  (2014, p.5)  
As such, it is possible that the development of psychological self-concepts is delayed/ 
atypical in children with ASD (e.g., Lee & Hobson, 1998), but by adulthood individuals 
with ASD have formed at least relatively robust self-concepts. 
Indeed, whilst the adults with ASD may possess typical psychological self-
concepts, these concepts themselves may have been acquired through atypical 
processes.  For example, an individual may know that they are a kind person because 
they are aware of psychological aspects of themselves.  However, this knowledge may 
also be learnt through indirect means (e.g., being told by other individuals that they are 
kind).  It is not clear from the results of this study what processes individuals used to 
generate self-concepts during the task. 
It is of course possible that the ASD group employed an atypical strategy on the 
task (thus producing statements that were qualitatively similar to those provided by 
neurotypical participants), despite impaired conceptual self-awareness.  For example, 
when asked to provide descriptive statements about themselves participants may 
simply have provided generic statements (that did not specifically apply to themselves), 
or provided statements based on stereotypes.  As such, although the results of this study 
inform us about the types of self-concepts individuals with ASD spontaneously attribute 
to themselves, which is of course important, we have no indication of how accurate 
these self-concepts are.  Indeed, in chapter three we saw that individuals with ASD 
reported they were very aware of their own minds.  However, the empirical evidence 
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reported in this chapter suggested that individuals in the ASD group were in fact 
impaired in metacognition.   
Despite finding no evidence of impairments in identity complexity in the ASD 
group, the study did find that individuals with ASD demonstrated significant 
impairments in their identity strength scores, relative to neurotypical individuals.  This 
reflected the fact that overall adults with ASD provided significantly fewer descriptions 
of themselves relative to neurotypical participants.  One explanation for this finding is 
the suggestion that overall adults with ASD hold self-concepts that are less detailed than 
neurotypical adults.  However, an alternative explanation for these results is the 
suggestion that poorer identity strength scores in the ASD group may be the result of 
impairments in generativity abilities in ASD.  Generativity ability refers to an 
individǯ ability to access stored information in memory and generate spontaneous, 
novel responses during a task (e.g., the ability to generate word beginning with a 
particular letter, etc.).  Several previous studies have suggested that individuals with 
ASD demonstrate diminished generativity abilities (e.g., Ambery et al., 2006; Dichter, 
Lam, Turner-Brown, Holtzclaw, & Bodfish, 2009).  For example, Dichter and colleagues 
(Dichter et al., 2009) found that, given the same amount of time, individuals with ASD 
were able to generate fewer examples of animal names and fewer uses of an object, 
relative to neurotypical individuals.  It is possible that individuals with ASD provided 
fewer self-concepts during the task than neurotypical participants, due to impaired 
generativity abilities.  As such, impairments in identity strength scores in the ASD group 
may not necessarily be indicative of impairments in conceptual self-awareness in ASD.  
However, one problem with this suggestion is that not all studies of generativity ability 
in ASD find evidence of impairments (see e.g., Lind & Bowler, 2010; Crane & Goddard, 
2008).  For example, Lind and Bowler (2010) found no evidence of generativity 
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impairments in individuals with ASD.  As such, evidence of generativity impairments in 
ASD is mixed.  Given this study did not asses generativity abilities in ASD it is thus 
unclear whether such impairments (rather than impairments in conceptual self-
awareness) explain impairments in identity strength scores on this task.   
Regarding the correlational analyses carried out in this study, the study found no 
evidence of a significant relatioǯ
the extent to which participants described themselves using psychological 
characteristics.  One mechanism accounts of mentalising predict that individuals who 
demonstrate mindreading impairments (such as the ASD group in this study) should 
also demonstrate impairments understanding their own mental states, and thus you 
would predict that mindreading impairments would be associated with impaired 
psychological self-concepts.  As such, the study did not provide direct support for the 
suggestion that mindreading is related to reports about ǯ.  
However, some caution should be taken interpreting these findings.  As stated above, it 
is not clear from the results of this study how accurate the psychological self-concepts 
reported by participants were (and thus we do not know the extent to which the self-
concepts participants provided were based on introspective awareness of their own 
mental states).   






Historically, ǲthe selfǳhas been central to theories of autism spectrum disorder 
(ASD).  Indeed the term autism itself derives from the word ǲautosǳǡ the Ancient Greek 
word for ǲselfǳǤHowever, paradoxically, whilst some researchers have suggested that 
classic autism involves a total focus on the self (Baron-Cohen, 2005) individuals with 
ASD have also been characterised as having an ǲabsent selfǳ(see e.g., Baron-Cohen, 
2005; Frith, 2003; Frith & Happé, 1999).  One resolution for this paradox is the 
suggestion that the self is itself not a single entity, but is instead multifaceted.  Whilst 
ASD may involve a total focus on some aspect of the self, it may be characterised by the 
absence of a different aspect of self.  The aim of this thesis was to explore self-
awareness in ASD, investigating whether ASD is defined by absolute impairments in 
self-awareness, or whether self-awareness is selectively impaired in children and/or 
adults with this disorder.   
It is evident from several of the studies reported in this thesis that individuals 
with ASD clearly do not demonstrate a completely ǲabsent selfǳ(Frith, 2003).  For 
example, the studies reported in chapter six and seven indicate that both children and 
adults with ASD demonstrate entirely typical action monitoring abilities.  Such findings 
are in keeping with the literature on action monitoring in ASD, and suggest that physical 
self-awareness appears to be intact in this disorder.  Additionally, the results reported 
in chapter eight suggest that self-concepts reported by individuals with ASD are similar 
to those provided by neurotypical individuals.  However, in contrast, the results 
reported in chapter three and five indicate that metacognitive monitoring is impaired in 
ASD, at least on some measures of metamemory ability.  This appears to suggest that 




children and adults with ASD demonstrate impaired understanding of their own mental 
states.  It is widely acknowledged that the self is multifaceted (e.g., Neisser, 1988, 
Rochat, 2003; Zahavi, 2010), and thus an individual can be aware of several aspects of 
the self at any one time.  As such, it follows that different aspects of self-awareness can 
be selectively impaired (see Zahavi, 2010).  The idea that ASD involves selective 
impairments in self-awareness is explored in this discussion.  More specifically it is 
suggested that, whilst individuals with ASD appear to be fully aware of their own 
physical selves, they demonstrate impairments in private/psychological self-awareness, 
and understanding their own minds (see Williams, 2010).  The following section 
considers whether the results reported in this thesis support this suggestion and 
whether these results are in keeping with the broader literature.   
Physical self-awareness in ASD 
Chapters six, seven, and eight all assessed aspects of the physical self in 
individuals with ASD and presented a consistent pattern of findings.  As predicted, 
throughout the studies reported in this thesis there was no hint of impairments in 
physical/ecological self-awareness, in either children or adults with ASD.   
One important aspect of physical self-ǯ
own actions.  This ability was explored in chapter six and seven, which employed 
measures of action monitoring in adults and children with ASD.  Results from the 
squares task employed in chapter six suggest that adults with ASD are able to accurately 
monitor their online actions.  Additionally, the studies of the enactment effect reported 
in chapters six and seven suggest that both children and adults with ASD demonstrate 
typical action monitoring ability.  Superior memory for self-performed actions over 
other-performed actions  (the enactment effect) is thought to result from additional 




motoric components involved in performing an action leading to those actions being 
more deeply encoded than observed actions (e.g., Engelkamp & Zimmer, 1989).  As such 
the presence of typical enactment effects in individuals with ASD also suggest that 
action monitoring is unimpaired in this disorder.  Findings that suggest individuals with 
ASD appear to demonstrate typical action monitoring ability are in keeping with other 
studies of online action monitoring ability (e.g., Russell & Hill, 2001; Williams & Happé, 
2009a) alongside studies in the broader action monitoring literature in ASD (e.g., 
Blakemore et al., 2006; David et al., 2006).  As such, it appears that the majority of the 
literature surrounding action monitoring in ASD support the suggestion that physical 
self-awareness is a relative strength in ASD.   
Chapter eight explored a different aspect of self-awareness in ASD, and 
investigated whether individuals with ASD conceptualise themselves in a similar way to 
neurotypical individuals.  The results of this study found that adults with ASD described 
themselves using physical concepts as often as neurotypical individuals.  These results 
are in keeping with studies that have fairly consistently found that a large proportion of 
the children with ASD tested successfully recognise their own image in the mirror 
(Dawson & McKissick, 1984; Ferrari & Matthews, 1983; Neuman & Hill, 1978; Spiker & 
Ricks, 1984).  Mirror self-recognition can be considered another indication that a child 
holds a physical self-concept, and appears to be a relative strength in children with ASD.   
Altogether, the results reported in this thesis support suggestions that physical 
self-awareness is intact in ASD.  Indeed, there was some tentative evidence to suggest 
individuals with ASD were somewhat more sensitive to their agency than comparison 
participants.  When looking at performance on the Squares task, employed in chapter 
six, participants with ASD performed better than neurotypical participants, when the 
number of successful levels completed on the Squares task was taken as the dependent 




measure of performance.  These results are also in keeping with those from an early 
study by Frith and Hermelin (Frith & Hermelin, 1969), which also suggested children 
with ASD appeared to be better at monitoring their own efference copy, relative to 
comparison participants.  In this study participants were required to move a stylus 
along a track that had been cut into a piece of Perspex.  Participants were then asked to 
complete the task again, this time without the aid of visual cues.  Frith and Hermelin 
(1969) found that participants with ASD completed the task significantly faster than 
comparison participants, and concluded that these findings were consistent with 
enhanced, rather that impaired, action monitoring.  This suggests that, far from being 
impaired, individuals with ASD might show heightened physical self-awareness.  ǯǡ
reported in this thesis certainly suggest that this aspect of self-awareness is not 
impaired.   
Psychological self-awareness in ASD  
Recently, Williams (2010) suggested that individuals are impaired at ǲtheory of 
own mindǳand are as impaired at recognising their own mental states as they are at 
recognising mental states in others (Williams, 2010).  One of the central aims of this 
thesis was to explore psychological self-awareness in both children and adults with ASD 
in more detail than in previous studies, using classic tests of metacognition.  Chapters 
three, four, and five assessed metacognition in children and adults with ASD.  However, 
the results reported in these chapters are not as clear cut as those reported in the 
studies of physical self-awareness.  Chapter three employed a classic feeling-of-knowing 
(FOK) paradigm to explore metamemory monitoring ability in adults with ASD.  This 
study found that participants with ASD showed significantly diminished FOK accuracy.  




This diminution was associated with a large effect size (d = 0.97), indicating a 
substantial difficulty with metamemory monitoring.  As such, this suggests that adults 
with ASD are impaired at understanding their own mental states.  In keeping with this 
finding were the results reported in chapter five, which found children with ASD also 
demonstrated impairments in meta-monitoring.  During a judgment of confidence (JOC) 
task children with ASD found it significantly  harder to judge whether the answers they 
had provided during the task were correct or incorrect.  Again, this suggests that 
metamemory monitoring is impaired in ASD.  As such, together these studies provide 
evidence of monitoring impairments in both children and adults with ASD.   
Metacognitive bias in individuals with ASD 
Whilst impairments in both FOK and JOC accuracy are in keeping with the 
suggestion that psychological self-awareness is impaired in ASD, there are of course 
several potential explanations for diminished judgements accuracy in the ASD group.  
One possibility is that poor judgement accuracy on both tasks was the result of a 
particular responding bias in ASD.  For example, as discussed in chapter three, some ǲǳǡ-assess their perceived competence as greater than 
their actual ability.  If people with ASD were consistently over-confident because of a 
tendency to be ǲarrogantǳȋȌ, or indeed consistently under-confident 
because of a tendency to be ǲmodestǳ (for example), then they may well demonstrate 
impaired performance on metamemory tasks (and such impairments would not 
necessarily suggest monitoring is impaired in ASD).   
Concerning the JOC task, it appears that children with ASD demonstrated 
monitoring impairments that were driven by overconfidence on the task.  The children 
in the ASD group reported significantly higher confidence in their incorrect answers, 




relative to neurotypical children.  Children with ASD were also more confident in the 
answers they then removed, relative to the neurotypical group.  This is in keeping with 
previous findings that suggest individuals with ASD tend to overestimate their cognitive 
abilities.  Some studies have indicated that individuals with ASD tend to self-report their 
own social functioning more positively than parents will report (e.g., Lerner et al., 
2012), and  self-report their own ASD traits as less severe than parents will report (e.g., 
Johnson et al., 2009).  Indeed, the results from the meta-cognitions questionnaire 
reported in chapter three suggested that adults with ASD self-report greater awareness 
of their own mental states than neurotypical participants report.  These studies all 
suggest that, at least when providing self-reports, individuals with ASD demonstrate a 
tendency to report their perceived competence as greater than their actual ability.   
However, the results reported in chapter three found that during a FOK task, 
monitoring impairments in individuals with ASD were not driven by overconfidence.  
Instead, among adults with ASD, diminished performance on the FOK task was driven 
by a relative underconfidence existing knowledge, rather than by overconfidence in 
judgements during the task.  Thus it appears that the type of errors individuals with 
ASD made differed depending on the type of metamemory judgement.  The fact that 
individuals with ASD did not demonstrate a consistent type of bias across the FOK and 
JOC tasks suggests that one particular response bias in ASD does not best explain 
impaired performance on these tasks.  Instead, this pattern of findings is in keeping with 
the idea that metacognition is impaired in ASD.  If individuals with ASD are impaired at 
understanding their own mental states, one would predict diminished accuracy on 
metamemory tasks.  However, you would not expect individuals with ASD to make 
metamemory monitoring mistakes that were exclusively under-confident or over-
confident.   




Judgment of learning (JOL) accuracy 
Together, diminished performance on both the FOK and JOC task suggests that 
individuals with ASD are impaired at understanding their own mental states.  However, 
there was no hint of metamemory impairments in the experiments reported in chapter 
four.  The results from all three judgement of learning (JOL) experiments reported no 
significant differences in JOL accuracy among either children or adults with ASD.  These 
results are clearly not in keeping with the results reported in chapter three or five, nor ǡǯmental states is impaired in 
ASD (Williams & Happé, 2009b, 2010).  However, they are in keeping with the only 
other study to explore JOL accuracy in ASD (Wojcik et al., 2014).  Wojcik and colleagues 
also found that adolescents with ASD can make accurate JOL assessments.  However, 
there were several methodological issues associated with this study.  Firstly, the ASD 
group was not matched to the neurotypical group for VIQ.  Additionally, the study did 
not assess whether mindreading ability was impaired in the sample of ASD participants 
they assessed.  This is important, as several theories only ever predict impaired JOL 
accuracy in individuals who also demonstrate mindreading impairments.  Given these 
considerations, the results of the JOL tasks reported in chapter four provide more 
definitive evidence that JOL accuracy is impaired in ASD.   
If metacognitive monitoring ability (and psychological self-awareness) truly is 
impaired in individuals with ASD this begs the question why do individuals with ASD 
not demonstrate impairments on JOL tasks (neither cue-alone, cue-target, nor aggregate 
JOL task).?  There are at least three possible explanations for the discrepancy in the 
results across chapters three, four, and five.   
1) Different underlying bases of metamemory judgements.  One possible 
explanation of this inconsistent pattern of results is the suggestion that different 




metamemory judgements rely on different sources of information.  Although making ǡ	ǯǡ
been argued that these types of judgements rely on different memory heuristics (see 
Kelemen et al., 2000; Schwartz, 1994; Souchay & Isingrini, 2012).  Within the memory ǲǳǲǳǤ  Familiarity in this sense refers to a general feeling of memory that varies 
in strength, but does not contain any information about the context in which that 
knowledge was acquired.  ǲǳǡ
additional incorporation of contextual information in memory.  Evidence suggests that 
some judgments are heavily influenced by the familiarity an individual has towards a 
cue word during a metamemory task (see Metcalfe et al., 1993; Reder, 1987)  In 
contrast, whilst making metamemory judgments individuals may alternatively rely on 
the extent to which they can recollect partial or related information about the target 
word (see Koriat, 1993).   
One potential explanation for differences in metamemory accuracy in ASD is the 
suggestion that impairments in memory explain metamemory impairments in this 
disorder.  More specifically, Wojcik and colleagues suggest that metamemory 
impairments in ASD may arise due to impairments in recollection ability in this disorder 
(see Wojcik et al., 2014).  These authors suggest that some judgements, particularly 
those made at retrieval (such as FOK and JOC judgements), rely heavily on the 
recollection of partial or related information about the target word.  In contrast 
judgements made before retrieval (such as JOLs) may not rely on recollection to the 
same extent.  Instead, Wojcik and colleagues (see Wojcik et al., 2014)  suggest that 
individuals may base judgements made at encoding (including JOLs) more on cues 




related to the type of task or material they are judging, as well as basing such 
judgements on general knowledge of factors that affect memory performance. 
In support of this suggestion, studies have found that FOK judgments in 
particular appear to rely heavily on recollection.  For example, Souchay (Souchay et al., 
2007) explored whether FOK accuracy in older adults was associated with performance 
on a remember/know task.  A remember/know task is a variation of an old/new 
recognition memory task.  During this task participants are presented with stimuli and ǲǳȋȌǲǳǤ	ǲǳare the asked to 
identify whether they think they can explicitly ǲrememberǳthe occurrence of that 
memory item during study, or whether they simply ǲknowǳit is old.  Remember 
responses are typically associated with the process of recollection, whereas know 
responses are typically associated with the process of familiarity.  Souchay found that 
FOK judgments accuracy (gamma scores) in older adults was positively associated with ǲǳ
remember/know recognition task (Souchay et al., 2007).  These results were ǲǳ
recognition are better at making accurate FOK judgments. 
Additionally, studies exploring the effect of divided attention at encoding suggest 
that FOK judgements rely heavily on recollection.  Divided attention tasks appear to ǯnot familiarity ability (see Yonelinas, 2002).  
Sacher and colleagues found that when participants engage in divided attention at 
encoding, FOK gamma accuracy is much poorer (see Sacher, Taconnat, Souchay, & 
Isingrini, 2009).  Interestingly, divided attention does not appear to affect JOL accuracy 
(Barnes & Dougherty, 2007) 




As Wojcik and Souchay suggest, individuals with ASD may not demonstrate 
impairments on JOL tasks because such task rely less on recollection than other 
metamemory tasks.  However, there are several potential problems with this 
explanation.  Firstly, the results reported in this thesis are not entirely in keeping with 
this suggestion.  Whilst individuals with ASD demonstrated significant impairments in 
metacognitive accuracy during a FOK and JOC task, these impairments were apparent 
despite typical object-level performance on the task.  In both experiments object level 
ability was assessed using a cued-recall memory test, and accurate performance on such 
recall tasks is typically thought to rely on recollection.  As such, this suggests that the 
metacognitive impairments demonstrated by individuals with ASD were not solely 
driven by impairments in recollective ability.   
Additionally, within the broader literature the evidence to support the 
suggestion that recollection abilities are impaired in ASD is mixed.  Whilst some studies 
suggest recollection is impaired in ASD Wojcik and Souchay themselves report evidence 
that suggests recollection is intact in individuals with this disorder.  Across a series of 
experiments (Souchay, Wojcik, Williams, Crathern, & Clarke, 2013) Souchay and 
colleagues assessed recollection in adolescents with ASD, using both subjective 
measures of recollection (remember/know tasks) and objective measured of 
recollection (source monitoring tasks).  Using remember/know paradigms, the study 
assessed recollection abilities during a memory task by asking participants to explicitly 
report whether they remembered a piece of information, or whether they simply knew 
it.  To assess the quality of these subjective judgements, participants were also then 
asked to provide additional contextual information to justify their ǲrememberǳ
responses.  In one of the experiments reported in their paper (Souchay et al., 2013; 
Experiment 1) individuals with ASD reported significantly fewer ǲrememberǳresponses 




relative to neurotypical participants.  This finding is in keeping with other studies in the 
literature (see e.g., Bowler et al., 2000), and suggests that, if participants were making 
accurate remember/ know responses, ASD participants demonstrate impairments in 
recollection.  However, the evidence to support the suggestion that these ǲrememberǳ
responses were accurate (in both the ASD and neurotypical groups) was fairly limited.  
Whilst ASD participants were able to provide correct source information for 59% of the 
items they reported they remembered, neurotypical participants provided correct 
source information for 48% of their remember response (this difference was not 
significant).  Given that chance performance on this task would predict participants 
would be able to provide contextual information for 50% of the items they say they can ǲrememberǳǡ these findings suggest that in fact, participants (in both groups) were not 
very good at determining whether they had in fact recollected information or not.  As 
such, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from the finding that individuals with 
ASD report recollecting memory items less often than neurotypical participants. 
Additionally, the other two remember/know experiments reported in Souchay et 
al., (2013) paper found that the proportion of items participants reported they 
remembered did not differ between the ASD and neurotypical groups.  Furthermore, 
across three source monitoring experiments, the study found that adolescents with ASD 
were able to recollect contextual information about previously studied items (e.g., what 
colour a picture had been presented in) as accurately as neurotypical adolescents.  This ǲȏ
individuals with ASD], at least as measured objectively by the source memory ǳ(Souchay et al., 2013, p.1605).  As such, these findings appear to 
contradict the suggestion that impairments in metamemory in ASD are the results of 
impaired recollection in this disorder.   




Neuroimaging studies also suggest that individuals do rely on recollection whilst 
making accurate judgements of learning.  For example, Do Lam and colleagues suggest 
that JOL are based (at least partially) on recollection (Do Lam et al., 2012).  In support of 
this suggestion they found that the brain activation associated with making judgements 
of learning shared common neural correlates with successful memory retrieval, in 
particular the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC).  They suggests that the mPFC may be 
engaged in monitoring retrieval outcomes whilst making JOL assessments (although 
these findings might also imply that instead/as well meta-mnemonic processes are 
involved during retrieval).   
Whilst it is unlikely that impairment in recollection in ASD can entirely explain 
impaired performance on FOK and JOC tasks, there are several ways this theory could 
be assessed.  For example within the typically developing literature, neural signatures 
for specific mnemonic strategies (such as familiarity and recollection) have been 
identified (Paynter, Reder, & Kieffaber, 2009), and ERPs have been used extensively to 
investigate memory  (Rugg & Curran, 2007) and metamemory (Paynter et al., 2009; 
Skavhaug, Wilding, & Donaldson, 2010; Skavhaug, Wilding, & Donaldson, 2013) among 
neurotypical individuals.  For example, there is evidence that suggests specific early-
onset ERP components are associated with feelings of familiarity during a FOK task 
(Paynter et al., 2009).  As such, future EEG research exploring the neural underpinnings 
of metacognition in ASD would help to answer the question of whether impairments in 
metamemory accuracy in ASD are in fact driven by a relative lack of mnemonic cues (as 
Wojcik and colleagues suggest), or by monitoring impairments (as one-mechanism 
theories suggest).   
2) Individuals with ASD used an alternative strategy on the JOL tasks.  
Another potential explanation for the pattern of results found across metamemory tasks 




is the suggestion that individuals with ASD were able to perform relatively well on the 
JOL task despite impaired metamemory, by employing an atypical strategy during the 
task.  The cue-target JOL task employed in chapter four (experiment 3) directly 
addressed this issue.  The results from this experiment suggested that performance in 
children with ASD was not driven by simply basing each JOL on whether participants 
could bring to mind a missing cue word.  However, studies within the typically 
developing literature have shown that performance on JOL tasks can be accurate when 
other strategies are used to predict future memory performance.  In addition to factors 
that influence encoding and retrieval processes, studies have shown that inferential ǯ(see Chua, 
Pergolizzi, & Weintraub, 2014).  For example, Sommer and colleagues presented 
participants with a series of faces during a facial recognition task (Sommer, Heinz, 
Leuthold, Matt, & Schweinberger, 1995).  Half of the individuals who participated in this 
study were asked to make a JOL for each face, and were asked to judge whether they 
thought they would recognise each face in a future recognition task.  However, the other 
half of the participants were simply asked to rate each face on how distinctive they 
found them.  Sommer and colleagues found that distinctiveness ratings were as 
predictive of future memory performance as JOL rating.  This suggests that it is possible 
to make perfectly accurate judgments of learning by basing each judgment purely on 
inferential information (a strategy that does not rely on metamemory monitoring 
ability).  If such a strategy was used, this might explain why individuals performed 
typically on the JOL task, despite underlying metamemory impairments.  This 
suggestion is of course tentative, as it is not clear from the studies reported in this thesis 
what information individuals with ASD used to inform their JOL decisions (or indeed 
their FOK/JOC assessments).  Additionally, if it is the case that individuals with ASD 




ǲhacked outǳtypical performance on the JOL despite poor metacognitive skills, the 
question of why compensatory strategies were not used (or why compensatory 
strategies were not as effective) on the FOK and JOC tasks needs to be addressed.  As 
discussed, different metamemory tasks rely on different sources of information.  One 
possibility could be that FOK and JOC tasks require greater metacognitive demands than 
JOL tasks, and thus it is harder to perform as well on such task by using an alternative 
strategy.  Again this suggestion is tentative, and future research is needed to help 
answer existing questions surrounding the underlying processes involved during 
metamemory tasks in individuals with ASD.   
3). Individuals do not possess general metamemory abilities.  Interestingly ǯ
not tend to correlate with their accuracy on a different task (e.g., Souchay & Isingrini, 
2012; Souchay, Isingrini, Clarys, Taconnat, & Eustache, 2004).  Indeed, the evidence that 
individuals have stable metacognitive abilities that are employed across several time 
and different types of tasks is relatively weak (see Kelemen et al., 2000).  This has led 
some researchers to argue again a general metacognitive ability.  If individuals do not 
hold a general metamemory ability, it is possible that individuals with ASD are only 
impaired in some aspects of metamemory and not others.  In terms of one mechanism 
theories of mindreading, perhaps only some aspects of metacognition rely on the same 
underlying mechanisms that mindreading rely on.   
However, to counter this suggestion, Keleman suggests that a general 
metamemory ability (across tasks) is apparent when studies employ a large number of 
trials (Kelemen et al., 2000).  Fleming has provided support for this suggestion by 
demonstrating participants show good reliability on a perceptual decision making task, 
when the task employs large numbers of trials (Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 




2010) .  Additionally, Song and colleagues found that individual differences in 
metacognitive accuracy on two perceptual tasks, each of which employed large trial 
numbers, were strongly correlated (Song et al., 2011).  These researchers support the 
idea that metamemory paradigms measure the same underlying processes 
(metamemory accuracy), but reliability in performance between tasks is only apparent 
when large trial numbers are used.   
Evidence from neuroimaging studies also supports the suggestion that 
metamemory tasks share the same underlying processes.  For example, studies suggest 
that the anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC) is particularly involved in making accurate 
metamemory judgements, across tasks.  Whilst medial regions of the aPFC appear to be 
involved in making accurate JOL (Kao, Davis, & Gabrieli, 2005) and FOK assessments 
(Schnyer, Nicholls, & Verfaellie, 2005; Schnyer et al., 2004), more lateral areas of the 
aPFC are involved in making accurate JOC assessments (Yokoyama et al., 2010).  This 
dissociation is most likely due to the fact that JOL and FOK judgements are prospective 
in nature, whilst JOC judgments are retrospective in nature (Chua et al., 2014) .  This is 
in keeping with other studies that find medial parts of the aPFC are particularly involved 
in making predictions (see e.g., Bar, 2009).  Of course, these studies do not tell us what 
areas are recruited by individuals with ASD whilst making accurate metamemory 
judgements, but do support the suggestion that in typical development, accuracy on 
metamemory tasks is driven by common underlying mechanisms.   
Chua and colleagues (Chua, Schacter, & Sperling, 2009) also found that both FOK 
and JOC tasks appear to produce differential activation (when than in a  non-
metamemory task) in several overlapping brain regions, including both the left and the 
right temporo-parietal junctions (TPJ).  Interestingly, TPJ also appears to be involved in 
mental state understanding in others, and reasoning about thoughts, including false 




beliefs (see Perner et al., 2006; Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004; Saxe 
& Powell, 2006).  This provides some support for the one mechanism account that 
suggest metacognition and mindreading rely on the same underlying processes.  
However, to date the only two fMRI studies that have explored the brain regions 
associated with making judgments of learning, found no indication that TPJ was 
activated during  JOL tasks (Do Lam et al., 2012; Kao et al., 2005).  This suggest that 
perhaps, JOL tasks do not rely on the same processes as those engaged during 
mindreading, whereas FOK and JOC do.  This is another alternative suggestion for why 
JOL accuracy appears intact in ASD whilst FOK and JOC accuracy appears diminished.   
Currently, there is not enough evidence to determine which, if any of these three 
possibilities, if any, is the best one to explain the pattern of results found in this thesis 
(impaired FOK and JOC accuracy in ASD, alongside intact JOL accuracy).  As such, it will 
be important that future research investigates the nature of the cues that people with 
ASD use to inform their JOL assessment (as well as other metamemory judgments).   
Metacognitive control processes in individuals with ASD 
When considering the question of whether metacognition is impaired in ASD it is 
also important to look at the evidence from studies of metacognitive control processes.  
The JOC task employed in chapter five explored both monitoring and control processes 
in children with ASD.  Although this study found clear evidence that metacognitive 
monitoring is diminished among children with ASD, it found little evidence to support 
the idea that metacognitive control was similarly diminished.  Having said this, it is 
notable that control processes were less accurate amongst ASD participants than 
neurotypical participants (albeit non-significantly so) and that the effect size associated 
with the between-group difference (d = 0.38) was strikingly similar to the effect size for 




the group difference in control ability reported by Sawyer et al.,(2014; d = 0.32, 
averaged across general knowledge and emotion recognition conditions).  This 
consistency across the only two studies to have explored metacognitive control ability 
in ASD might suggest that this ability is subtly diminished in ASD.  However, it is 
important to note that if such a diminution exists, it is questionable whether it is 
clinically significant, given the small magnitude of the effect. 
Are significant group differences in any aspect of self-awareness simply 
chance findings?   
Looking at the thesis as a whole, it is striking that only two of the chapters 
indicate self-awareness is significantly impaired in ASD.  Indeed, almost all of the other 
analysis carried out to explore group difference in self-awareness suggests that there 
were no significant difference between ASD participants and neurotypical participants.  
As such, it is worth considering whether the significant between group differences that 
were found (in FOK gamma scores and JOC accuracy) were simply chance findings?  It 
could be suggested that these differences may be simply the result of carrying out 
multiple statistical tests rather than indicative of underlying impairments in 
metacognition.  Whilst this is of course possible there are several arguments against this 
suggestion.  Firstly, there are several theoretical reasons to predict that metacognition 
should be impaired in ASD, and to directly predict group differences in FOK and JOC 
accuracy.  For example, several theories suggest that individuals with ASD should be as ǯ
mental states (see e.g., Carruthers, 2009; Williams, 2010).  As such, impaired accuracy 
on the FOK and JOC tasks was directly in keeping with a priori hypotheses that 
predicted metacognitive monitoring accuracy should be impaired in individuals with 




ASD.  Thus, group differences on these measures were expected, in the direction that 
significant group differences were found.  Additionally, impairments in FOK accuracy 
and JOC accuracy are in keeping with the result of other studies within the literature 
that report diminished monitoring accuracy in individuals with ASD (Wilkinson et al., 
2010; Wojcik et al., 2013).  Given these factors, it is highly unlikely that these results are 
chance findings. 
Implications for theories of self-awareness  
From the results reported in this thesis it is not possible to conclude that 
metacognition is definitively impaired in ASD.  However the results suggest that at least 
some aspects of private self-awareness are diminished in ASD, yet individuals will 
demonstrate no obvious impairments in physical self-awareness.  As such, overall, the 
pattern of findings reported in this thesis provides most support for theories of self-
awareness that distinguish between physical and psychological aspects of self (Gillihan 
& Farah, 2005; Neisser, 1988; Williams, 2010).  In contrast, the evidence from ASD does 
not support theories that suggest physical self-awareness is dependent on having 
psychological self-awareness (Lewis & Ramsay, 2004).  Additionally, the case of ASD 
does not support suggestions that awareness of the physical self is sufficient to provide 
awareness of the psychological self (Russell, 1996).   
Alongside results from the behavioural studies summarised in this thesis, 
support for this suggestion also comes from neuroimaging studies.  During an fMRI 
study, Kennedy and Courchesne (2008) presented adults with ASD, alongside a group of 
age and IQ matched neurotypical individuals, with various statements which either 
referred to psychological personality traits (e.g.., I am polite) or observable, external 
characteristics/behaviours (e.g., I have a dog).  Individuals were asked to judge 




(true/false) whether each statement described themselves (Self condition) or their 
mother (Other condition).  One interesting result from this study was that group 
differences were observed in activation in the dorsal medial PFC and the PCC.  In both 
these brain regions, individuals with ASD showed reduced activation relative to the 
neurotypical group, when judging statements that concerned psychological traits (in 
both the self and other condition).  However they showed similar activation to 
neurotypical individuals when judging statements that concerned observable traits.  
This suggests that, perhaps, rather than showing general patterns of atypical activation 
during self- and other-processing, individuals with ASD may demonstrate a specific 
deficit in making judgements that rely on inferring mental states (in both oneself and 
others), but show no impairments making judgements that rely on observable 
phenomenon (in both oneself and others).  Interestingly, Lind (2010) highlights the fact 
that all existing studies of self-referencing in individuals with ASD have explored self-
referencing in relation to psychological trait adjectives.  As such, they examine whether ǯ
self-concept.  Following the suggestion that that awareness of the physical self may not 
be impaired in ASD Lind (2010) directly predicts that individuals with ASD would show 
self-reference effects when encoding information in relation to the physical self, as 
physical aspect of the conceptual self are not diminished in ASD.  However, these 
predictions have never been empirically tested.   
The relation between mindreading and metacognition 
The studies reported in this thesis can also inform the theoretical debate 
concerning the relation between mindreading and metacognition.  Findings of 
diminished FOK accuracy and JOC accuracy alongside diminished mindreading ability 




are in keeping with the predictions of the one mechanism theory of the relation 
between metacognition and mindreading, which directly predict that both 
metacognition and mindreading should be impaired in ASD.  Certainly, the results of this 
thesis are not in keeping with key predictions made by either the simulation theory or 
two-mechanism theories, which both predict that metacognition is unimpaired in ASD.  
Of course, the results of these studies do not definitively confirm that these abilities are 
not underpinned by two separate mechanisms (e.g., Goldman, 2006), because it may be 
that both systems (one underpinning mindreading and the other underpinning 
metacognition) are impaired in ASD.  They are simply not in keeping with predictions 
made by either Goldman (2006) or Nichols and Stich (2003).   
However, the results from this thesis are not entirely in keeping with the one-
mechanism accounts.  Firstly, one-mechanism accounts would predict global 
impairments across metamemory tasks.  As such, findings that JOL accuracy was typical 
in individuals with ASD who also demonstrate mindreading impairments do not 
support one-mechanism accounts of mentalising.  Secondly, none of the studies found 
evidence of a significant positive association between metacognitive accuracy and 
performance on either the animations task or strange stories task.  The one-mechanism 
account would directly predict such associations between metamemory and 
mindreading, so the current results do not support the theory in this respect.  Whilst the 
FOK and JOC were underpowered to detect significant associations between 
mindreading performance and metacognitive accuracy, the JOC study (reported in 
chapter five) was suitably powered to detect at least a moderate sized (r = 0.30) 
predicted association between these abilities if one existed.  Thus, the failure to find a 
significant association is unlikely to be due to insufficient power.  As such, the 
correlations reported in this thesis do not support one-mechanism accounts.   




However, some caution should be taken when interpreting the results of the 
correlation analyses.  Finding that mindreading performance and metacognitive 
monitoring performance were not associated does not rule out one system theories of 
the relation between these two abilities.  Cognitive measures are rarely (if ever) process 
pure and thus an association or lack thereof should not be taken in-and-of-itself as 
evidence for/against the notion that the underlying cognitive abilities are/are not 
associated.   
To summarise, whilst the results from this thesis probably provide most support 
for one-mechanism accounts of mentalising, they do not definitively support one-
mechanism theories, two-mechanism theories or simulation theory.  Indeed, several of 
the studies reported in this thesis found significant correlations not predicted by any 
theories of mentalising.  For example, in experiment 3 of chapter four, JOL accuracy on 
the cue-target JOL task was strongly negatively association with performance on both 
conditions of the strange stories task.  This indicates that, for ASD participants the 
better their accuracy on the cue-target JOL task, the poorer their performance on the 
strange stories (in both conditions).  However, given several of the studies reported in 
the thesis conducted large numbers of correlations it is unsurprising that some 
unpredicted associations occurred.  It is likely that these correlations are chance 
finding, and it is notable that they would not survive corrections for multiple 
comparisons.   
The main aim of this thesis was not to systematically decide between competing 
theories of the relation between mindreading and metacognition ,but was rather to 
better understand the nature of metacognition and self-awareness in ASD.  As such, the 
thesis was fairly limited in the methodology it employed to assess the relationship 
between mindreading and metacognition (in neurotypical individuals and individuals 




with ASD).  As discussed, cognitive measures are rarely (if ever) process pure.  Thus 
finding an association or lack of association between two measures does not provide the 
best support for or against competing theories.  Instead of using correlational analyses 
to explore this question, future research could employ dual-task paradigms to better 
understand the relationship between mindreading and metacognition in ASD.  For 
example, during a dual task paradigm individuals could engage in a primary task that 
involved metacognition, thus drawing upon the resources of the 
mindreading/metacognition faculty (if one-mechanism theories are to be believed).  
Alongside engaging in this primary task, the task would also involve either a) a 
secondary mindreading task (e.g., making a key-board response when a mental state 
term is presented) or b) a secondary task that was equally as demanding, but did not 
involve mindreading (e.g., making a keyboard response when an animal name is 
presented).  If metacognition does rely on the same underlying processes as those 
employed in mindreading, you would expect to see impairments on a secondary task 
that involves mindreading, but not on a secondary task that did not involve 
mindreading.   
Mindreading performance in individuals with ASD 
Another potential explanation for why the correlational results reported in 
chapters three, four, and five failed to support one-mechanism account of mentalising,  
could be the fact that individuals with ASD did not consistently demonstrate predicted 
patterns of performance on the animations task(a well-established measure of 
mindreading ability).  Interestingly throughout the studies reported in the thesis, 
performance on the animations task was not always impaired specifically in the 
mentalising condition.  In chapters three, four (experiment 1), six and eight performance 




was impaired in ASD individuals in both conditions of the task.  This raises the question 
of whether mindreading ability itself specifically was driving diminished performance 
on the animations task in the ASD participants tested.   
Several papers have also used accuracy/appropriateness scores from both the 
goal-directed and mentalising condition of the animation task to assess mindreading 
ability in individuals with ASD (Abell et al., 2000; Campbell et al., 2006; Castelli et al., 
2002; Jones et al., 2011; Lind, Bowler, et al., 2014; Lind, Williams, et al., 2014; Salter et 
al., 2008; White et al., 2011; Zwickel et al., 2011).  Four of these papers (Lind, Bowler, et 
al., 2014; Lind, Williams, et al., 2014; Salter et al., 2008; Zwickel et al., 2011) explicitly 
report a failure to observe a significant group by condition interaction effect.  Whilst 
Lind, Bowler et al., (2014) also failed to find a significant main effect of group, the other 
three studies failed to find a significant interaction effect, despite observing a significant 
main effect of group.  These findings are in keeping with the findings from chapters 
three, four, six, and eight of this thesis.  Out of the remaining (five) papers,  three papers 
(Campbell et al., 2006; Castelli et al.,2002; Abell et al., 2000) do not report any 
inferential statistics for a group by condition interaction effect.  Thus, it is not clear 
whether they found a significant group by condition interaction or not.  The other two 
papers (White et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2011) analysed group differences separately in 
each condition of the animation task (using Mann-Whitney comparisons), and do not 
discuss interaction effects.  As such, of these papers, the only five that explicitly report 
the group (ASD, neurotypical) by condition (goal-directed/mentalising) interaction 
effect do not find a significant effect. 
One suggestion that explains this pattern of results is the suggestion that both 
conditions of the task involve some level of mindreading.  Behavioural and 
neuroimaging studies support the view that the goal-directed condition of the task 




involves an aspect/level of mindreading, albeit a lower level/different aspect than is 
tapped by the mentalising condition of the task.  Behavioural studies have shown that 
neurotypical individuals do reliably employ mental-state language when describing the 
interactions of the triangles in the goal-directed condition, albeit less frequently than 
when describing the interactions of the triangles in the mentalising condition (e.g., 
Castelli et al., 2002; Castelli et al., 2000; Klein, Zwickel, Prinz, & Frith, 2009; Zwickel et 
al., 2011).   
In terms of neuroimaging studies, there is strong evidence that mentalising is 
underpinned by a network of brain regions that consists of the medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC), the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), superior temporal sulcus (STS), the 
temporal pole, and (importantly) the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ).  The importance 
of the TPJ is that it is specifically involved in mental state understanding and reasoning 
about thoughts, including false beliefs (see Perner et al., 2006; Samson, Apperly, 
Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004; Saxe & Powell, 2006).  Neuroimaging studies have 
shown that the TPJ (as well as the mPFC, STS, and TPJ) is activated when neurotypical 
adults watch the clips that comprise the mentalising and goal-directed conditions of the 
task, albeit that this activation is significantly greater in the mentalising condition than 
the goal-directed condition (see, for example, Castelli et al., 2002; Castelli et al., 2000).  
Thus, it is highly unlikely that the goal-directed condition has nothing to do with 
mindreading. 
The difference between the mentalising and goal-directed conditions may lie in 
the fact that success in the goal-directed condition can be achieved by attributing non-
propositional attitudes.  Leslie (e.g., Leslie, 1994) ǲǳ
consists of two distinct sub-systems, one subsystem (system1) that processes the goal ǯȋǲ-ǳ




mindreading), and another subsystem (system2) that processes the propositional 
attitudes that underpin agents in relation to their propositional attitudes (henceforth  ǲ-ǳȌǤ  Although the goal-directed condition of the 
animations task does not require the attribution of propositional attitudes (and thus 
will not rely on system2 of the mindreading mechanism), arguably this condition still 
relies on the goal-directed subsystem (system1) of the mindreading mechanism.   
This suggestion explains why impairments were seen in both conditions of the 
animations task in several of the studies reported in this thesis.  However, it cannot 
explain why children with ASD who participated in the experiments reported in 
chapters five, six (experiment three), and seven failed to demonstrate impairments in 
either condition of the animations task.  In all of the studies reported in this thesis 
children with ASD failed to show any impairment on the animations task, in either the 
mentalising or goal-directed conditions (yet the same samples of participants 
consistently demonstrated mindreading impairments on the strange stories task).  This 
could be due to children only completing four trials on the task (two mentalising trials 
and two goal-directed trials).  Instead adults who participated in the animations task 
completed eight trials (four mentalising trials and four goal-directed trials).  This 
suggests that perhaps the animations task is only a sensitive measure of mindreading 
when participants complete all trials in the task.  Alternatively, it may be that only some 
of the animation trials are a good measure of mindreading ability, and the four 
animations chosen as the trials for the child studies did not measure mindreading 
ability as well as other (excluded) trials from the task.   
Questions for future research 




Recently, there has been a growing interest in the study of self-awareness in ASD.  Upon 
the onset of my PhD only two studies (Wilkinson et al., 2010; Wojcik et al., 2011) had 
employed metamemory paradigms to explore psychological self-awareness in ASD.  
Since then there have been five more published studies of metacognition in ASD 
(Grainger et al., 2014; Sawyer et al., 2014; Wojcik et al., 2013; Wojcik et al., 2014; 
Elmose & Happé, 2014).  These studies have clearly extended our understanding of 
(psychological) self-awareness in ASD.  However, it is evident that several questions 
concerning self-awareness in ASD still remain.   
Within the typically developing literature there is a growing body of literature 
that had explored the underlying processes involves in metacognition using both fMRI 
and EEG techniques.  Future research employing such techniques in individuals with 
ASD will be crucial to help answer questions surrounding the underlying processes 
engaged during tasks that assess self-awareness in ASD (see also p.252 above).  
Additionally, future research should also explore whether aspects of self-awareness can 
be fostered in individuals with this disorder.  Previous studies have indicated that it is 
possible to imǯ (Begeer et al., 2011; Fisher 
et al., 2005).  One-mechanism theorists should predict that, after mindreading training, 
individuals with ASD should also demonstrate improvements in metacognitive 
accuracy.  In contrast, two-mechanism theories predict that mindreading training will 
not improve metacognitive.   
Additionally, studies have shown that transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS) to the right temporal parietal junction can improve ǯ
ability to make judgments about both the self and the other (Santiesteban, Banissy, 
Catmur, & Bird, 2012).  ǲfindings demonstrate the efficacy 
of tDCS to improve social cognition, and highlight the potential for tDCS to be used as a 




tool to aid self other processing in ǳȋǤǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ 
p.2274).  Given studies have indicated that TPJ appears to be engaged when making FOK 
and JOC judgements, it would be interesting to investigate whether tDCS stimulation to 
TPJ could also enhance metamemory accuracy in both neurotypical individuals and 
individuals with ASD.   
Furthermore, within the typically developing literature it is still not clear 
whether metacognitive accuracy is stable across domains.  For example, Fleming has 
shown that individuals with anterior prefrontal lesions demonstrate domain-specific 
impairments in metacognitive accuracy, showing impairments in perceptual decision 
making judgements, but intact metamemory accuracy (Fleming, Ryu, Golfinos, & 
Blackmon, 2014).  Whilst the theories proposed in this thesis predict that impairments 
in metacognition in ASD should be domain-general, to date no study has explore 
metacognitive accuracy in individuals with ASD on a perceptual decision making task.  
As such, it will be important to establish whether predicted impairments in 
metacognition are global or domain-specific in the future.   
Implications and final comments 
Alongside theoretical implications, the results of this thesis also have several 
potential practical and clinical implications.  Ultimately, if an individual has a reduced 
ability to accurately assess what information they know, and what they do not know, 
this may have several consequences.  From an educational perspective, studies have 
shown that several outcomes (such as exam performance) can be predicted by 
metacognitive monitoring accuracy (e.g., Hartwig et al., 2012; Thiede et al., 2003).  
Other studies have shown that metacognitive training has been shown to remediate 
difficulties in reading, writing and mathematical reasoning (see Brown & Campione, 




1996; Fuchs et al., 2003; Sitko, 1998) in typical development.  Such studies suggest that 
impairments in psychological self-awareness and metacognition will significantly ǯabilities.  This may be 
particularly relevant for intellectually high-functioning people with ASD, given that 
many of these individuals show significantly lower academic achievement than would 
be expected on the basis of their intelligence, which in turn impacts negatively on their 
life chances (see Estes et al., 2011) 
It is important to establish a comprehensive account of self-awareness in ASD, 
given the consequences that impaired self-awareness (particularly impairments in ȌǯǤ  
Future research should explore the educational and social consequences of specific 
impairments in self-awareness.  It is hoped that alongside future research, the findings 
from this thesis will help to establish a more definitive account of self-awareness in 
ASD, and that a greater understanding of this area will eventually contribute to 
successful remediation of cognitive and behavioural impairments in this disorder.  
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(2009) 
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Appendix 1:  Details of the coding scheme used to score the Animations Task, 
based on the coding scheme Abell, Happé and Frith (2000).   
General Rules  
 
Each description is scored 2, 1, or 0 according to how accurately it reflects the sequence. 
2 = spot-on description of the story or the actions represented; can be concise 
just capturing gist, or can be discursive. 
1 = partial description of the sequence; description is related to the sequence, 
but imprecise or incomplete. 
0 = bizarre descriptions, plainly wrong descriptions, and responses that focus 
solely on a minor unimportant aspect of the sequence. 
 
Specific Rules - Random movement sequences 
 
Floating/Bouncing: Character roles: just triangles (both sequences without enclosure) 
2 = anything implying random or purposeless movement including moving, 
bouncing, just dancing. 
1 = purposeful movement without interaction, including turning round and 
getting dizzy, dancing in a circle. 
0 = purposeful movement implying interaction between the triangles including 
copying each other; avoiding each other. 
 
Specific Rules - Goal directed movement sequences 
 
Fighting: Character roles: two deer.  No enclosure. 
2 = action implying physical fight, e.g., bashing each other. 
1 = action that conveys the idea of a conflict, but is too specific or too vague, e.g., 
biting; pushing. 
0 = action that does not relate to conflict, e.g., following each other. 
Following: Character roles: mother duck and duckling.  Enclosure. 
2 = description which conveys following each other. 
1 = description that is related to but somewhat remote from following, e.g., 
copying; chasing. 
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0 = action that does not relate to following each other, e.g., jumping. 
Chasing: Character roles: two cats.  Enclosure. 
2 = description that conveys the idea of a chase. 
1 = description that is related to but somewhat remote from chasing. 
0 = action that does not relate to chasing, e.g., going up and down. 
Dancing: Character roles: two ponies.  No enclosure. 
2 = description that conveys the idea of moving in formation, e.g., dancing; 
making a pattern. 
1 = description that is partially correct or related to dancing, e.g., doing different 
things e.g., one went one way, the other went the other way. 
0 = action that is not related to moving in formation, e.g., galloping along. 
 
Specific Rules - ToM movement sequences 
 
Surprising: Character roles: grandma and grandson.  Enclosure. 
2 = any mention of boy tricking, surprising his grandma; hiding, hide and seek. 
1 = description which gives part of the story but misses the critical point (see 
above). 
0 = description which gives only minor part of action e.g., knocking on the door, 
or does not relate to any of the events in the sequence. 
Coaxing: Character roles: mother and child.  Enclosure. 
2 = description that conveys child's reluctance to go out and mother's attempts 
to get child out, e.g., persuading. 
1 = partially correct description focussing on one aspect of the story or one 
character only, e.g., child does not want to go out; or, mother is pushing child to 
go out. 
0= actions that do not relate to the events or relate to a minor aspect of the 
sequence only, e.g., dancing together, or unrelated description.. 
Mocking: Character roles: teacher and boy.  No enclosure. 
2 = description that conveys that boy is copying teacher without the teacher 
noticing, including pretending, hiding, being naughty. 
1 = partially correct, e.g., following, copying. 
A p p e n d i c e s  | 272 
 
 
0 = focus on a single unimportant event, e.g., boy ran away, or unrelated 
description. 
Seducing: Character roles: girl prisoner and guard.  Enclosure. 
2 = description that conveys the girl prisoner luring, persuading or tricking the 
guard. 
1 = partial story with minimal action for each character, e.g., girl trying to escape; 
guard blocking. 
0 = description which focusses on unimportant event or is extremely minimal, 
e.g., she got out, or unrelated description.    
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Appendix 2:  Details of the coding scheme used to score the Strange Stories task 
based on the scoring criteria outlined in White, Hill, Happé and Frith (2009). 
General Rules  
2= Full and complete aswer. 
1= incomplete or partially correct answer. 
0= incorrect answer. 
 
Specific Rules- Theory of Mind Stories 
 
ȋǲǫǳȌǣ 
2 = reference to fact that other army will not believe and hence look in other ǡǯǯǯǡ
to double bluff. 
1 = ȋǯȌ. 
0 = reference to motivation that misses the point of double bluff (he was scared). 
 
ȋǲǫǳȌǣ 
2 = reference to persuasion, manipulating feelings, trying to induce guilt  ? pity. 
1 = reference to outcome (to sell them or get rid of them in a way which implies 
not drowning) or simple motivation (to make Jill sad).   
0 = reference to general knowledge or dilemma without realization that the 
statement was. ȋǯȌ. 
 
Specific rules- Phsyical Stoires 
 
ȋǲǫǳȌǣ 
2 = reference to both weather conditions and either relative ground superiority 
or inability ǯȋs of armies 
unimportant). 
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1 = reference either to weather or relative superiority on ground versus air 
(because it was foggy); nothing about why weather makes it especially difficult 
for planes or nothing about planes being affected more than tanks; reference to 
fog to justify incorrect response (the aeroplanes won because the fog meant they 
could hide from the tanks). 
0 = reference to irrelevant or incorrect information (they won because they had 
better planes); justifications for why tanks are better than planes. 
 
ȋǲǫǳȌǣ 
2 = reference to animal which the burglar disturbed setting off alarm by crossing 
beam (type of animal unimportant). 
1 = reference to burglar setting off alarm (he was startled by the animal so 
crossed the beam); reference to animal setting off alarm without explaining it 
crossed the beam (he trod on a cat and it set off the alarm).  ? éȋǯ
alarm); alternative reasons for alarm going off (a security camera saw him and 















Appendix 3: Coding system used to code the Twenty Statements Task, based on 
the coding scheme outlined in Rhee et al., (1995).   






1.  Trait    
Pure (e.g., kind, friendly) Psychological Abstract Autonomous 
Qualified    
        Contextualised (e.g., at home) Psychological Specific Social 
        Temporal (e.g., sometimes) Psychological Specific Social 
2.  Social Identity    
Role Status (e.g., student) / Specific Social 
Family Info (e.g., sister, dad) / Specific Social 
Ethnicity/race/nationality / Specific Social 
Gender (e.g., boy, female) Physical Specific Social 
Self-ascribed identities (e.g., dancer) / Specific Social 
Origin (e.g., from Scotland) / Specific Social 
Religion (e.g., a Buddhist)  / Specific Social 
Occupation (e.g., a lecturer) / Specific Social 
Negation (e.g., not a Christian) / Specific Social 
Name (e.g., I am Josh) / Specific Autonomous 
Sexual Orientation (e.g., homosexual) / Specific Social 
3.  Specific Attribute    
Preferences (e.g., interests, likes)    
        Autonomous Psychological Specific Autonomous 
        Social Psychological Specific Social 
Aspirations (e.g., hopes wishes)    
        Autonomous Psychological Specific Autonomous 
        Social Psychological Specific Social 
Activities (e.g., habits, activities)    
        Autonomous / Specific Autonomous 
        Social / Specific Social 
4.  Evaluative Description    
Autonomous (e.g., good at maths) / Specific Autonomous 
Social (a good friend)  / Specific Social 
5.  Physical descriptions    
Descriptive (e.g., tall, blonde) Physical Specific Autonomous 
Age  Physical Specific Autonomous 
Factual (e.g., height, weight) Physical Specific Autonomous 
Physical condition (e.g., long-sighted) Physical Specific Autonomous 
6.  Emotional State    
Autonomous (e.g., worried) Psychological Abstract Autonomous 
Social (e.g., in love) Psychological Specific Social 
7.  Peripheral Information /   
Immediate situations (e.g., tired) / Specific Autonomous 
Present residence (e.g., live at home) / Specific Social 
Other's descriptions  / Specific Social 
Possessions (e.g., clothes) / Specific Autonomous 
8.  Global Descriptions    
Universal (e.g., human, earthling) / Abstract Social 
Existential (e.g., I am me) / Abstract Autonomous 
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